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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines potential time variance of the Pricing-to-market (PTM) and Exchange 
rate pass-through (ERPT) from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. We argue that 
the response of the export and import prices to the exchange rate is time dependent. We 
develop three models that justify the inconstancy of the PTM and ERPT. The first model 
represents a partial equilibrium theoretic framework where the existence of the cost of 
switching between substitutes generates structural breaks in the ERPT parameters. This 
model is subsequently tested by applying the threshold regression framework of Hansen 
(1999) to data on the US imports from selected European economies. The second model is 
a partial equilibrium model of export pricing where consumers dislike price volatility. 
Through solving the firm’s profit maximization problem we show that the volatility of the 
exchange rate undermines the stability of the response of the export price to currency 
movements. This model is tested using data on the UK exports to the EU and four out-of-
sample forecasting tests, namely fixed, rolling, recursive and random walk coefficient time 
varying parameter regressions. The third model represents a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model with subsistence points in consumption and investment. It features two 
countries and two types of firm – local currency pricing and producer currency pricing. 
Through maximizing the household’s utility and firms’ profits we show that the extent of 
the PTM and ERPT is time varying and depends on the unstable response of the mark-up 
of price over the marginal cost to currency movements. In order to illustrate the 
inconstancy of the mark-up for both firm types, we compute the impulse responses of the 
mark-ups to positive shocks to consumer preferences and production technology. Our 
findings on the time variance of the PTM and ERPT have important policy implications. 
Since the degree of the PTM and ERPT into import prices affects the extent of the rise of 
the domestic price level following the devaluation of the domestic currency, monetary 
policy should consider potential time evolution of the PTM and ERPT in order to control 
inflation. 
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Introduction 
 
The phenomena of Pricing-to-market (PTM) and Exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) were 
developed in the literature to describe the responsiveness of internationally traded goods’ 
prices to exchange rate movements. The ERPT is defined as the percent change in the 
import price in response to a one percent change in the exchange rate (Campa and 
Goldberg, 2002). The PTM hypothesis emerged in Krugman (1986) to justify the puzzling 
evidence suggesting an incomplete ERPT whereby import prices fail to move one-to-one 
with the exchange rate. Specifically, Krugman (1986) defined the PTM as the policy of 
price discrimination by foreign firms across export destinations. The purpose of this 
international price discrimination is to stabilize import prices during the importer's 
currency appreciation or depreciation. Thus, an incomplete ERPT reflects the presence of 
the PTM (Obstfeld, 2001). 
 
The motivation behind studying the phenomena of PTM and incomplete ERPT stems from 
their ability to justify international price differentials. Specifically, they represent a handy 
tool for explaining one of the major macroeconomic puzzles, i.e. the failure of the 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). PPP implies that the aggregate price level in 
country A should equal the aggregate price level in country B , if both price levels are 
converted to a common currency (Rogoff, 1996). The underpinning assumption of the PPP 
is the Law of One Price (LOP), which suggests that, for any good i , the price paid by 
customers in country A  would equal the price faced by consumers in country B , when both 
prices are expressed in a common currency. 
 
The LOP holds in the absence of the international price discrimination. The LOP can be 
represented as 
exp
itt
imp
it psp  ,                                    (1) 
where ts denotes the exchange rate in units of the importer’s currency per unit of the 
exporter’s currency, impitp and
exp
itp define prices paid by the importer and exporter, 
respectively, for good i. Therefore, the LOP implies that the price differential between the 
two countries must equal zero, i.e. 0exp  itt
imp
it psp .  
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However, international trade is likely to imply additional costs imposed by the existence of 
trade barriers that are constant over time (Goldberg and Knetter, 1997). Thus, a more 
realistic version of the LOP suggests that these fixed barriers denoted by drive a stable 
disparity between the two prices when expressed in a common currency: 
exp
itt
imp
it psp  .                                    (1a) 
Taking logs and first-differences of the LOP (1a) gives 
 exploglog ittimpit psp  .                    (2) 
The first-difference operator, , applied to any variable X is defined as 1 ttt XXX .  
The log-differenced LOP (2) rules out international price differentials for the same product 
after the effect of trade barriers, , has been taken into account.  
 
For instance, consider a US good i exported to the UK and Germany. Normalizing 
parameter to1 in the LOP (1a) for the simplicity of exposition gives the following import 
prices: 
USD
it
USDGBP
it
GBP
it psp
, ,                               (3) 
USD
it
USDEURO
it
EURO
it psp
, ,                             (4) 
where GBPitp and
EURO
itp denote the import prices in the UK (in Great British Pounds) and 
Germany (in EURO), respectively. USDitp is the export price expressed in US dollars. 
USDGBP
its
, and USDEUROits
, stand for the exchange rates calculated as the number of units of GBP 
and EURO, respectively, per one USD. Equations (3) and (4) jointly imply the following 
relationship between the import prices in the UK and Germany: 
USDEURO
it
EURO
it
USDGBP
it
GBP
it
s
p
s
p
,,
 .                              (5) 
Equation (5) suggests that the import price paid by the UK customers is equivalent to the 
import price faced by the German customers when both prices are expressed in USD. Thus, 
the LOP equalizes import prices across the export destination countries after all prices have 
been converted to the same currency. 
 
Evidence suggests that the LOP rarely holds in the actual data (Rogoff, 1996). In fact, 
international price differentials for the same product are large and persistent. Table A 
displays log-differences of the retail prices of roasted coffee in various importing countries 
from 2001 to 2011. Annual average price data was obtained from the International Coffee 
Organization Statistics. Roasted coffee was chosen due to its relatively homogeneous 
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nature, whereby the product characteristics do not vary significantly across importing 
countries. In the absence of substantial product differences across countries, inernational 
price diffferentials are less likely to occur. 
 
Table A 
USD retail prices of roasted coffee in log-differences (2001-2011) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
AT -0.04 -0.03 0.11 0.05 0.12 0.09 0.03 0.11 0.38 -0.04 0.22 
BE -0.07 0.02 0.16 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.13 0.11 -0.04 -0.02 0.22 
CY 0.00 0.12 0.19 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.07 -0.06 -0.05 0.05 
CZ -0.15 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.27 -0.11 -0.03 0.27 
DK -0.08 -0.03 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.11 -0.02 0.03 0.24 
FI -0.15 -0.07 0.15 0.09 0.19 0.04 0.10 0.13 -0.06 0.05 0.37 
FR -0.07 0.04 0.19 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.14 0.12 -0.02 -0.04 0.13 
DE -0.07 0.03 0.15 0.05 0.20 0.06 0.08 0.09 -0.08 0.00 0.07 
IT -0.03 0.05 0.18 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.11 -0.02 -0.04 0.15 
LV -0.19 -0.02 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.20 0.03 0.00 0.35 
LU -0.04 0.05 0.21 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.10 -0.03 -0.03 0.15 
PL -0.09 -0.20 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.23 0.24 -0.24 0.04 0.13 
PT -0.03 0.00 0.17 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.08 0.11 -0.07 -0.07 0.08 
SK -0.08 -0.03 0.12 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.24 0.26 0.01 -0.05 0.22 
SI -0.15 0.02 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.13 0.10 -0.04 -0.10 0.11 
ES -0.06 0.02 0.15 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.11 -0.03 -0.06 0.12 
SE -0.18 0.01 0.14 0.05 -0.03 0.05 0.11 0.06 -0.06 0.12 0.34 
JP -0.41 -0.06 0.01 0.07 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.32 0.05 0.14 
NO -0.04 0.08 0.12 0.10 0.07 -0.05 0.14 0.05 -0.15 0.11 0.26 
Value 
range 
0.41 0.32 0.2 0.11 0.26 0.14 0.25 0.24 0.7 0.22 0.32 
Vari-
ance 
0.008 
 
0.004 0.004 0.001 
 
0.005 0.002 
 
0.003 
 
0.005 
 
0.018 
 
0.003 
 
0.009 
 
Notes: 1. Country abbreviations – AT (Austria), BE (Belgium), CY (Cyprus), CZ (Czech Republic), DK 
(Denmark), FI (Finland), FR (France), DE (Germany), IT (Italy), LV (Latvia), Luxembourg (LU), Poland 
(PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Japan (JP), Norway (NO). 
2. Log-difference of retail price rt is computed as (ln rt – ln rt-1). 3. Data on the retail prices of roasted coffee 
was obtained from the International Coffee Organization Statistics. 
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Examining data in Table A column by column yields substantial retail price disparities 
among the countries importing roasted coffee, although the LOP suggests that the log-
differences of import prices should be equal across countries in any given year. Two 
measures of dispersion are considered in Table A – range and variance. The range of 
values is defined as the distance between the maximum and minimum values of the log-
differenced import price among all countries in one year. The largest range of values for 
the log-differences of the USD coffee prices was observed in 2009 – [-0.32; 0.38]. The 
smallest range corresponds to 2004 – [0.00; 0.11]. Thus, years 2004 and 2009 offer the 
smallest and largest levels of the international price dispersion, respectively. Therefore, 
data for 2004 mimics the LOP more successfully, compared to all other years, since the 
LOP (2) implies that the international range of values of the log-differenced import prices 
equals zero, i.e.   0loglog ,  yityxitxit psp for each pair of countries, {x; y}. 
 
Similarly, the cross-country variance of log-differenced coffee prices should equal zero 
under the LOP. The last row of Table A reports the annual cross-country variance of coffee 
prices in log-differences. Denoting the log-difference of retail price in country i by ix , the 
sample mean average by x and the sample size (number of countries) by n , variance is 
computed as 
 
1
var 1
2





n
xx
n
i
i
.              (6) 
Under the LOP, variance (6) equals zero since xxi  as there are no international price 
differentials, i.e. ni xxxx  ...21 . Variance operator delivers the same conclusion on 
the international price dispersion as the range measure. Specifically, the largest cross-
country variance of prices was observed in 2009, while the smallest variance corresponds 
to 2004. This finding confirms that the LOP fits the coffee price data for 2004 more 
accurately than in other periods. 
 
In order to illustrate international price dispersions for roasted coffee, in Figure A we 
display the log-differenced retail price differentials for ten pairs of importers. Price 
differential between countries X andY  for good i is computed as 
USDY
it
USDX
itit ppalDifferenti
,, loglog  .        (7) 
The superscriptUSD indicates that prices in both countries are expressed in US dollars. The 
LOP suggests that the international price differential between any two countries is equal to 
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zero. Figure A illustrates that only the Japan-Sweden and Norway-Japan price differentials 
remain close to the zero boundary. In all others country pairs we observe substantial 
deviations from the LOP: 
Figure A 
International retail price differentials for roasted coffee 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-0.5
0
0.5
Belgium-Austria price differential
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-0.5
0
0.5
Czech-Cyprus price differential
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-0.2
0
0.2
Finland-Denmark price differential
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-0.2
0
0.2
Germany-France price differential
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-0.2
0
0.2
Latvia-Italy price differential
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-0.5
0
0.5
Poland-Luxembourg price differential
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-0.2
0
0.2
Slovakia-Portugal price differential
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-0.1
0
0.1
Spain-Slovenia price differential
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-0.5
0
0.5
Japan-Sweden price differential
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-0.5
0
0.5
Norway-Japan price differential
 
Note: This figure displays differences between log-differenced import prices of two countries (in USD). Data 
was retrieved from International Coffee Organization Statistics.  
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The overwhelming evidence on the violations of the LOP and PPP can be justified by 
employing the theory of PTM and incomplete ERPT. Specifically, the fundamental idea of 
the PTM hypothesis represents persistent international price differentials for the same 
commodity due to price discrimination by exporters. Consequently, since a country’s 
consumption basket contains goods that are subject to the PTM, we observe persistent 
differences in aggregate price levels across countries. 
 
In addition to motivating the deviations from the PPP, the incomplete ERPT has a direct 
policy implication for the debate on inflation. Specifically, import price movements 
generate fluctuations in the domestic price level. Intuitively, the larger the proportion of 
goods exhibiting an incomplete ERPT, the weaker the increase of the home aggregate price 
index following the domestic currency depreciation (Betts and Devereux, 1996). Likewise, 
a higher pass-through causes a stronger increase of the aggregate price level following the 
depreciation. Therefore, a reasonably accurate estimate of the ERPT allows conducting a 
more informed monetary policy. First, the awareness of the prevailing ERPT degree allows 
policy makers to accurately assess the impact of planned currency devaluation on domestic 
inflation. For example, in a country with a low pass-through environment, currency 
devaluation and the resulting depreciation will generate a relatively small increase in the 
aggregate price level, since the depreciation of the domestic currency leads to an 
insignificant rise in the domestic price level. Second, observations on the ERPT enable the 
central bank to choose a more appropriate inflation target. For example, it may not be 
feasible to achieve a low inflation target in a country with a high ERPT level while the 
domestic currency is continuously depreciating. 
 
This thesis attempts to make a theoretical and empirical contribution to the literature by 
examining the PTM and incomplete ERPT from a non-linear perspective. Specifically, we 
analyze time variance of the response of traded goods’ prices to exchange rate movements 
and develop new tests of international price discrimination.  
 
This thesis contains 5 Chapters. Chapter 1 reviews benchmark theoretic and empirical 
models of the PTM and ERPT in order to introduce the linear framework of export pricing 
before we proceed to developing non-linear tests of incomplete ERPT in subsequent 
chapters.  
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Chapter 2 develops a two-regime partial equilibrium model of inconstant ERPT, which 
features the costs of switching to a substitute variety. We argue that the ERPT follows a 
two regime process. In the first regime, the ERPT is high because consumers’ costs of 
switching to a different supplier are relatively large. Since the exporter is unlikely to lose 
customers in this regime, he allows a relatively large pass-through of a currency change 
into the import price. In the second regime, the ERPT falls because the cost of switching is 
relatively low. Since the customer is likely to switch to a rival firm, the exporter decreases 
his mark-up of price over the marginal cost and limits the ERPT into import prices.  
 
This model is tested using the recently developed threshold regression methodology by 
Hansen (1999). This methodology allows us to detect structural breaks in the ERPT by 
searching over a grid of potential values for the threshold in order to minimize the 
concentrated sum of squared errors. The significance of the threshold estimate is tested 
using bootstrap p-values for the F1 statistic which is used to test the null hypothesis of no 
structural change in the ERPT coefficient. 
 
Chapter 3 develops another partial equilibrium model of export pricing. We adopt 
Krugman’s hypothesis about consumers’ preference for price stability (Krugman, 1986) 
and build a time varying relationship between the export price and the exchange rate. We 
suggest that the response of the export price to currency fluctuations depends on the 
volatility of the import price. Since the volatility of the import price is likely to be unstable 
because of an inconstant volatility of the exchange rate, the effect of the exchange rate on 
the export price is also likely to be time varying.  
 
Time variation of the PTM is tested using a selection of out-of-sample forecasting tests 
which vary in their degrees of parameter evolution. We chose this class of tests because re-
estimating the regression parameters over time is essential when parameter constancy is 
under question (Rossi, 2006). Our empirical analysis is conducted to answer two research 
questions. The first question is to determine whether the PTM model offers a significantly 
lower average forecast error than a rival specification. The statistical significance of the 
difference between the average prediction errors of rival models is tested using the forecast 
encompassing test by Clark and McCracken (2001). The second research question is 
whether regressions with time varying parameters predict export prices better than fixed 
parameter regressions. A positive answer to both questions will enable us to conclude that 
selected goods are subject to a time varying PTM. 
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Chapter 4 builds a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of an 
inconstant PTM and ERPT. We borrow the concept of subsistence points in consumption 
and investment from Ravn et al. (2006) and consider two types of firm – producer currency 
pricing and local currency pricing. By solving the optimization problem of the utility 
maximizing households and profit maximizing firms we show that the degree of the PTM 
and ERPT is inconstant due to the countercyclical nature of the mark-up of price over the 
marginal cost. Specifically, the response of the export and import prices to the exchange 
rate is time varying because it depends on the effect of currency movements on the 
aggregate demand in the two countries.  
 
In order to illustrate the inconstant and countercyclical nature of the mark-up, we simulate 
the impulse response of the mark-up of price over the marginal cost to positive shocks to 
consumer preferences and production technology. The purpose of this simulation is to 
determine whether the LCP and PCP mark-ups respond to positive shocks differently. We 
intend to show that both mark-ups fall at the time of the positive shock and gradually 
increase as the effect of the positive shock fades away. Thus, irrespective of the firm type, 
the degree of the PTM and ERPT is inconstant in our model, contrary to the stylzed models 
that predict zero pass-through in the LCP and constant ERPT equal to 1 in the PCP case 
(Gopinath et al., 2010). 
 
Chapter 5 summarizes the main theoretic and empirical findings of this study and briefly 
discusses their policy implications. Specifically, we examine whether the effect of a 
domestic currency devaluation on the home inflation rate depends on structural breaks in 
the ERPT and PTM. We conclude that failure to take into account potential time evolution 
in the PTM and ERPT parameters may lead the policy maker to lose the control over the 
domestic inflation. 
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1. Chapter 1: Benchmark Models 
of the PTM and ERPT 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces the theory of PTM and ERPT by surveying a selection of the most 
influential theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature. First, it outlines partial 
equilibrium models whereby exchange rate changes are viewed as exogenous (Kasa, 1989). 
Second, it surveys general equilibrium frameworks whereby exchange rates and prices are 
determined simultaneously. This chapter concludes by reviewing seminal econometric 
specifications used to estimate the degree of PTM and ERPT. 
 
1.2 Partial equilibrium models 
 
The benchmark theory of PTM was developed by Krugman (1986) in order to justify the 
increase of the US prices of imported European luxury automobiles despite the US dollar 
appreciation. He proposed several partial equilibrium frameworks justifying an incomplete 
ERPT. Section 1.2.1 outlines in detail Krugman’s model of the monopolistic price 
discrimination, since this set-up serves as a basis for subsequent studies of the PTM 
(Knetter, 1989). Sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 discuss alternative frameworks explaining an 
incomplete ERPT.  
 
1.2.1 Demand elasticity hypothesis (Krugman, 1986) 
 
Consider a European monopolistic firm producing at a constant marginal cost, *c , which is 
fixed in European Currency Units (ECU). The monopolist’s product is sold either in the 
European Community (EC) or in the US. The prices paid by the European and American 
consumers are denoted by 
*P (in ECU) and P (in USD), respectively. The exchange rate,e , 
is measured as the number of ECU per US dollar. The monopolistic firm sets a unique 
optimal price for each market. In order to determine the optimal pricing rules, the 
monopolist’s profits (1) must be maximized with respect to prices, *P and P . 
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The firm’s profits, , represent the difference between the revenues from selling in both 
markets and the production costs: 
   **** cePDcPD  ,                                      (1) 
where  ** PD and  PD  denote the demands in the EC and US, respectively. The optimal 
level of the price *P must satisfy the following first-order condition: 
0
*
*
*
*
*
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P
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.                               (2) 
Multiplying both sides of the condition (2) by 





*
*
D
P
and denoting the demand 
elasticity, 
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P
D
, by *E  yields 
    0*****  EcEPP .                                       (3) 
Consequently, the optimal price for the EC market is defined as 
*
*
*
*
1
c
E
E
P

 .                                                               (4) 
Thus, within the monopolistic price discrimination, price is modelled as a mark-up over the 
marginal cost. The extent of the mark-up falls in the demand elasticity,
*E . 
 
Similarly, the optimal level of the price P must correspond to the first-order condition 
0* 







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P
D
c
P
D
ePeD
P

.                                     (5) 
Multiplying both sides of the condition (5) by 





D
P
and defining the demand 
elasticity, 








D
P
P
D
, by E  gives the optimal price for the US market 
e
c
E
E
P
*
1
 .          (6) 
Thus, the optimal level of price P represents a mark-up over the marginal cost expressed in 
the importer’s currency (USD). Similarly to the mark-up charged in the EC, the US mark-
up (6) decreases in the importer’s demand elasticity, E . 
 
The optimal price rule (6) provides an insight into the ERPT into US import prices. 
Consider an increase in the exchange rate e , i.e. an appreciation of the USD. The optimal 
price rule (6) suggests that price P is decreasing in the exchange rate e . The extent of the 
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price decrease following the USD appreciation depends on the shape of the demand curve, 
since the price mark-up,
1E
E
, may respond to price fluctuations generated by the 
appreciation. Note that the mark-up represents a function of the price elasticity of the 
demand, E. 
 
If the demand elasticity, E , is constant, price P falls in full proportion to the exchange rate 
movement. Using the log-transformation of the optimal price (6), the ERPT is computed as 
the derivative of the log-transformed P with respect to the log-transformed e  (Parsley, 
1993): 
  
1
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lnln1lnln
ln
ln *



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

e
ecEE
e
P
.     (7) 
Thus, assuming a constant demand elasticity yields a complete ERPT (7). Therefore, the 
degree of the PTM is zero as the exporter does not limit the degree of the ERPT. 
 
If the demand elasticity is not invariant to price, an appreciation of the exchange rate may 
generate a more or less than proportionate movement in price P. For a variable E , the 
ERPT is defined as  
    
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since the elasticity E is a function of price P, which in turn depends on the exchange rate e. 
Solving the equation (8) for ERPT gives 
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.       (9) 
Thus, depending on the responsiveness of the demand elasticity to price movements, 
i.e.
P
E
ln
ln


, the absolute value of the ERPT may either overshoot or undershoot 1.  
 
Therefore, Krugman (1986) suggests that the degree of the ERPT and PTM depends on the 
monopolist’s perception of the demand curve. If the demand is perceived to have a 
constant elasticity (see 7), a complete ERPT into import prices is observed, since the mark-
up is invariant to currency fluctuations. If the perceived shape of the demand curve is 
linear, the absolute value of the ERPT is always less than one-half (see Proof in Appendix 
1), since mark-up movements mitigate import price fluctuations.  
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As Krugman (1986) recognizes himself, the drawback of this PTM model is reflected in its 
heavy reliance on the assumptions about the shape of the demand schedule. Thus, the 
predictions of the model are not robust to its assumptions. Nevertheless, mark-up 
adjustments in response to shifts in the perceived elasticity of demand with respect to price 
became one of the dominant hypotheses justifying an incomplete ERPT. 
 
1.2.2 Foreign input hypothesis (Campa and Goldberg, 2002) 
 
The partial equilibrium framework outlined in section 1.2.1 concentrates on the effect of 
the structure of demand and assumes that the exporter’s costs are constant and irresponsive 
to exchange rate realizations. This assumption seems implausible, since the use of foreign 
inputs is prevalent in the modern globalized economy. Campa and Goldberg (2002) relax 
the assumption of constant marginal costs and argue that both the demand structure and the 
proportion of foreign inputs used in the production process are crucial for the degree of 
ERPT. Similarly to Krugman (1986), the exporter’s pricing rule represents a mark-up over 
the marginal cost: 
 ttt
x
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t
m
tx
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x
tt
m
t EYWC
P
P
EPEP ,,







  ,      (10) 
where mtP and
x
tP denote the import and export prices at period t . tE is the nominal exchange 
rate measured as the number of the importer’s currency units per unit of the exporter’s 
currency. An increase in Et suggests the appreciation of the exporter’s currency. The mark-
up xt represents a function of the import price relative to the domestic price index in the 
importer’s country, Pt. The exporter’s marginal cost,
x
tC , depends on the labour cost, tW , 
the importer’s GDP, tY , and the exchange rate.  
 
The main difference between this framework and the benchmark model by Krugman 
(1986) lies in the sensitivity of the marginal cost to currency fluctuations. In order to 
observe the cost channel of the ERPT, the elasticity of the import price (10) with respect to 
exchange rate is computed: 
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Using the identity xt
x
tt
m
t CEP  and rearranging the terms, the ERPT definition (11) can be 
simplified as follows: 
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where the second and third terms on the right hand side of the equation have been 
multiplied by 
x
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1
1
1  .        (13) 
 
The ERPT (13) definition shows the crucial role of  defining the sensitivity of the 
marginal cost to the exchange rate. Since the marginal cost, xtC , is expressed in the 
exporter’s currency, an appreciation of his currency leads to a fall in his expenditures on 
inputs purchased from the importing country, i.e. 0


t
x
t
E
C
and 0 . Thus, a higher 
responsiveness of costs to currency fluctuations generates a lower ERPT into import prices. 
Consider a US firm exporting to the Euro zone. Intuitively, when the share of European 
inputs in the exporter’s costs is large, the Euro costs, xttCE , do not fluctuate significantly 
with currency movements since the price of European inputs is set in Euro. Since the 
import price represents a mark-up over the Euro costs (see 10), the sensitivity of the Euro 
price to the exchange rate falls in the share of inputs imported from the Euro zone. Thus, 
the use of inputs purchased from the importer of the final good stabilizes the import price 
by mitigating its increase following the importer’s currency depreciation. 
 
1.2.3 Depreciation persistence hypothesis (Taylor, 2000) 
 
Both models outlined in the previous two sections represent a static framework that does 
not discriminate between permanent and temporary changes in the exchange rate. However, 
Taylor (2000) shows that the degree of the ERPT depends critically on the duration of the 
currency depreciation. He adopts the price stickiness hypothesis whereby a representative 
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firm producing a differentiated good does not reset its price every period. In contrast, the 
good’s price lasts for four periods following the price adjustment.  
 
Taylor (2000) assumes that a firm sells a differentiated product and maximizes the 
following expected profit function: 
     

 
3
0i
itititittt pxcxE   .      (14) 
The conditional expectations operator, tE , denotes an expected value, conditional on the 
information at time t . tx defines the price of the firm’s good and tp stands for the average 
market price. A random term t denotes shifts in demand and  is the slope of the linear 
demand function,  ttt px   . tc is the marginal cost of producing the good. The 
optimal level of price tx is found by maximizing the expected profits (14) according to the 
following first order condition: 
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Solving the equation (15) for the expectation of the optimal price gives 
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where we used the condition xt+i=xt, because the firm’s price set at time t is assumed to last 
for four periods, i.e. t
i
itt xxE 4
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Thus, a unit increase in the marginal cost tc leads to a rise in the optimal price tx by 0.125 
units. If the marginal cost depends on the exchange rate due to foreign input usage, the 
depreciation of the exporter’s currency generates higher expenditures on imported inputs. 
An increase in the marginal cost will be passed through into the optimal price, but the 
extent of the price increase will depend on the persistence of the depreciation.  
 
Taylor (2000) suggests modelling the marginal cost as a first order autoregression process 
with persistence parameter  : 
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11   ttt ucc  ,         (17) 
where 1tu is a random term whose expected value equals zero, i.e.   0itt uE . Using the 
cost process (17), the future marginal costs 2tc and 3tc are defined as 
  21
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Given the marginal cost definitions (18) and (19), the cost pass-through into the export 
price (16) is computed as follows: 
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The cost pass-through definition (20) sheds light on the importance of the persistence of 
the exporter’s currency depreciation. A smaller  , i.e. a lower persistence of the cost 
increase that follows the exporter’s currency depreciation reduces the pass-through (20). 
According to Taylor (2000), a temporary exchange rate depreciation corresponding to a 
low persistence   will not raise the price tx  substantially. The intuition behind the 
persistence of the exchange rate change is based on the belief of firms about future 
movements of the exchange rate (Krugman, 1986). If the exchange rate depreciation is 
believed to be temporary, firms will refrain from re-setting prices substantially, since the 
exchange rate is expected to return to the pre-depreciation level shortly. However, a more 
permanent depreciation reflected in a larger   will encourage the firm to adjust the price 
significantly, since the depreciation is expected to last in the long-run. Thus, the temporary 
nature of the exporter’s currency depreciation mitigates the price increase. 
 
1.3 General equilibrium models (Betts and Devereux, 1996) 
 
Unlike partial equilibrium models of the PTM and ERPT, general equilibrium models have 
more than one optimizing agent. In addition to profit-maximizing firms, a general 
equilibrium model features utility-maximizing consumers. Consequently, while the 
exchange rate is considered to be exogenous within a partial equilibrium framework, a 
general equilibrium model determines the exchange rate endogenously by solving the 
agents’ optimization problems.  
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This section outlines the seminal study of the incomplete ERPT in a general equilibrium 
context by Betts and Devereux (1996). Betts and Devereux (1996) build a two-country 
model of international price discrimination whereby a fraction s of firms set a separate 
price for the home and the foreign market. These firms are labelled “pricing-to-market” 
(PTM) firms. Since these firms set prices in the buyer’s currency, they are also referred to 
in the literature as local-currency-pricing (LCP) firms. The remaining firms denoted by 
fraction s1 represent non-PTM firms that apply the same price to both markets. This type 
of firm is commonly defined as producer-currency-pricing (PCP), since prices are set in the 
exporter’s currency. By solving the optimization problems of consumers and firms, Betts 
and Devereux (1996) show that fraction s defining the share of price-discriminating firms 
governs the degree of the ERPT into the aggregate price level.  
 
1.3.1 Consumers  
 
The domestic consumers maximize the utility (U) function 
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subject to their budget constraint 
TRMwhMPC  0 ,      (22) 
where C denotes a basket of consumption goods 
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where  ic defines the consumption of good i and  is price elasticity of the 
demand. M denotes nominal money balances, P defines the domestic consumer price 
index, h stands for total hours worked, w represents wage and oM is the initial money 
holding. In addition, consumers receive profits   from owning domestic firms and 
government transfer payments,TR . Parameters  and  determine marginal utility of real 
money holdings. Parameter governs marginal utility of leisure time, (1-h).  
 
The optimal level of good-specific consumption,  ic , is found by minimizing the total 
consumption expenditure,    diiciv
1
0
, subject to the consumption basket definition (23), 
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where  iv is the local currency price of good i . This minimization problem is described by 
the following Lagrangean: 
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Differentiating the Lagrangean (24) with respect to  ic yields the first order condition 
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Raising both sides of the equation (25) to the power   and using the definition (23) 
gives 
   icCiv 1    .         (24b) 
Solving equation (24b) for consumption  ic yields  
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Substituting the optimal level of consumption (25) into the consumption basket definition 
(23) implies that the Lagrange multiplier,  , equals the domestic price index, 
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Thus, the optimal level of consumption for good i is defined as 
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The optimal good-specific level of consumption (27) represents the demand function for 
good i, which suggests that demand falls in the relative price of the good, 
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In order to derive the ERPT, the optimal level of real money balances must be determined 
through the consumers’ optimization problem described by the Lagrangean 
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where is the Lagrange multiplier. The first order conditions with respect to nominal 
money balances and consumption are given by 
 
0
1
1
1
1










 



 

M
PM
L
,       (29) 
0
1



P
CC
L
 .         (30) 
The first order condition (30) implies that the Lagrange multiplier is defined as
PC
1
 . 
Substituting this definition into the first order condition (29) gives the optimal level of 
nominal money balances: 
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The optimality condition (31) suggests that real money holdings increase in the 
consumption level.  
 
Since foreign and domestic households by assumption have identical preferences and 
budget constraints, the optimal level of foreign nominal money balances is given by 
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  ,         (32) 
where
*M , *P and *C denote foreign nominal money balances, consumer price index and 
consumption, respectively. Before we derive the exchange rate from the domestic and 
foreign real money holdings, let us review the firms’ optimization problem. 
 
1.3.2 Firms 
 
Both PTM and non-PTM firms produce according to the linear technology 
ii Ahy  ,          (33) 
where iy denotes firm i ’s output and A represents a constant technology shock. 
Consequently, the average total cost of production equals  
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Thus, the average total cost (34) is increasing in the wage rate and falling in the technology 
shock. Since the PTM and non-PTM firms’ profit functions differ, we outline their profit 
maximization problems separately. 
 
1.3.2.1 PTM firms’ profit maximization problem 
 
A domestic PTM firm charges price ip from domestic consumers and price iq from foreign 
buyers. Since the PTM firm faces the demand function specified in (25), it maximizes the 
following profit function 
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where e stands for the exchange rate, i.e. units of the national currency per unit of the 
foreign currency. The first order conditions with respect to ip and iq are 
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Solving the first order conditions (36) and (37) for prices yields the following optimal 
pricing rules  
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Thus, optimal prices expressed in the firm’s currency, i.e. ip and ieq , represent a fixed 
mark-up over the cost,
A
w
. This mark-up is falling in the price elasticity of demand,  , 
because a more elastic demand implies a weaker market power of the firm. Moreover, it 
follows from definitions (38) and (39) that the LOP holds, i.e. ii eqp  . 
 
A foreign PTM firm maximizes an analogous profit function to (35) by charging 
price *ip from domestic customers and
*
iq from foreign customers: 
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The first order conditions with respect to prices *ip and
*
iq are given by 
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Solving the conditions (41) and (42) for prices *ip and
*
iq yields the optimal pricing rule 
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Consequently, the LOP holds for the foreign PTM good too, i.e. ** ii eqp  . Therefore, PPP 
holds in a flexible price environment, i.e. PeP * , because the LOP holds for both 
domestic and foreign PTM goods. First, the domestic PTM good’s price is identical across 
the two markets when common currency is used, i.e. ii eqp  . Second, the foreign PTM 
good’s price is the same in the two markets when expressed in the same 
currency, ** ii eqp   .  
 
Using the PPP definition, we can find the exchange rate from combining the domestic and 
foreign real money holdings (31) and (32):  
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The exchange rate e thus depends positively on the ratio between the domestic and foreign 
nominal money holdings, but falls in the ratio of the domestic consumption to foreign 
consumption. 
 
1.3.2.2 Non-PTM firms’ profit maximization problem 
 
A domestic non-PTM firm charges a unified price ip in both domestic and foreign markets. 
Consequently, the non-PTM firm chooses price ip to maximize its profits 
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Using the PPP identity, PeP * , the profit function (45) can be re-written as 
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The first order condition with respect to price ip  is represented by  
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Solving the equation (47) for ip yields the optimal price 
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Therefore, PTM and non-PTM firms (see 38) charge the same price mark-up over the 
marginal cost in the domestic market. 
 
A foreign non-PTM firm charges a unified price *iq from domestic and foreign customers 
and maximizes the profit function 
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where the PPP definition, PeP * , has been used to substitute for the exchange rate. The 
first order condition with respect to price *iq is 
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Solving the condition (50) for *iq gives the optimal export price 
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Thus, the foreign non-PTM firm sets price as a fixed mark-up over its cost, where the 
mark-up is identical to that charged by the domestic non-PTM producer. The optimal 
prices of PTM and non-PTM goods enable us to compute the ERPT into the domestic price 
level. 
 
1.3.3 ERPT into the domestic price level 
 
In order to derive the ERPT into the domestic price level, we need to transform the 
following price index: 
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Betts and Devereux (1996) use linear approximation around the zero shock equilibrium, 
where n and n1 denote the shares of domestic and foreign firms, respectively. Linear 
approximation implies that each variable X must be expressed as a percentage deviation 
from its steady-state value, X , i.e.
 
X
XX
X

ˆ . Thus, the price index (52) may be 
approximated as 
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Assuming a sticky price environment for computational simplicity gives 0ˆ ip , 
0ˆ * ip and 0ˆ
* iq . Thus, the response of the aggregate price index to the exchange rate 
equals 
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The ERPT (53a) only depends on the share of foreign non-PTM firms, which is denoted 
by   sn  11 . An increase in the fraction of foreign non-PTM firms leads to a larger rise 
in the price index (53) following the depreciation of the domestic currency. Intuitively, 
since import prices of the foreign non-PTM goods fluctuate with the exchange rate, the 
ERPT increases in the share of these goods in the consumption basket.  
 
The seminal framework of Betts and Devereux (1996) highlighted the importance of 
currency invoicing for the degree of ERPT by distinguishing between the PTM firms 
which set prices in the importer’s currency and the non-PTM firms that invoice prices in 
the exporter’s currency. However, the fractions of the PTM and non-PTM firms are 
exogenous constants. Bacchetta and Wincoop (2002) overcome the exogenous nature of 
the firm type by endogenously determining the optimal pricing strategy of the firm. They 
show that a representative firm sets prices in the currency that generates the highest 
expected utility of profits. Engel (2000) further accentuates the importance of the invoicing 
currency by showing that the choice of the optimal exchange rate regime depends on the 
share of the foreign non-PTM firms.  
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1.4 Econometric tests of PTM and ERPT  
 
The majority of econometric tests of the ERPT proposed in the literature consist of 
regressing a good’s import price on the exchange rate and a selection of independent 
variables contributing to the import price determination (Parsley, 1993). The exchange rate 
coefficient reflects the degree of the ERPT, since it shows the response of the import price 
to exchange rate movements. The size of the exchange rate coefficient also reflects the 
extent of PTM. Specifically, if exporters stabilize import prices against currency 
fluctuations, the response of the import price to the exchange rate will be reduced. Thus, 
both ERPT and PTM can be inferred from a regression of the import price on the exchange 
rate. 
 
Regressions of a good’s export price on the exchange rate and a set of independent 
variables are also widely used to analyze the degree of ERPT and PTM (Feenstra et al., 
1996). A statistically significant exchange rate coefficient that shows a decrease in the 
export price following the exporter’s currency appreciation serves as evidence of the PTM 
by the PCP firms. Specifically, a negative exchange rate coefficient implies that a fall in 
the export price stabilizes the import price by preventing it from increasing by the full 
amount of the appreciation. 
 
This section surveys prevailing econometric methodologies for detecting the PTM and 
incomplete ERPT in traded goods prices. 
 
1.4.1 Fixed effects panel data regression (Knetter, 1989) 
 
Knetter (1989) pioneered the method for testing the PTM and incomplete ERPT using 
time-series-cross-section data on US and German exports. His framework allows us to 
distinguish among three cases: (1) perfect competition with no price discrimination across 
importers; (2) imperfect competition with price discrimination and constant elasticity of 
demand; (3) imperfect competition with price discrimination and variable demand 
elasticity. He argues that the exchange rate has a significant impact on the export price 
only in the third case. 
 
Knetter (1989) considers a firm selling to N export destinations denoted by i and proposes 
the following fixed effects regression: 
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ititiitit usp  lnln   ,       (54) 
where itp denotes price in the exporter’s currency, t defines a time effect, i stands for a 
country effect, its is the exchange rate measured in units of the importer’s currency per unit 
of the exporter’s currency and itu is an error term. In a perfectly competitive economy, firm 
sets a single price for all export destinations since the export price should equal the 
marginal cost of production, i.e. 0i . Moreover, since the only determinant of the export 
price is the marginal cost, which does not depend on currency movements by assumption, 
the exchange rate coefficient is insignificant under the perfect competition hypothesis, 
i.e. 0i . Even if the marginal cost depended on the exchange rate, a time effect, t , 
would absorb marginal cost swings generated by currency movements, because these cost 
effects are common across destinations. 
 
In an imperfectly competitive world, export price represents a mark-up over the marginal 
cost (see 6) whereby the mark-up depends on the price elasticity of demand. Imperfectly 
competitive firms implement price-discrimination across destinations by generating 
international price differentials. The extent of this price-discrimination depends on the 
elasticity of the importer’s demand.  
 
If the demand elasticity is constant, the price mark-up over the marginal cost (6) is constant. 
Therefore, although mark-ups vary across destinations, they remain fixed and irresponsive 
to exchange rate movements. Thus, the null hypothesis of imperfect competition with 
constant demand elasticity suggests that 0i and 0i .  
 
However, if the price elasticity of demand is not constant, the destination-specific mark-
ups will respond to exchange rate movements. Specifically, an increase in its reflecting a 
depreciation of the importer’s currency raises the import price, which affects the elasticity 
of the importer’s demand. If the demand elasticity with respect to price increases as import 
price rises, the optimal mark-up (6) falls. Similarly, a fall in the demand elasticity 
following the import price rise generates a rise of the mark-up. Thus, the exchange rate 
coefficient, 0i , reflects the adjustment of the destination-specific mark-up to currency 
movements, whereby the mark-up responds to fluctuations in the demand elasticity. 
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Therefore, the presence of the PTM is reflected in the statistical significance of the 
coefficients i and i , since they show the degree of international price discrimination 
generated by mark-up differences across destinations. The expected sign of coefficient i is 
negative with PTM, since it would be reasonable for firms to protect their market share by 
a downward mark-up adjustment in order to limit the import price increase following the 
importer’s currency depreciation. However, Knetter (1989) also provides evidence of the 
increase in the export price despite the importer’s currency depreciation. Thus, instead of 
stabilizing the import price, in certain cases US exporters amplify the effect of the 
depreciation. 
 
As far as the ERPT is concerned, its dynamics can be predicted from the size of the 
exchange rate coefficient. A larger absolute magnitude of the negative 
coefficient i implies a lower ERPT, since a downward export price adjustment prevents 
the import price from increasing in proportion to the exchange rate movement. 
 
The innovation of Knetter (1989) lies in his attempt to avoid a direct measurement of the 
marginal cost and mark-up with accounting data, which is susceptible to measurement 
errors. Instead of using highly aggregated data, he designs a fixed effects framework to 
infer mark-up behaviour from the response of the export price to the exchange rate and 
country effects. Knetter’s seminal study served as basis for subsequent empirical tests of 
PTM and ERPT. 
 
1.4.2 Three-stage least squares regression (Aw, 1993)    
 
As Knetter (1989), Aw (1993) focuses her attention on the mark-up behaviour, but expands 
the scope of analysis by attempting to estimate the actual size of the mark-ups charged by 
Taiwanese footwear exporters in selected destination markets. The mark-up of price ( tP ) 
over marginal cost ( tMC ) is modelled as a function of the demand elasticity,  , and the 
competitiveness of Taiwanese footwear producers in the importer’s market,  : 
ttt MCMCP


/1
1



 .       (55) 
The mark-up (55) increases in firm’s competitiveness and falls in the demand elasticity. In 
perfect competition, individual firms have no competitive advantage, i.e. 0 , and export 
price equals marginal cost. When parameter  becomes positive, i.e. exporter receives 
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market power, export price exceeds marginal cost. The deviation of the export price from 
the marginal cost is thus governed by the competitiveness parameter,  . Aw (1993) 
computes the mark-up (55) using estimated parameters from the inverse demand and 
generalized supply models.  
 
For example, consider Taiwanese footwear exports to Saudi Arabia. The demand for 
Taiwanese footwear in Saudi Arabia can be estimated as  
ttttttttttt eQSeSeGDPeQP   43210 ,    (56) 
where tP denotes export price, tQ defines volume of exports, te is exchange rate in Taiwan 
dollars per Saudi riyal, tS stands for price of substitute and t is an error term. The supply of 
Taiwanese footwear in Saudi Arabia can be described as 
  ttttttttt eQSPMPLPKYP   4154321 ,  (57) 
where tY represents the total output of footwear and  is an index measuring the 
competitiveness of Taiwanese producers in the Saudi market. tPK , tPL and tPM denote 
respectively prices of capital, labour and materials used by Taiwanese producers. t refers 
to a disturbance term. Constructing the supply and demand relationships for four export 
destinations yields a system of 8 equations estimated with three-stage least squares.  
 
Estimated parameters from regressions (56) and (57) are used to construct the Lerner index 
measuring the mark-up of price over the marginal cost: 


L ,          (58) 
where  is the estimated competitiveness parameter from (57) and the elasticity  is 
computed from coefficients in regression (56) as  
S
QP
41
/

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
 .         (59) 
 
A bar over a variable in equation (59) denotes average value over the sample period. 
Lerner index governs the extent of the mark-up over the marginal cost. Under perfect 
competition, L is zero because firms have no competitive advantage (i.e.  is zero) and 
elasticity equals infinity as all goods in the industry become perfect substitutes for each 
other. Consequently, export price (55) equals marginal cost and there is no mark-up over 
the marginal cost. Under imperfect competition, 0L  because the competitiveness 
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measure,  , is positive and industry goods are imperfect substitutes for each other, 
i.e.  . Therefore, a positive mark-up of price over the marginal cost is charged. An 
increase in the Lerner index (58) implies an increase in the mark-up, 
 /1
1

. Thus, 
Lerner index represents a measure of the exporter’s market power. 
 
The empirical test of PTM amounts to determining the statistical significance of the Lerner 
index (58). If this index is significantly different from zero and varies across export 
destinations, the exporter is said to price-discriminate among importers by setting distinct 
mark-ups. Using standard errors evaluated at the sample mean, Aw (1993) finds that only 
the Lerner index corresponding to Taiwanese exports to Germany is significantly different 
from zero.  
 
The framework of Aw (1993) also allows drawing implications on the degree of ERPT into 
local currency prices of imported Taiwanese footwear. For cases exhibiting a zero 
competitiveness index, , the ERPT is likely to be complete, since exporters do not have 
the market power to absorb currency changes into the export price. This is obvious from 
the zero response of the export price (57) to exchange rate changes: 
  tt
t
t QS
e
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
.        (60) 
However, a non-zero competitiveness index,  , in the derivative (60) implies that the 
import price will fail to move one-to-one with the exchange rate, since the export price will 
be adjusted to the exchange rate. 
 
These predictions on the degree of the ERPT rest on the assumption that prices are fixed in 
the exporter’s currency. Since the import price equals
t
t
e
P
, knowing the response of the 
export price, Pt, to the exchange rate is sufficient for finding the degree of the ERPT into 
the import price. However, prices may also be invoiced in the importer’s currency. In order 
to analyze the ERPT with local currency pricing, instead of regressing the export price, we 
must regress the import price on the exchange rate and cost terms. 
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1.4.3 Error correction methodology (Frankel et al., 2012) 
 
Unlike Aw (1993) who predicts the degree of the ERPT into the import price from the 
response of the export price to the exchange rate, Frankel et al. (2012) directly estimate the 
ERPT into import prices using the following error correction equation in first-differences: 
t
p
j
c
kit
i
iti
i
titt
imp
t DDXECMECMXspsp     11exp21 ,(61) 
where imptp denotes log-transformed import price, ts defines log-transformed bilateral 
exchange rate measured in units of importer’s currency per unit of exporter’s currency, 
exp
tp stands for the good’s log-transformed price in the exporting 
country. exp1111   tt
imp
tt pspECM is error correction term measuring the past deviation 
from absolute price parity known as the LOP. ckD and
p
jD refer to country and product 
dummies, respectively, and t is regression error term. The dummies are included to 
accommodate omitted variables measuring factors that are specific to country or product. 
Finally, iX is a regressor matrix containing 9 additional independent variables: 1X  - time 
trend, 2X  - difference between the log of importing country’s per capita GDP and the log 
of exporting country’s per capita GDP, 3X  -  log-transformed tariff in importing country, 
4X  -   log-transformed distance between importer and exporter, 5X  -  difference between 
the log of importing country’s GDP and the log of exporting country’s GDP, 6X  -  log of 
real wage in importing country, 7X  -  log of inflation in importing country, 8X  -  standard 
deviation of previous log changes in ts , 9X  -  dummy variable for cases when US is 
importer. 
 
First, Frankel et al. (2012) consider an empty regressor matrix, iX . The specification (61) 
allows us to distinguish two exchange rate effects – contemporaneous and past. The ERPT 
of contemporaneous currency movements is defined by coefficient 1 showing the response 
of the log-differenced import price to the current log-differenced exchange rate. The effect 
of a past log-transformed exchange rate is defined by   where represents the speed of 
long-run reversion to the LOP, exptt
imp
t psp  . 
 
Successive addition of each regressor from the matrix iX to the regression (61) allows us to 
examine the determinants of the ERPT. For example, consider an interaction of 5X and ts . 
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The contemporaneous ERPT is given by  551 X  where the sign of the 
parameter 5 shows the effect of the GDP differential between importer and exporter on the 
ERPT. Suppose that 5X is negative, i.e. importing economy is smaller than exporting 
economy. A positive 5 indicates that a negative GDP differential contributes to reducing 
the degree of ERPT into import prices. A negative 5 implies that the ERPT is relatively 
large for importers whose GDP is lower than the exporter’s GDP. For a positive 5X , a 
positive 5 would indicate an increase in ERPT and a negative 5 would imply a reduction 
of ERPT, compared to the baseline ERPT, 1 . The empirical results of Frankel et al. (2012) 
suggest that a lower ERPT is observed in rich countries, compared to poor countries. 
 
While the statistical significance of the US dummy, 9X , is interpreted by Frankel et al. 
(2012) as evidence of PTM for exports to the US, the specification (61) does not allow us 
to measure the extent of mark-up discrimination due to the absence of a measure for 
exporter’s costs. Therefore, it has become common in recent studies on international price 
discrimination to incorporate both marginal cost and exchange rate into a price regression, 
in addition to controlling for other important determinants of ERPT.  
 
1.5 Non-linear models of PTM and ERPT 
 
The benchmark tests of PTM and ERPT assume that the relationship between prices and 
exchange rates is stable over time. As time-series econometricians developed methods for 
testing the stability in regression parameters, an interest for non-linearities in the PTM and 
ERPT emerged.  
 
Nogueira and Leon-Ledesma (2011) argue that the ERPT is higher during periods of 
macroeconomic instability in the importing country, since firms are concerned with a 
likely default of the importer. Therefore, firms do not limit substantially the ERPT into 
import prices, as investing into the loyalty of the market that is about to default does not 
yield benefits. In contrast, a favourable macroeconomic environment in the importing 
country is associated with a lower ERPT. Since firms expect a long-term trade with the 
stable partner, they reduce the ERPT by mark-up adjustment in order to retain customer 
loyalty. Thus, the ERPT depends non-linearly on the macroeconomic environment of the 
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importing country, whereby some threshold value of the market stability measure allows us 
to discriminate between favourable and unfavourable conditions.  
 
Nogueira and Leon-Ledesma (2011) test their hypothesis of non-linear ERPT by applying 
a logistic smooth transition model to Mexico’s data. Model parameters are estimated by 
nonlinear least squares in order to determine how the response of the CPI (Consumer Price 
Index) change to the exchange rate change differs across the two regimes.  The first regime 
representing an unstable macroeconomic environment is characterized by high (above-
threshold) values of EMBI+ spreads and real interest rate differentials with respect to the 
US. The second regime approximates macroeconomic stability and corresponds to low 
(below-threshold) values of the aforementioned two transition variables. The estimation 
results confirm the major predictions of the model. Specifically, Nogueira and Leon-
Ledesma (2011) show the existence of a positive non-linear relationship between the 
Mexican ERPT and the two proposed measures of macroeconomic instability.  
 
While the theoretic model of Nogueira and Leon-Ledesma (2011) a priori assumes a non-
linearity in the response of the ERPT to macroeconomic conditions, Gervais and Larue 
(2009) justify such non-linearity by solving the exporter’s profit-maximization problem in 
the presence of menu costs of price adjustment. Gervais and Larue (2009) argue that the 
menu costs of changing prices (e.g. translation services and legal advice) lead to non-linear 
rigidities in the response of prices to exchange rate movements. These fixed menu costs 
generate boundaries (thresholds) which divide the range of exchange rate fluctuations into 
two groups - small exchange rate changes and large exchange rate movements. Specifically, 
if the appreciation of the importer’s currency was significantly large (above-threshold), it 
would be profitable to raise the export price, because the menu cost is not large enough to 
offset the revenue gain from price adjustment. However, if the extent of appreciation was 
not big enough to exceed the threshold, it would not be reasonable to increase the export 
price, because the profit associated with the new price would be lower than the profit 
generated by the old price due to adjustment costs.  
 
Gervais and Larue (2009) test the non-linearity of the export price response to exchange 
rate movements using a two-regime threshold regression. Observations are sorted into the 
first regime if the corresponding absolute value of the exchange rate change, te , is less 
than or equal to the threshold, where an increase in et denotes the depreciation of the 
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importer’s currency. Consequently, the excess of te over the threshold defines the second 
regime. Applying sequential least squares to data on Canadian pork exports to the US and 
Japan confirms the theoretic predictions of Gervais and Larue (2009). They found that the 
likelihood ratio statistic rejects the null hypothesis of no threshold in 75% of the cases 
considered. Thus, the extent of the ERPT into the export price is regime-dependent. The 
negative sign of the pass-through coefficient in both regimes suggests that the export price 
falls with the depreciation of the importer’s currency. This finding is consistent with the 
benchmark theory of international price discrimination revisited in Nogueira and Leon-
Ledesma (2011) whose model suggests a downward adjustment in the mark-up of price 
over the marginal cost during periods of the importer’s currency depreciation. However, 
the estimation results of Gervais and Larue (2009) do not enable them to confirm the 
hypothesis that the export price is insensitive to exchange rate movements in the area 
between the two thresholds. On the contrary, the absolute value of the ERPT into the 
export price is larger in the first regime, compared to the second regime, in all equations.  
 
Correa and Minella (2006) explore the ERPT non-linearity caused by business cycle 
effects using a threshold autoregressive model. Their theoretic hypothesis is similar to the 
macroeconomic stability proposition by Nogueira and Leon-Ledesma (2011), while their 
econometric methodology belongs to the same category of tests as that adopted in Gervais 
and Larue (2009). Correa and Minella (2006) explore three possible factors causing non-
linearities in the ERPT – economic growth, exchange rate volatility and the direction of the 
nominal exchange rate change (appreciation versus depreciation). Thus, their first 
hypothesis of interest is whether the sensitivity of prices to exchange rates differs across 
economic booms and slowdowns. Their second research question explores how the extent 
of ERPT varies depending on the size of the exchange rate volatility. Their third objective 
is to determine whether the ERPT behaves differently across appreciations and 
depreciations of the importer’s currency. 
 
Adopting Brazilian data on the consumer price inflation, average nominal exchange rates 
(in units of national currency per US dollar) and output, they estimate the ERPT using 
three TAR specifications that differ in the threshold variable used to split data into two 
regimes. The first regime encompasses all observations for which the threshold variable 
does not surpass the threshold, while the second regime is distinguished by the excess of 
the threshold variable over its threshold. Correa and Minella (2006) use output gap, 
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exchange rate volatility and nominal exchange rate change as threshold variable and 
examine regression parameter switching across the two regimes.  
 
The estimation results of Correa and Minella (2006) confirm that the output gap generates 
non-linearities in the response of the domestic inflation to nominal exchange rates. 
Specifically, the ERPT is zero in the first regime but significantly positive when the output 
gap surpasses the threshold. Similarly, their findings suggest an asymmetric effect of 
exchange rate changes on inflation. In particular, inflation is irresponsive to small 
depreciations but reacts positively to large depreciations of the domestic currency. Correa 
and Minella (2006) explain that firms offset the effect of small depreciations on the import 
price by mark-up adjustment in order to retain their market shares. However, when the 
depreciation is large, the exporter may refrain from limiting the ERPT because mark-up 
adjustment causes substantial reductions in profit margins. Finally, prices were found to be 
irresponsive to exchange rates in periods of low exchange rate volatility. However, during 
high exchange rate instability the observed ERPT is positive. This finding contradicts the 
ERPT dynamics expected by Correa and Minella (2006). They suggest that exchange rate 
instability should lead to a low pass-through because, in an unstable environment, firms 
perceive exchange rate changes as transitory. Therefore, exporters are reluctant to pass-
through short-term currency changes into the local currency price because of costs 
associated with price adjustment.  Nevertheless, Correa and Minella (2006) provide robust 
evidence of non-linearities  in Brazilian ERPT by exploring various sources of such non-
linearities. 
 
1.6 Novelty of this study 
 
This thesis contributes to the emerging stream of literature on non-linearities in the ERPT 
and PTM by proposing three innovative approaches to modelling possible inconstancy in 
the response of traded goods prices to exchange rate movements.  
 
The first model suggests that consumers’ costs of switching between varities generate 
thresholds in the ERPT. To the best of our knowledge, while exporter’s costs of price 
adjustment have been frequently used to justify non-linear ERPT (Gervais and Larue, 
2009; Correa and Minella, 2006), switching costs have not been suggested as potential 
cause of ERPT thresholds. We argue that the ERPT is high when switching costs are 
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relatively high, because the exporter believes that consumer is unlikely to switch to a 
different supplier. Therefore, the exporter does not find it necessary to limit the ERPT, as 
his market share is unlikely to shrink. However, when the switching cost becomes 
relatively low, the exporter limits the import price increase following the importer’s 
currency depreciation because he fears that consumers may switch to a substitute. Thus, 
switching costs generate a two-regime ERPT. High pass-through regime is consistent with 
relatively high values of the switching cost, while relatively small switching costs lead to 
low ERPT. 
 
Our second model is innovative from both theoretic and empirical perspectives. First, we 
build a partial equilibrium model of export pricing where the volatility of the import price 
generates an inconstant degree of the PTM. Although the importance of the volatility of the 
import price for export pricing has been proposed in Krugman (1986), to the best of our 
knowledge, the link between price volatility and PTM has not been built into a model. We 
propose a new form of consumption function and solve firms’ profit maximization problem 
to show that the response of the export price to currency movements is unstable because of 
the import price volatility. 
 
Second, we develop a new empirical method for testing the significance of the PTM effect. 
Specifically, we examine the predictive content of the exchange rate for export prices using 
out-of-sample forecasting tests which are robust to parameter evolution – rolling, recursive 
and random walk coefficient time varying parameter regressions. The null hypothesis of no 
PTM is rejected if the ENC-NEW forecast encompassing test by Clark and McCracken 
(2001) suggests that the inclusion of the exchange rate in the model significantly reduces 
the average forecasting error of the model. The advantage of the out-of-sample forecasting 
approach is that it enables us to test the null hypothesis of no PTM in the situation when 
parameter stability is under question. Note that fixed parameter regressions are only 
suitable to test the PTM when the parameter constancy is ensured. To the best of our 
knowledge, forecast encompassing tests have not been used previously as test of PTM. 
 
The novelty of our third model lies in its attempt to justify inconstant PTM and ERPT 
within a general equilibrium framework. Specifically, the seminal general equilibrium 
model by Betts and Devereux (1996) generates a constant response of trade goods prices to 
the exchange rate, because the mark-up of price over the marginal cost is constant. In 
contrast, we adopt a time varying mark-up by borrowing the concept of subsistence 
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consumption from Ravn et al. (2006). Due to the existence of subsistence absorption, the 
mark-up of price over the marginal cost is countercyclical and falls in the aggregate 
demand. Therefore, fluctuations in the aggregate demand following currency movements 
generate variations in the mark-up. By solving the optimization problems of utility 
maximizing households and profit maximizing firms, we show that the countercyclical 
nature of the mark-up leads to instability in the degree of the PTM and ERPT irrespective 
of the currency in which prices are set (local currency or producer currency). 
 
Thus, this thesis attempts to contribute to the literature on non-linear ERPT and PTM in 
theoretical (both partial equilibrium and general equilibrium) and empirical aspects. First, 
we develop a new partial equilibrium model of non-linear ERPT with switching costs. 
Second, we offer a series of new tests of PTM, namely out-of-sample forecasting tests with 
time varying parameters. Finally, we build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model 
of inconstant PTM and ERPT with subsistence absorption. 
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2. Chapter 2: Does Competition 
Lead to Structural Breaks in the 
ERPT? 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explores potential non-linearities in the ERPT using a threshold regression 
framework developed in Hansen (1999). In addition, it offers a new model of structural 
breaks in the ERPT. In this set-up, the sensitivity of the import price to exchange rate 
movements depends non-linearly on the difference between the consumer’s cost of 
switching to a substitute good and the consumer’s gain from switching. This switching 
gain is defined as the excess of a variety’s import price over the import price of a substitute 
variety.  Thus, the switching gain represents the amount that consumer saves by changing 
to a cheaper supplier.  
 
Specifically, when the switching gain exceeds the switching cost, consumers receive an 
incentive to switch to a substitute variety. Consequently, a high likelihood of losing 
customers encourages the existing supplier to limit an import price increase resulting from 
the importer’s currency depreciation. As a result, the ERPT into import prices is weakened 
by a downward adjustment of the export price in order to retain customers. In contrast, 
when the switching gain fails to exceed the switching cost, customers are likely to continue 
buying from the existing supplier due to a relatively large cost of switching to a substitute. 
Consequently, a larger ERPT is allowed by exporters, since it is not imperative to limit 
import price rise when the danger of losing customers is low. 
 
Specifically, consider a two-regime process for the price differential between the imported 
variety and its substitute. In the first regime, the imported good is significantly expensive 
compared to a substitute variety produced in a different exporting country. The resulting 
price differential is large enough to exceed the switching cost. Consequently, the importer 
is likely to switch to a firm producing a cheaper brand in order to save on purchases. As a 
result, the current supplier is expected to offset the import price increase following the 
importer’s currency depreciation in order to prevent a loss of market share. In the second 
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regime, the imported good’s price may also be higher than a substitute variety’s price, but 
this price differential is insufficient to exceed the switching cost. Since in the presence of 
significant switching costs consumers are unable to switch to a cheaper brand, the exporter 
is unlikely to protect the import price from an increase. Thus, the extent of ERPT differs 
across the two regimes. 
 
This study tests for structural breaks in the ERPT into the US import prices of selected 
European traded commodities. We apply the threshold regression framework derived in 
Hansen (1999). Compared to other frameworks for inference in the presence of structural 
breaks, the advantage of this technique is two-fold. First, this framework was developed 
for cases when the value of the threshold parameter is unknown. Specifically, Hansen 
(1999) avoids an ad hoc choice of the threshold value by estimating threshold effects using 
least squares. Second, this methodology enables us to overcome the difficulties caused by a 
non-standard asymptotic distribution of threshold estimates. Namely, it allows us to test the 
significance of threshold estimates using the asymptotic distribution of the likelihood ratio 
test simulated with bootstrap replications.  
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 develops a partial equilibrium set-up 
justifying a two-regime non-linear ERPT using the cost of switching between different 
varieties of the same product. Section 2.3 describes the threshold regression and bootstrap 
replication frameworks (see Hansen, 1999) used to estimate the significance of non-linear 
effects in the import price model. Section 2.4 summarizes the data sources used and 
Section 2.5 discusses the main empirical findings. Section 2.6 conducts robustness checks 
against omitted variable bias and serial correlation among regressors. Section 2.7 
summarizes the main theoretical and empirical findings of this chapter. 
 
2.2 Model 
 
This section offers a new model of non-linear ERPT featuring two monopolistically 
competitive foreign firms that produce different varieties of the same good. An exporter 
based in country i faces the competition from an exporting firm producing in country j , 
ji  . The exporter from country i optimally chooses its export price to maximize current 
profits subject to the importing country’s demand. Customers in the importing country 
have the opportunity to switch from the variety produced in country i to the variety bought 
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from country j , but face the cost of switching between different brands. Klemperer (1987) 
identifies three types of costs faced by consumers who switch between different brands of 
the same good: transaction costs, learning costs and contractual costs. For example, 
transaction costs are incurred by customers during the process of closing an account with 
their current service provider and opening an account with a new supplier. Examples of 
learning costs include a cost associated with learning to use new software. Finally, 
contractual costs represent brand loyalty programmes (e.g. “frequent flyer”) imposed by 
firms to reward their existing customers. 
 
First, this section builds a novel consumption function featuring a non-linear price 
elasticity of demand. Second, it solves the firm’s optimization problem and develops an 
optimal price-setting mechanism. This section concludes by showing that the non-linear 
demand elasticity causes non-linearities in the ERPT behaviour by affecting the exporter’s 
mark-up over the marginal cost. 
 
2.2.1 Consumers 
 
This study proposes a novel demand function in order to model structural breaks in the 
relationship between import price and exchange rate. mitc defines the importer’s demand for 
the variety produced in country i : 
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where ite refers to the nominal exchange rate representing the units of the importer’s 
currency per unit of the currency adopted by country i . An increase in ite  reflects the 
importer’s currency depreciation. itp defines the brand’s price in the exporter’s currency. 
Thus, the demand for good i, mitc , is a function of the variety’s import price, itit pe , relative 
to 
m
tP denoting the consumer price index in the importer’s country: 
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where      jtjiti dd   11 . itp and jtp  refer to the export prices charged by 
the firms producing varieties i and j , respectively. Export prices are set in the producer’s 
currency. ite and jte represent exchange rates measured in units of the importer’s currency 
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per unit of the currency adopted by countries i and j , respectively. Thus, the import prices 
of brands i and j equal itit pe and jtjt pe , respectively. In addition, the importer’s demand, 
m
itc , is a function of the composite consumption good, tx , modelled as 
    
1
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.  Similarly, mjtc denotes the importer’s demand 
for variety j and follows 
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where itd and jtd denote price differentials between brands i and j , i.e. 
jtjtititit peped  and ititjtjtjt peped  . 
 
For computational simplicity, the composite good (3) only contains two imported varieties, 
since the primary objective of this study is to investigate whether the ERPT depends on the 
price differential between two commodities exported by competing countries. This basic 
case can be extended to a continuum of varieties indexed by  1,0j . This extension will 
not affect the main conclusion of the study. Namely, we will attempt to show that in the 
case of two competitors the ERPT is reduced by the exporter if the price of his good 
significantly exceeds the price of the competitor’s good, when both prices are expressed in 
the importer’s currency. If the number of competitors is increased, the same reasoning will 
apply to the ERPT, i.e. pass-through will fall when the good’s price becomes less 
competitive. However, instead of comparing the representative exporter’s price to a 
competitor’s price, we will need some aggregate benchmark describing the price level 
prevailing among the competitors. 
 
The novelty of the demand function (1) lies in its elasticity with respect to the import price, 
where the elasticity represents a ratio of the relative change in the demand to a relative 
change in the import price: 
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We assume that all producers are monopolistic competitors. Therefore, the price elasticity 
of the demand for good i  (4) must exceed 1 by the definition of the monopolistic 
competition. Thus, demand elasticity (4) is assumed to contain two components. The first 
component is constant and denoted by parameter . The second component,  it
i d , is a 
function of the price differential between two brands and a fixed switching cost, s : 
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Thus, the time varying component of the demand elasticity (5) follows two regimes. The 
upper regime encompasses all values of  it
i d  for which the price differential exceeds the 
switching cost, i.e. sd it  . The lower regime is defined by the inequality sd it  .  
 
Similarly, the price elasticity of the demand for variety j equals 
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The demand elasticity (4a) represents a sum of the constant parameter,  , and a non-linear 
function of the price differential, jtd : 
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Suppose that 0itd because the import price of variety i  exceeds that of variety j . Every 
period the importer has the opportunity to switch between the varieties produced by 
countries i and j , but there is a fixed cost, s , incurred while switching from brand i to 
brand j or vice versa. If the importer decides to switch from the variety produced in 
country i to a cheaper substitute exported by country j , she saves an amount equal to itd , 
which denotes the price differential between these two brands. However, the switch is 
costly and requires a payment equal to s . Thus, when the gain from switching to brand 
j is less than or equal to the switching cost, i.e. sd it  , the importer does not have 
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incentives to change supplier. It is reasonable to switch from exporter i to exporter j only 
when the resulting gain exceeds the implied cost. 
 
Thus, the switching cost, s , represents a threshold determining structural change in the 
price elasticity of the demand (4). The demand elasticity depends non-linearly on itd  
denoting the gain from switching to variety j from variety i : 
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The elasticity parameter  must satisfy the condition 1  in both regimes, because good 
i producer is monopolistic competitor. Moreover, irrespective of the distance between the 
switching gain and the switching cost, the price elasticity of the demand (6) must exceed 
one. Specifically, in the lower regime, i.e. sd it  , the demand elasticity for brand i is lower 
than in the upper regime, i.e. sd it  , since both  and 
i are positive constants. Intuitively, 
when the benefit from switching to variety j is higher, the importer’s incentive to stop 
purchasing variety i is stronger. Consequently, the demand for brand i is more sensitive to 
price changes in the upper regime. 
 
Similarly, the price elasticity of the demand for brand j is a non-linear function of the 
price differential, jtd : 
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Thus, due to a stronger incentive to switch to variety i in the upper regime, i.e. sd jt  , the 
demand elasticity for brand j is larger in the upper regime compared to the lower regime, 
i.e. sd jt  .  
 
An increase in the sensitivity of the importer’s demand to price changes endangers the 
exporting firm’s market share. Consequently, an optimal price-setting mechanism has to 
accommodate changes in the demand elasticity. The next section examines the effect of 
non-linear demand elasticity on the foreign exporters’ price-setting policy. 
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2.2.2 Firms 
 
Consider a monopolistically competitive firm exporting from country i  its variety priced 
in the producer’s currency at itp . The firm incurs a fixed marginal cost of production 
denoted by itMC . The firm’s optimization problem is solved by maximizing its profits 
subject to the importer’s demand for variety i  (1). Therefore, the firm chooses itp to 
maximize the following profit function: 
m
itit
m
ititit cMCcp  .        (7) 
Substituting the demand definition (1) for mitc in the profit function (7) gives  
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Since the optimal price, oitp , should maximize the profit function (7a), 
o
itp  must satisfy the 
first order condition with respect to price itp , i.e. 0


it
it
p
. Substituting the profits 
definition (7a) for it  in this first order condition yields 
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Solving the first order condition (8) for the optimal price gives 
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 denotes the price mark-up over the marginal cost. Similarly, the 
optimal export price for variety j satisfies the first order condition 0
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The optimal export price, ojtp , that satisfies the first order condition (8a) is defined by 
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Thus, the optimal export price represents a non-linear mark-up over the marginal cost, 
since monopolistic competitors have market power. If firms had no market power, the 
price elasticity of the demand for their good,  jtj d  , would be infinitely large. 
Rearranging the mark-up, jt , into 









1)(
1
1
jt
j d
 shows that the mark-up 
approaches 1 as the demand elasticity in the denominator becomes infinitely large. 
Consequently, the export price approaches the marginal cost, i.e. the condition of the 
perfect competition. However, monopolistic competition implies that the demand 
elasticity,  jtj d  , lies in the range between 1 and positive infinity. Therefore, the 
mark-up exceeds unity, i.e. 1jt , because     1 jtjjtj dd  .  
 
Thus, the optimal mark-up, it , follows one of the following two regimes depending on the 
difference between the switching gain, itd , and the cost, s : 
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Rearranging the lower regime and upper regime mark-ups into
1
1
1
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1
1
1
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, 
respectively, suggests that the mark-up falls when the price differential exceeds the 
threshold, s: 
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Similarly, the mark-up jt represents a two-regime process featuring the threshold s : 
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where 
11 


 j
j




. Thus, the mark-up is larger in the lower regime compared to the 
upper regime. Intuitively, in the lower regime, the exporter enjoys a greater market power, 
since the consumer is unlikely to switch to a substitute when the switching gain does not 
exceed the switching cost. Thus, the producer is able to exploit his market power by setting 
a larger mark-up. However, in the upper regime, the exporter’s market power is weakened 
by the importer’s incentive to shift to a cheaper variety, since the switching gain outweighs 
the cost. Consequently, the mark-up falls to generate a price decrease, which is intended to 
prevent a loss of customers.  
 
Given the non-linearity of the mark-up, it , variety i ’s export price follows a two-regime 
process: 
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Likewise, variety j ’s export price is defined by the following threshold function: 
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Similarly to the mark-ups, the optimal export prices, oitp and 
o
jtp , depend non-linearly on 
the price differentials itd and jtd . Specifically, the export price is higher in the lower regime, 
since the importer is locked into his current consumption pattern and unable to switch to an 
alternative supplier due to a relatively large switching cost, s . Consequently, the exporter 
may charge a higher export price as he does not face the risk of losing customers. However, 
in the upper regime, the producer reduces the export price to discourage customers from 
replacing its product with a cheaper substitute due to a relatively large switching gain. 
 
In this section we modelled structural breaks in the export price-setting mechanism. 
Intuitively, any non-linearity in the export prices, itp  and jtp , is transmitted into the import 
prices, itit pe and jtjt pe , since the export price functionally determines the import price. 
Consequently, the ERPT defining the response of the import price to exchange rate 
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movements follows a non-linear process. The next section examines structural breaks in 
the ERPT into the import prices of brands i and j . 
 
2.2.3 Exchange Rate Pass-through (ERPT) 
 
In this section, we compute the ERPT as the derivative of the import price with respect to 
the exchange rate, i.e.
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e
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. Substituting the optimal export price (9) into 
variety i ’s import price, i.e. itit pe , gives 
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More specifically, the optimal import price (13) represents a two-regime process due to the 
non-linearity of the mark-up, it : 
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The import price, oitit pe , is higher in the lower regime, as opposed to the upper regime, 
since the mark-up corresponding to the upper regime is smaller than that of the lower 
regime.  
 
Similarly, variety j ’s optimal import price, ojtjt pe , is larger in the lower regime, compared 
to the upper regime: 
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Differentiating the import price (13a) with respect to the exchange rate gives the ERPT 
into variety i ’s optimal import price: 
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Similarly to the import price level, the magnitude of the ERPT (14) differs across the two 
regimes. Specifically, the lower regime is characterized by a higher pass-through, as 
opposed to the upper regime. Intuitively, when a large switching cost prevents the 
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consumer of variety i  from joining supplier j , firm i does not have to protect its market 
share by limiting the rise of variety i ’s import price following the importer’s currency 
depreciation. However, in the upper regime, the ERPT (14) is smaller relative to the lower 
regime. Intuitively, since the importer’s incentive to switch to a cheaper supplier increases 
when the switching gain exceeds the cost, exporter i limits the ERPT by adjusting the 
mark-up, it , downwards and offsetting the import price increase either partially or 
completely. 
 
Likewise, the ERPT into variety j ’s optimal import price is greater in the lower regime 
compared to the upper regime: 
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This section developed a partial equilibrium model of export pricing by monopolistically 
competitive firms to justify possible non-linearities in the ERPT into import prices. We 
showed that a non-linearity of the price elasticity of the demand induces structural breaks 
in the firm’s mark-up over the marginal cost. Through affecting the product’s export and 
import prices, the non-linearity of the mark-up generates structural breaks in the response 
of the import price to currency movements. The following section outlines the econometric 
methodology adopted in this study to test for structural breaks in the relationship between 
import price and exchange rate. 
 
2.3 Econometric Methodology 
 
This study employs the threshold regression methodology developed in Hansen (1999) to 
test for threshold effects in the regression parameters of non-dynamic panels. This section 
proceeds as follows. First, it builds an import price model used to estimate structural 
breaks in the ERPT. Second, it outlines the computation algorithm for estimating the value 
and statistical significance of threshold estimates. 
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2.3.1 Econometric specification 
 
The econometric specification adopted in this study is based on the import price model 
(13). Specifically, since the ERPT represents the response of the import price to exchange 
rate changes, this paper estimates the non-linear pass-through by performing a threshold 
regression of the import price on the exchange rate and selected regressors.  
 
In order to determine the linear regression specification, the optimal import price (13) must 
be log-transformed: 
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The purpose of the log-transformation of the threshold model is two-fold. First, it allows us 
to estimate the individual effect of each regressor on the import price. Second, log-
transformation facilitates the search for an optimal threshold estimate by reducing the 
range of possible values of the threshold. 
 
Thus, the log-transformed import price (14b) gives the following log-linearized reduced 
form regression of the import price,
i
ktp : 
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Equation (15) defining a two-regime process for the log-transformed import price can be 
re-written as: 
    ktktktktktktk
i
kt dIedIeMCp   lnlnlnlnlnln 321 , (16) 
where 1 , 2 and 3 are parameters. Subscript k denotes exporting country, i.e. 
.,...,3,2,1 Kk   
i
ktpln represents the log of variety k ’s import price whose theoretic 
counterpart is  ktkt peln , jik ,  (see 13 and 13b). There are K countries exporting a 
distinct brand of the same good to the USA. Thus, the log of the product’s import price is 
regressed on ktMCln and kteln denoting the log-transformed marginal cost of production in 
exporting country k and the log-transformed bilateral exchange rate between exporter k and 
the USA, respectively. In addition, since the specification (15) corresponds to a panel 
dataset, it includes unobservable individual effects, k . Examples of unobservable 
exporter-specific factors include the quality of country k ’s product relative to the quality of 
commodities produced by the remaining 1K exporters. Parameter  stands for threshold 
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whose theoretic counterpart is the log-transformed switching cost, sln (see 
14a).  I denotes an indicator function that sorts observations into one of the two regimes 
defined in (15). The error term, kt , is modelled as an independent and identically 
distributed ( ... dii ) process with mean zero and variance
2
 .  
 
Therefore, the ERPT represented by the exchange rate coefficients, 2 and 3 , follows a 
two-regime process where the log-transformed switching gain, ktdln , acts as a threshold 
variable. In order to clarify the dependence of the ERPT, 2 and 3 , on the threshold 
function,  it
i d , let us note that the threshold variable, itd , represents a function of the 
exchange rate, ite , i.e. jtjtititit peped  . Therefore, the log-transformed import price 
(14b) may be rewritten as 
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Moreover, the ratio 
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to simplify the differentiation operation.  
 
Using the import price definition (14c), the degree of the ERPT can be computed as the 
derivative of the log-transformed import price with respect to the log of the exchange rate: 
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where the dependence of the price differential, itd , on the log-transformed exchange rate, 
iteln , is evident from the following version of the price gap definition: 
jtjtit
e
it peped
it  ln . Therefore, the ERPT (14d) is non-linear and depends on the relative 
magnitude of the switching cost, s, since the exchange rate elasticity of the import price 
(14d) is determined by the value of the threshold function (5a),  it
i d , which depends non-
linearly on the cost of switching to variety j.  
 
The null hypothesis of interest implies no structural change in the regression coefficients, 
i.e. 32   . Thus, under the null, the position of the log-transformed switching gain with 
respect to the threshold is irrelevant for determining the extent of the ERPT. The 
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alternative hypothesis is consistent with the theoretic model developed in this study (see 
14) and suggests a non-linear process for the exchange rate coefficient, i.e. 32   .  
 
Suppose that a depreciation of the US dollar led to an increase in kteln . Under the 
alternative hypothesis, the ERPT defining the increase of the import price following the 
depreciation crucially depends on the deviation of the switching gain from its threshold. 
When the gain from shifting to an alternative supplier exceeds the switching cost, i.e. 
sd it  and i=k in (14), the log-transformed switching gain rises above the threshold, 
i.e. ktdln in (15). Therefore, an exporter from country k  will limit the ERPT by a 
downward mark-up adjustment (10) to prevent the US importer from switching. However, 
when the switching gain is insufficient to overshoot the switching cost and encourage the 
importer to switch, i.e. sdkt  , the log-transformed shifting gain fails to exceed the 
threshold, i.e. ktdln . Consequently, the exporter receives no incentive to limit the 
ERPT by a downward mark-up adjustment. Therefore, the theory developed in the 
previous section predicts that the degree of the ERPT corresponding to the lower regime 
exceeds that observed in the upper regime, i.e. 32   . 
 
In order to estimate the magnitude and statistical significance of the threshold effect in the 
ERPT, this study employs a modified version of the specification (16): 
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where  2,0...~  diikt . There are four differences between the import price models (17) 
and (16).  
 
First, all time variant regressors in (17) are lagged by one period in order to accommodate 
possible price stickiness. Bils and Klenow (2004) documented that some prices persist over 
one year before being re-set. If firms are unable to adjust prices instantaneously following 
any fluctuation in the explanatory variables, current prices are governed by the past values 
of the regressors.  
 
Second, the switching gain is denoted by 1ktD and computed as the ratio between the price 
of country k ’s variety and the world price of the good under consideration, i.e.
i
wt
i
kt pp 11 /  . 
The superscript i indicates that both prices are expressed in the importer’s currency and the 
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subscript w refers to world. This measure of the switching gain was preferred due to its 
ability to provide a sensible proxy for the price differential, jtjtititit peped  , from the 
theoretic model, since the log-transformation of 1ktD  gives 
i
wt
i
ktkt ppD 111 lnlnln   . 
Thus, the price differential  iwtikt pp lnln   differs in two aspects from its theoretic 
counterpart, jtjtitit pepe  . First, each import price is presented in a log-transformed state. 
Second, instead of considering only one competitor’s price, i.e. jtjt pe , ktDln presents a 
more comprehensive measure of competition by taking into account the world market price 
for the commodity, 
i
wtp . The world market price is taken as the benchmark against which 
each brand’s price is compared, since the existence of multiple competitors necessitates a 
single benchmark indicating an average price prevailing among competitors.  
 
Third, the specification (17) contains the log of the previous switching gain, i.e. 1ln ktD , in 
order to separate the linear effect of the gain on the import price (see 2 ) from the non-
linear (threshold) impact of 1ln ktD on the ERPT (see 4  and 5 ).  
 
Finally, a non-linear interaction term, 11 lnln  ktkt DMC , is added to alleviate spurious 
correlations that may be induced by omitted variables bias.  
 
Since to the best of the author’s knowledge data on consumer’s switching cost is 
unavailable, the import price specification (17) replaces the measure of the switching cost, 
sln , with an unobserved threshold parameter,  , which can be estimated using the least 
squares method by Hansen (1999). The ability of this methodology to overcome the 
unavailability of switching cost data represents the main reason for choosing the threshold 
regression algorithm by Hansen (1999). For instance,  time variance in the ERPT could be 
estimated using regime-switching time-series models. For example, an extension of the 
Markov-switching framework by Hamilton (1989) could be applied in order to model two 
unobserved states of the ERPT, i.e. large and small pass-through. Similarly, a logistic 
mixture model (Wong and Li, 2001) could be applied to distinguish between the states of 
low and high pass-through. However, the aforementioned non-linear approaches represent 
significant computation challenges, since they require us to estimate the probabilities of the 
state of the unobserved process by adopting restrictive assumptions on the distribution of 
the probability of the occurence of a given state. In contrast, the approach in Hansen 
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(1999) allows us to test for structural breaks in the ERPT by estimating the unobserved 
threshold parameter with an optimization mechanism that does not rely on the assumptions 
about the probability density functions corresponding to different regimes.  
 
The following sub-section outlines the computation algorithm for estimating the parameter 
set   ,,,,,, 54321k  from (17). In addition, it explains the bootstrap replication 
procedure for estimating the asymptotic p -values used in testing the significance of the 
threshold effect. 
 
2.3.2 Computation algorithm 
 
This section describes the five-step computation algorithm for estimating the ERPT using 
the two-regime regression of the import price (17). The computation procedure is 
conducted by splitting the observations into two samples in order to determine whether the 
regression coefficients are significantly different across the two regimes. In addition to 
estimating the coefficients, the objective of the computation process is to estimate the 
magnitude and statistical significance of the threshold   defining a structural break.  
 
The computation algorithm is performed in five steps. First, a threshold estimate, ˆ , is 
obtained using the least squares regression applied to a grid of potential threshold values. 
Second, an estimated coefficient vector,      ˆˆ,ˆˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ 54321 , corresponding to the 
least squares estimate of the threshold, is delivered. Third, a likelihood ratio (LR) test 
statistic is constructed to test the null hypothesis of no structural change against the 
alternative hypothesis of parameter instability. Fourth, bootstrap replications are conducted 
to construct asymptotic p -values for the LR statistic under the null hypothesis. Finally, 
asymptotic confidence intervals for the threshold parameter, , are formed to determine the 
precision of the threshold estimate. 
 
2.3.2.1 Step 1: Estimating the threshold parameter  
 
Before proceeding to the estimation, a fixed effects transformation is used to remove from 
(17) the time-invariant effects, k , denoting unobservable constant characteristics of the 
exporters. Fixed effects are eliminated in order to allow for a consistent estimation of the 
regression coefficients. One of the conventional procedures for eliminating the individual-
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specific effects requires transforming the variables into their deviations from individual-
specific averages over time t  (Hausman and Taylor, 1981): 
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where the demeaned variables are denoted by superscript “*” and defined as follows: 
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In order to facilitate the exposition of the computation algorithm, stack the data 
over K exporting countries: 
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where   *1 ktx represents a 51 vector of explanatory variables: 
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Substituting the variable definitions (19) and (20) into the regression (18) gives a neat 
specification of the import price 
  ***   XP i ,         (21) 
where  defines a 15 vector of regression coefficients  
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Thus, only exchange rate coefficients, 4 and 5 , depend on the value of the threshold 
parameter, while the remaining coefficients are regime-independent. The subsequent 
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exposition of the estimation algorithm uses the specification (21) to explain computation 
steps. 
 
The threshold parameter, , is estimated using the least squares method suggested in Chan 
(1993) and Hansen (2000). This approach implies an optimization search for the 
estimate ˆ over distinct values of the threshold variable. In order to reduce the duration of 
this computation procedure, this study restricts the search to specific quantiles by using a 
grid containing 50 quantiles, i.e.  %100%,...,4%,2%,0 . In addition, trimming the smallest 
and largest observations on the threshold variable yields a further reduction in the number 
of regressions by limiting the search to the most likely points for structural break. Current 
study adopts the grid  %90%,...,14%,12%,10 , where 10 % of the observations is eliminated 
from each tail of the data on 1ln ktD , which is sorted in the ascending order. 
 
After constructing the grid for optimization search, the regression (21) is estimated by 
ordinary least squares for each of the 40 quantiles specified in the grid to deliver the 
following matrix of coefficient estimates: 
 
 
            (23) 
 
 
 
where      4012111 ˆ...ˆˆ   ,      4022212 ˆ...ˆˆ   and
     4032313 ˆ...ˆˆ   . Thus, the estimates of the regression coefficients may vary 
across quantiles. Therefore, we consider 40 possible values for the threshold parameter, out 
of which only one value is optimal. The optimal value of the threshold parameter is 
represented by the value of  which minimizes the concentrated sum of squared errors: 
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2.3.2.2 Step 2: Deriving the estimated coefficient vector 
 
This step uses the estimated threshold parameter (24) to determine the estimated 
coefficient vector,   ˆˆ . This task does not require additional computation, 
since   ˆˆ represents a vector of estimated coefficients corresponding to the threshold 
estimate,  40321 ,...,,,ˆ   . Thus, the estimated coefficient vector,   ˆ
ˆ
, represents 
specific column from the matrix of coefficient estimates (23): 
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The estimated regression coefficients that are functionally determined by the estimated 
threshold parameter represent regime-specific ERPT coefficients. 
 
2.3.2.3 Step 3: Testing the Ho  of no structural change 
 
The objective of this stage is to determine the statistical significance of the threshold 
estimate, ˆ , obtained in Step 1. This aim is achieved by testing the null hypothesis of no 
threshold effect: 
eH   540 : .         (25) 
Thus, the null hypothesis (25) suggests the following restricted regression: 
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The alternative hypothesis, i.e. 54:  aH , corresponds to the unrestricted regression 
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First, the restricted model (26) is estimated by OLS to deliver the sum of squared errors 
denoted by **
~~


. Second, using      ˆˆˆˆ **   which defines the concentrated sum of 
squared errors from the unrestricted regression (27), the following LR test is constructed: 
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Finally, the value of the LR test statistic, 1F , is compared against the relevant critical value. 
The null hypothesis of no structural change is rejected if the statistic value exceeds the 
critical value corresponding to the desired confidence level. The existence of an 
unidentified nuisance parameter,  , under 0H  renders the tabulation of critical values 
impossible due to a non-standard asymptotic distribution of 1F . The next section describes 
a bootstrap procedure used to approximate actual critical values for 1F  by constructing 
asymptotic p-values under the null hypothesis (see Hansen, 1996). 
 
2.3.2.4 Step 4: Computing the bootstrap p-values for F1 under Ho 
 
The asymptotic p-values for the 
1F statistic under the null hypothesis are constructed by 
conducting 300
1
 bootstrap replications. A bootstrap sample is created using an error matrix, 
which consists of the unrestricted regression residuals grouped by exporting country: 
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First, a random sample of size K is drawn (with replacement) from the empirical 
distribution of unrestricted errors,
B*ˆ (29). Using these random errors, we create a 
bootstrap sample under the null: 
                                               
1 This study follows Hansen (1999) in choosing the appropriate number of bootstrap replications. 
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Each element of the bootstrap sample, BiP * , is computed by using an error Br
*ˆ , which is 
drawn randomly from (29) to augment the predicted values of the dependent variable under 
the null hypothesis: 
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Second, the bootstrap values of the dependent variable are regressed according to the 
following unrestricted (31) and restricted (32) models of import price: 
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Third, a bootstrap value of the 1F  statistic is constructed: 
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  BBBB ** ~~  and      ˆˆˆˆ ** BBBB   define the sums of squared errors from the 
restricted (32) and unrestricted (31) regressions, respectively. 
65 
 
 
This three-step procedure is conducted 300 times following repeated random draws from 
the empirical distribution of unrestricted errors, B*ˆ .  The bootstrap estimate of the 
asymptotic p-value for F1 under the null hypothesis is found by dividing the number of 
cases where the simulated statistic, BF1 , exceeded the actual value of F1 by the total number 
of replications: 
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In order to test the null hypothesis of no structural change, the bootstrap p-value, BPV (34), 
must be compared to the desired significance level. This study adopts the 95% confidence 
level. Therefore, the null hypothesis of coefficient stability is rejected if 05.0BPV .  
 
An alternative way to test the null hypothesis suggests comparing the value of the F1 
statistic to the bootstrap critical value corresponding to the chosen significance level. The 
bootstrap critical values for the 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels are found by sorting 
the bootstrap values of the simulated statistic, BF1 , in ascending order and extracting the 
270
th
, 285
th
 and 297
th
 elements, respectively. If the actual value of the F1 statistic exceeds 
the chosen critical value, the null hypothesis of no structural change is rejected in favour of 
the alternative hypothesis suggesting a threshold framework.  
 
2.3.2.5 Step 5: Constructing confidence intervals 
 
In order to determine the precision of the threshold estimate, ˆ , asymptotic confidence 
intervals for  are constructed with an LR statistic,  2F , which uses the residual sequence 
computed in Step 1: 
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
 TKF .       (35) 
The  2F statistic enables us to test the null hypothesis that the observed threshold value is 
equal to the true threshold, i.e. 00 :  H . For each value of  , the  2F statistic 
compares the resulting sum of squared errors,     ** ˆˆ  , against     ˆˆˆˆ **   which 
denotes the sum of squared errors corresponding to the estimated threshold, ˆ . Thus, 
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the  2F  test assumes the consistency of ˆ for 0 in the presence of a threshold effect (see 
Hansen, 2000 and Chan, 1993). 
 
If the value of the  2F  statistic exceeds the critical value at the chosen level of 
significance, the null hypothesis is rejected. The critical value for  2F at significance 
level is computed as 
     11ln2c .        (36) 
Critical values (36) are used in constructing the following asymptotic confidence interval 
for : 
           40240222121 ,....,,  FFFI  ,     (37) 
where  I is an indicator function defined as 
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The asymptotic confidence interval (37) represents the “no-rejection” region encompassing 
all values of that satisfy the null hypothesis, 00 :  H . A narrow confidence interval 
reflects a high precision of the threshold estimate. 
 
This section outlined the econometric methodology that we use to estimate threshold 
effects in the ERPT. It also explained the bootstrap method for testing the statistical 
significance of the threshold estimate by constructing asymptotically valid p-values of the 
LR test statistic. Finally, we showed the procedure for forming asymptotic confidence 
intervals that are used to judge the uncertainty implied by the point estimate of the 
threshold. The following section describes the data sources used to test for structural 
breaks in the ERPT into US import prices. 
 
2.4 Data sources 
 
This section identifies the databases used to collect time series data on import 
prices, iktp and
i
wtp , marginal costs, ktMC , and bilateral exchange rates, kte .  
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Import prices are approximated by import unit-values computed for each traded 
commodity as a ratio of import value to import quantity. Export and import unit-values 
represent a common tool for approximating unavailable series on export and import prices 
(Berthou and Emlinger, 2011). To the best of the author’s knowledge, the only accessible 
database providing bilateral trade data for a diverse range of countries and commodities is 
the OECD International Trade by Commodity Statistics (ITCS). Since the ITCS database 
offers annual trade data on value, net weight and quantity only, we compute annual import 
unit-values. 
 
We consider the following 12 commodities imported by the USA from selected European 
countries: (1) Spirits and liqueurs (henceforth Spirits); (2) Cigarettes containing tobacco 
(henceforth Cigarettes); (3) Pigments, paints, varnishes and related materials (henceforth 
Pigments); (4) Parts of footwear (henceforth Footwear); (5) Materials of rubber (pastes, 
plates, sheets, etc.) (henceforth Rubber); (6) Builders’ joinery and carpentry of wood 
(henceforth Joinery); (7) Cartons, bags, other containers, of paper, paperback, etc. 
(henceforth Cartons); (8) Tubes, pipes and fittings, of iron or steel (henceforth Tubes); (9) 
Peripheral units, including control and adapting units (henceforth Peripheral units); (10) 
Sailboats, not inflatable, with auxiliary motor or not (henceforth Sailboats); (11) Stockings, 
ankle-socks and the like (henceforth Stockings); (12) Trade advertising material, 
commercial catalogues, etc (henceforth Catalogues). 
 
Table 1 in the Appendix summarizes the availability of import unit-value data for each 
commodity and exporter considered in the empirical analysis. For some trade partners and 
years, it was not possible to construct unit-values due to the absence or incompleteness of 
quantity series. Therefore, the set of trade partners and the number of years are different 
for each product regression, since the methodology applied in this study requires balanced 
panels. Specifically, an exporting country is dropped from the regression analysis, if there 
are missing observations associated with it. Similarly, a year is omitted from the beginning 
or end of the sample period if missing data is observed in that year. Table 2 displays 
sample periods for all products studied. The longest sample spans a period from 1995 to 
2011 (see Spirits and Sailboats). The shortest sample period is observed for Stockings 
(1996 to 2006). 
 
European exporters are preferred over alternative trade partners due to the availability of 
detailed data on industry-specific marginal costs of the European Union producers. We 
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approximate marginal costs using annual data on the Industry Producer Price Index 
(2005=100) (henceforth PPI) retrieved from the Eurostat Short-term Business Statistics 
database. PPI is commonly used as a proxy for marginal cost in the empirical literature on 
the ERPT (Bussière and Peltonen, 2008). Table 3 displays the set of industries for which 
the PPI data has been collected. Since none of the accessible PPI databases use the product 
disaggregation method employed in the OECD ITCS dataset, we approximate unavailable 
series on a commodity marginal cost using PPI data for the industry to which the chosen 
commodity belongs.  
 
Annual nominal exchange rates measured as the amount of US dollars per 1 Euro or ECU 
were retrieved from the Eurostat Economy and Finance database. For the years preceding 
the exporter’s adoption of the Euro, bilateral nominal exchange rates between the US 
dollar and the European partner’s currency were computed using the IMF International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) country data on national currency units per ECU. For example, 
the bilateral nominal exchange rate between the US dollar and the Austrian shilling was 
computed as  
ECUAT
ECUUS
ATUS
e
e
e
,
,
,  ,         (39) 
where ATUSe , denotes US dollars per Austrian Shilling, ECUUSe , represents US dollars per 
ECU and ECUATe , stands for Austrian Shillings per ECU. Table 4 shows the Euro adoption 
date of each trade partner. 
 
2.5 Empirical results 
 
This section summarizes the empirical results from applying the threshold regression 
methodology outlined in Section 2.3 to the US import data. It proceeds as follows. First, 
this section reports estimated regression parameters from (18) to infer the contribution of 
each explanatory variable to the import price. Second, it examines the sign of the ERPT 
coefficients, 4 and 5 , and reconciles these estimation results with the benchmark theory 
of international price discrimination (Knetter, 1989). Third, we report threshold parameter 
estimates and corresponding bootstrap critical values for the 1F LR test statistic (see 28), in 
order to challenge the linearity of the ERPT coefficients. Finally, we illustrate the precision 
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of the obtained threshold estimates by plotting their asymptotic confidence intervals, in 
order to visualize the level of our certainty about the non-linearity of the ERPT. 
 
Before discussing the estimation results, let us outline the expected signs of the regression 
coefficients in the estimated specification 
       
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It follows from the optimal import price (13a) that the expected effect of the marginal cost 
on the import price is positive. Therefore, 01  as producers have to raise the price of 
their good in order to cover the increased cost of production.  
 
The price differential,    *11
*
1 lnlnln
i
wt
i
ktkt ppD   , is expected to have a negative effect 
on the import price. Specifically, an increase in 1ln ktD suggests that the firm’s price 
becomes less attractive compared to the world price for this commodity. Since consumers 
are likely to switch to a cheaper supplier, the exporter should decrease the price for his 
good in order to align it with the world price level, i.e. 02  .  
 
The expected sign of the coefficient 3 is ambiguous, since the two variables comprising 
the interaction term,  *11 lnln  ktkt DMC , have opposite effects on the import price. While 
the log of the previous marginal cost, 1ln ktMC , has a positive effect on the import price, 
the log of the lagged price differential, 1ln ktD , generates a negative effect. Therefore, the 
ultimate sign of the coefficient 3 depends on the relative magnitudes of these two effects.  
The expected signs of the ERPT coefficients are positive, i.e. 0,0 54   . The optimal 
import price (13) suggests that the depreciation of the importer’s currency, i.e. an increase 
in 1ln kte , raises the import price. This result follows from the assumption of producer 
currency pricing, whereby the export price equals X units of the exporter’s currency. The 
depreciation of the importer’s currency implies that more units of the importer’s currency 
are required to purchase X units of the exporter’s currency. Therefore, the import price 
rises with the depreciation of the importer’s currency. Thus, the sign of both ERPT 
coefficients is positive, but 54   . We showed in Section 2.2 that the ERPT is lower in 
the upper regime, compared to the lower regime, because consumers are more likely to 
switch to a cheaper supplier when the switching gain exceeds the switching cost, sd it  , 
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i.e. ktDln . Thus, firms reduce the ERPT in the upper regime by cutting the mark-up of 
price over the marginal cost to prevent consumers from leaving their market (see 14a).  
 
Table 5 presents estimated coefficient values and standard errors from running the 
unrestricted regression corresponding to the optimal threshold, ˆ  (27). In order to 
determine the appropriate critical value for the 2-tail T-test at the desired confidence level, 
Table 5 reports the degrees of freedom, which are calculated as 
5)2(  KTdf ,         (40) 
where “5 ” reflects the number of regressors and K2 denotes the degrees of freedom that 
are used up as a result of constructing time-demeaned and lagged variables.  
 
The estimation results provide strong evidence of the importance of the nominal exchange 
rate for determining the import unit-value. This suggests that the ERPT into the US import 
prices is significantly different from zero. Thus, for 9 out of 12 commodities, the statistical 
significance of the exchange rate coefficient is confirmed for either the lower or the upper 
regime. The sign of the statistically significant coefficients on the exchange rate is 
predominantly positive. This finding on the positive ERPT is consistent with the producer 
currency pricing, whereby prices are set in the exporter’s currency. Therefore, the 
importer’s currency depreciation leads to an increase of the price in the importer’s 
currency, i.e. 0,0 54   .  
 
However, the exchange rate coefficients are significantly negative for Rubber, Joinery, 
Cartons and Peripheral units. This finding implies that despite the US dollar appreciation, 
which enables the US consumers to purchase the same number of ECU (Euro) as before 
with fewer US dollars, US import prices increase. Although negative ERPT contradicts the 
producer currency hypothesis, the increase of the US import prices despite the US dollar’s 
appreciation has been widely documented (Krugman, 1986).  
 
The negative ERPT documented in this study can be justified by the pricing-to-market that 
causes an excessive fall in the European exporters’ mark-ups following the US dollar’s 
depreciation. For instance, we showed that the exporter’s mark-up over the marginal cost 
(10) falls when the importer’s demand elasticity increases. We also suggested that 
sufficiently large depreciation of the importer’s currency leads to an increase in the 
demand elasticity (6a) by raising the price differential, dit, above the threshold. Thus, there 
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is a negative relationship between the extent of the importer’s currency depreciation and 
the size of the mark-up, which is explained by the reduction of the firm’s market power 
during the depreciation. Specifically, since the depreciation causes an increase in the 
import price of a good whose price is set in the exporter’s currency, this good becomes 
relatively expensive compared to brands imported from other countries. Therefore, the 
importer’s currency depreciation endangers the exporter’s market share in the importing 
country. In order to protect their market share abroad, exporting firms reduce the mark-up 
of price over the marginal cost. Essentially, firms attempt to stabilize the import price of 
their good by limiting its increase with a downward mark-up adjustment. 
 
However, firms may overshoot their target level of the import price by an excessively large 
mark-up adjustment. For example, holding the marginal cost constant, suppose that at the 
end of the first period a sudden depreciation, ke , led to an increase in the import price, 
i.e.   kkkkkkk MCeMCee 1111   . In order to stabilize the import price and return it to 
the pre-depreciation level, kkk MCe 11 , exporter k  must decrease the export price by cutting 
his mark-up, 1k . Specifically, the next period mark-up must equal   kkk
kkk
k
MCee
MCe


1
11
2
~  , 
where 21 kkk eee  . However, if the actual mark-up, 2k , undershoots its target 
level, 2
~
k , the resulting import price will fall below its initial level instead of equalling it, 
i.e.   kkkkkkk MCeMCee 1121   . This inequality is reflected empirically in the negative 
sign of the exchange rate coefficients in the restricted (26) and unrestricted (27) 
regressions of the import price.  
 
Table 5 also reports that, for the majority of commodities considered, the Industry PPI has 
a positive effect on the import unit value. This evidence is consistent with the optimal 
import price (13), whereby a higher marginal cost leads to an increase in the import price. 
However, the marginal cost coefficient is significantly negative for two commodities - 
Cigarettes and Joinery. The negative pass-through of the marginal cost into the import 
price can be justified by the exporter’s mark-up adjustment in the same way as the 
aforementioned negative ERPT. Specifically, holding the exchange rate fixed, suppose that 
an increase in the marginal cost, kMC , raises the import price from kkk eMC 11 to 
  kkkk eMCMC 11 . Since an increase in the import price leads to a rise in the demand 
elasticity (4), the optimal mark-up (10) charged by the firm falls. In order to restore the 
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initial import price level, the next period mark-up must equal
  kkk
kkk
k
eMCMC
eMC


1
11
2
~  , 
where 21 kkk MCMCMC  . If the actual mark-up undershoots the required level, 
i.e. 22
~
kk   , the next period import price will fall below the first period level, 
i.e.   kkkkkkk eMCeMCMC 1112   . Thus, mark-up undershooting may deliver a 
negative pass-through of the marginal cost change into the import price and explain 
negative coefficients on PPI in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 also shows that the log of the price differential, ktDln , is predominantly 
insignificant for determining the import prices of commodities, except Tubes, Stockings, 
and Catalogues. This result is consistent with the import price definition (13a), since our 
model does not predict a linear effect of the price differential on the import price. Within 
our theoretic framework, the switching gain, ktd , has only a threshold effect on prices via 
the mark-up channel. Therefore, since the log of the price differential, ktDln , represents a 
threshold variable, its effect should be assessed by examining the statistical significance of 
the threshold estimate, ˆ . 
 
Table 6 displays threshold parameter estimates and corresponding values of the 1F LR test 
statistic (28). In addition, the bootstrap critical values and the bootstrap p-values 
for 1F under the null hypothesis are reported. This study finds strong evidence for structural 
breaks in the ERPT into the import prices of Spirits and Pigments. For both categories, the 
LR 1F -test statistic is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level with bootstrap p-
values of 0.003 and 0.010, respectively. In addition, the threshold effect is close to being 
statistically significant at the 10% significance level for Rubber, Joinery, Cartons, 
Stockings and Catalogues, as the bootstrap p-values of the 1F -test do not exceed 0.2.  
 
The point estimates of the threshold parameter suggest that the sign of the threshold effect 
varies across commodities. For example, the threshold estimate for Spirits equals -0.14, 
yielding a statistically significant exchange rate coefficient of 0.55 in the lower regime and 
an insignificant exchange rate coefficient of -0.01 in the upper regime. This result is 
consistent with the ERPT definition (14). Thus, when the world price of Spirits exceeds the 
import price of European Spirits substantially, i.e. ˆln ktD , the ERPT is high and 
statistically significant. Intuitively, the importer has no incentive to search for alternative 
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suppliers, since the US import price of the European Spirits is lower than the world price 
of this commodity. Therefore, as the European exporters do not need to prevent the 
importer from switching by stabilizing import prices, the observed ERPT is large and 
significant. However, as the negative difference between the log of the European Spirits’ 
import price and the log of the world Spirits’ price approaches zero in the upper regime, 
the exchange rate coefficient becomes insignificant. The insignificance of the exchange 
rate coefficient can be explained by the local currency price stability ensured by the 
European exporters. Specifically, since in the upper regime the price advantage of the 
European exporters over competitors is not as strong as in the lower regime, the importer 
may seek an alternative trade partner. Therefore, the European exporters may decide to 
insulate the import price from the importer’s currency depreciation in order to avoid a 
further increase in the import prices of the European Spirits relative to competitors’ prices. 
As a result of the local currency price stabilization by European firms, the exchange rate 
may become insignificant for determining US import prices. 
 
In contrast, the threshold estimate for Pigments is positive and statistically significant. The 
corresponding exchange rate coefficients for the lower and upper regimes equal -0.04 and 
0.14, respectively. Out of these two exchange rate coefficients, only the upper-regime 
coefficient is statistically significant. This result can also be reconciled with our ERPT 
model (14). Specifically, since in the upper regime the US import price of the European 
Spirits significantly exceeds the world price of this commodity, the European exporters 
may choose to stabilize the import price either fully or partially in order to decrease the 
importer’s incentive to switch to a cheaper substitute. As a result of the local currency 
price stabilization, in the upper regime we observe a low ERPT coefficient, indicating that 
only a small percentage of the importer’s currency depreciation is passed through into the 
US import prices of the European Spirits. 
 
In order to effectively illustrate the asymptotic confidence intervals for the threshold and 
the uncertainty about the nature of structural breaks in the ERPT, Figures 1-12 plot the LR 
function,  2F (35), for each value of the threshold parameter. The point estimate of the 
threshold, i.e. ˆ , is defined as the threshold parameter value that satisfies the 
condition   02 F . This result follows from the LR definition (35) which shows that 
the  2F statistic equals zero at  ˆ . The significance of the point estimate of the 
threshold can be visualized by plotting its asymptotic confidence interval that represents a 
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set of all threshold values for which the LR function,  2F , does not exceed the horizontal 
line. This horizontal line shows the critical value for  2F  at the 0.05 significance level. 
Figures 1 (Spirits) and 3 (Pigments) display narrow asymptotic confidence intervals for the 
threshold. This observation suggests a high precision of the threshold estimates for Spirits 
and Pigments, where the threshold effect was found to be statistically significant. For 
reporting purposes, we also plot the LR function,  2F , for the cases that generated a 
statistically insignificant threshold effect (see Figures 2, 4-12). However, since the 
confidence interval construction is based on the assumption that the threshold effect is 
statistically significant, the precision of threshold estimates cannot be inferred from 
Figures 2 and 4-12.  
 
Overall, our empirical results from Table 5 are consistent with the theoretical model (14b) 
in suggesting that the exchange rate plays an important role in determining the import price, 
since for 75% of the products considered the coefficient on the exchange rate, 4 or 5 , is 
statistically significant in either upper or lower regime. The evidence in favour of the 
significance of the marginal cost effect, 1 , is weaker, but we were still able to reject the 
null hypothesis of the coefficient insignificance in approximately 50% of cases. In contrast, 
the linear effect of the price differential, 2 , and the coefficient on the interaction term, 3 , 
are predominantly insignificant at all confidence levels. However, since our theoretical 
model (14b) predicts neither the linear impact of the price differential, itd , nor the role of 
the product term, itit dMC , the insignificance of the aforementioned two coefficients should 
not represent a major concern.  
 
Although the statistical significance of the threshold effect has been confirmed for only 
16% of cases, the p-value of the structural break test is close to the region of the rejection 
of the null hypothesis implying no structural change in 60% of cases (see Table 6). This 
finding suggests that using data with a broader time span and higher frequency is likely to 
increase the ability of our threshold framework to capture structural breaks in the ERPT. 
 
2.6 Robustness checks 
 
In this section we examine the sensitivity of our estimation results to the chosen import 
price specification. Specifically, we consider two modifications of the import price model 
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(18). First, we eliminate the variables  *1ln ktD and  
*
11 lnln  ktkt DMC from the model in 
order to eliminate potential serial correlation between the price differential,  *1ln ktD , and 
the exchange rate,  *1ln kte . Specifically, since  
*
1ln ktD represents a difference between 
two import unit-values, any shock affecting the exchange rate may be transmitted to the 
price differential. Second, we introduce several additional non-linear terms to alleviate 
potential spurious correlations that result from omitted variables bias. Namely, we augment 
the import price model (18) with the terms   2*1ln ktMC ,   
3*
1ln ktMC ,   
2*
1ln ktD and 
  3*1ln ktD . Using these two modified specifications of the import price, we repeat the 
five-step estimation algorithm outlined in Section 2.3 and report the parameter estimates. 
 
It is worth noting that many empirical economists have been concerned with possible 
existence of a unit root in exchange rate series (MacDonald, 1995). While we acknowledge 
the importance of stationarity for the validity of our statistical inference, unit root tests 
have not been conducted in this study for two reasons. First, the small number of years in 
our data sample does not allow us to include a sufficient number of lags into the unit root 
test regression. On the one hand, using an insufficient number of lags is known to distort 
the size of a unit root test (Cavaliere et al., 2012). On the other hand, having a larger  
number of lags aborts the unit root test due to the problem of an insufficient number of 
observations. Second, the results of a unit root test applied to a short time-span are likely to 
be unreliable, because the rejection of the null hypothesis of the unit root necessitates a 
large number of time observations in order to analyse the mean reversion of the variable 
(MacDonald, 1996).   
 
Although our robustness checks do not address the unit root issues, a joint test of the 
linearity of the ERPT and the stationarity of data series is an interesting avenue for 
research that we wish to explore in the future with a more appropriate data sample. 
 
2.6.1 Checks for possible serial correlation among regressors 
 
In this section we eliminate the second and third regressors from the benchmark import 
price model (18) to examine the robustness of our empirical findings from Section 2.5 to 
possible serial correlation between the terms containing the price differential,  *1ln ktD , 
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and the exchange rate,  *1ln kte . We estimate the following unrestricted threshold 
regression: 
      
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lnlnlnln
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Consequently, the restricted regression implies no structural change in the exchange rate 
coefficient: 
      **1*11
*
lnlnln ktktekt
i
kt eMCp    .     (42) 
 
The estimation results are presented in Tables 7 and 8 of the Appendix. Comparing the 
robustness check results to the previous findings reported in Tables 5 and 6 does not reveal 
substantial differences either in terms of the size of the estimated parameters or their 
statistical significance. This implies that potential responsiveness of the log-transformed 
price differential,  *1ln ktD , to the shocks affecting the log-transformed exchange 
rate,  *1ln kte , does not undermine the validity of our statistical inference.        
 
Specifically, Table 5 showed that the only variable that has a statistically significant impact 
on the import unit-value of Spirits is the exchange rate in the lower regime. We also 
observed that the threshold estimate was statistically significant at the 99% confidence 
level. Our robustness check results from Tables 7 and 8 confirm previous findings. 
Specifically, the estimated coefficient on the exchange rate in the lower regime, 2 , is 
positive and statistically significant at the 99% confidence level, although it is slightly 
larger, than before the regression modification (see 4  in Table 5). Similarly, the value of 
the estimated threshold parameter, -0.14, is identical to that reported in Table 6 and has the 
same level of statistical significance, 0.01. 
 
The robustness of our previous estimation results is also confirmed for Cigarettes. We 
observed in Table 5 that the only statistically significant determinant of the Cigarettes’ 
import price was the PPI, while the exchange rate exhibited neither linear nor non-linear 
effect on the import unit-value. Our results from running the modified import price 
regression (41) are consistent with previous observations. First, the only statistically 
significant coefficient is the coefficient on the marginal cost, 1 , whose level of 
significance is higher than that of the PPI coefficient from the baseline regression (see 
Table 5). Second, the threshold estimate is not statistically significant, as reported 
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previously in Table 6. Thus, in both cases (Tables 6 and 8) we were unable to support our 
hypothesis that the ERPT into import prices follows a two-regime process. 
 
The results from estimating the modified unrestricted model (41) for Pigments are as 
encouraging as previously obtained estimates. The robustness check delivered the same 
point estimate of the threshold as before, 0.40, at the same level of statistical significance, 
5%. Similarly, the point estimates of the upper regime ERPT coefficient and their standard 
errors are identical across Tables 5 and 7. Interestingly, the modified import price 
specification (41) enabled us to reveal the statistical significance of the marginal cost 
coefficient, 1 , at the 10% significance level, while it was previously insignificant. 
However, since in Table 5 the T-statistic of 1 lies at the margin between the “no-
rejection” region and the rejection at the 90% confidence level, this discrepancy is not 
essential. 
 
Our results from running the robustness check on Footwear data slightly differ from 
previous findings (Table 5). On the one hand, while previously the marginal cost 
coefficient, 1 , was statistically insignificant, our new results suggest that the marginal cost 
has a significant impact on the import price. On the other hand, the exchange rate 
coefficient in the upper regime, 3  in Table 7, lost its statistical significance after we 
modified the baseline specification (18). However, this disparity is explained by a slight 
difference between Tables 5 and 7 in terms of coefficient point estimates and standard 
errors. These differences lead the T-statistic to cross the margin between the rejection and 
“no-rejection” regions in both directions, whereby those coefficients that are significant at 
a low confidence level may become statistically insignificant and vice versa. However, the 
similarity between the unrestricted models (18) and (41) lies in our inability to detect non-
linearity in the ERPT. In both situations the estimate of the threshold is statistically 
insignificant, although the p-value from the baseline case, 0.387, is closer to our theory 
than the new p-value, 0.510 (Table 8). 
 
The results for Rubber differ slightly from the findings corresponding to the benchmark 
model of import price (18). Previously we determined that the PPI coefficient, 1 , and the 
lower-regime ERPT coefficient, 4 , were statistically significant at the 99% confidence 
level (Table 5). After running the robustness check, we still observe a statistically 
significant coefficient on the PPI index at the 1% significance level, but the lower-regime 
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coefficient on the exchange rate loses statistical significance. Moreover, the upper regime-
coefficient on the exchange rate, 3 in Table 7, becomes significant at the 95% confidence 
level, although Table 5 reported that large price differentials were not relevant for the 
ERPT. However, this discrepancy between the ERPT estimates is not important because 
both Tables 6 and 8 suggest that the bootstrap p-value of the F1 - test statistic is 
insufficiently small to reject the null hypothesis of no structural change. Thus, we should 
adopt the restricted regressions of the benchmark (26) and modified (42) models of the 
import price and assume a linear effect of the exchange rate on the import price, e . 
Therefore, since we were able to detect a negative and statistically significant effect of the 
exchange rate in both regressions, the robustness check results are consistent with our 
initial findings on the ERPT. 
 
The robustness check findings for Joinery are almost identical to the results from running 
the baseline regression (27) in terms of the size and statistical significance of the parameter 
estimates. In both cases, the only significant determinants of the import unit-value are the 
marginal cost and the lower-regime exchange rate, whereby both variables’ coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. Our conclusion on the linearity of the 
ERPT also remains unchanged after transforming the import price model (27) into equation 
(41). Specifically, both Tables 6 and 8 report a statistically insignificant threshold with a 
point estimate of -0.10.  
 
The robustness check of the ERPT into the import prices of Cartons is consistent with 
previous findings. Specifically, both Tables 5 and 7 deliver a statistically significant ERPT 
coefficient with a point estimate of -0.10. However, we note that the coefficient on the PPI 
becomes statistically significant, unlike the PPI coefficient estimate from the baseline 
regression (27). This finding can be explained by the absence of the interaction 
term,  *11 lnln  ktkt DMC , from the modified regression (41). Specifically, the statistically 
significant PPI coefficient (Table 7) may partially reflect the marginal cost effect that was 
previously absorbed by the coefficient on the omitted term  *11 lnln  ktkt DMC . Comparing 
the PPI coefficient, 1 (Table 7), to the coefficient on the interactive term, 3 (Table 5), 
confirms the plausibility of our hypothesis, i.e. the two coefficients are almost identical in 
size and have similar standard errors. As far as the threshold parameter is concerned, both 
baseline (27) and modified (41) regressions argue in favour of a linear ERPT with 
statistically insignificant threshold estimates.  
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The results from estimating the modified regression (41) for Tubes suggest that our 
previous findings on the ERPT are affected by the elimination of the terms containing the 
log of the price differential,  *1ln ktD and  
*
11 lnln  ktkt DMC . Specifically, while the 
exchange rate coefficients were previously statistically insignificant (Table 5), Table 7 
shows a statistically significant exchange rate coefficient with a point estimate of -0.20. 
We suggest that the coefficient on the exchange rate may have absorbed the effect of the 
omitted terms,  *1ln ktD and  
*
11 lnln  ktkt DMC , which were shown to have a statistically 
significant impact on the import price (Table 5). Specifically, a depreciation of the US 
dollar relative to Euro increases the differential between the import price of the European 
good and the world price for this commodity. Thus, the negative exchange rate coefficient 
(Table 7) may indicate a negative impact of the log of the price differential,  *1ln ktD , on 
the import price.  
 
The elimination of the regressors containing the price differential from the baseline import 
price model (27) for Tubes also affected the statistical significance of the threshold 
estimate. While the threshold parameter was previously insignificant (Table 6), it became 
statistically significant at the 10% significance level after running the modified regression 
(41). We argue that this finding on the non-linearity of the ERPT reflects the non-linear 
effect of the omitted interaction term,  *11 lnln  ktkt DMC . Specifically, Table 5 confirmed 
that the log of the price differential has a non-linear effect on the import price through the 
statistical significance of the coefficient on the interaction term,  *11 lnln  ktkt DMC . After 
the elimination of the interaction term, the non-linear effect of the price differential may 
have been reflected in the statistical significance of the threshold estimate, because the 
existence of threshold implies that the price differential (i.e. threshold variable) has a non-
linear impact on the import unit-value. However, our finding on the positive and 
statistically significant effect of the PPI on the import price is valid for both baseline (27) 
and modified (41) models.  
 
Examining the robustness check results for Peripheral units suggests no significant 
differences from the previous output. Both baseline (27) and modified (41) regressions 
revealed that the only variable having a statistically significant impact on the import price 
is the upper-regime exchange rate. In both cases, the upper-regime ERPT is negative with a 
point estimate of -0.39 and -0.38, respectively. Our previous finding on the linearity of the 
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ERPT is also robust to the exclusion of the price differential terms. Specifically, both 
Tables 6 and 8 report a statistically insignificant threshold parameter with a point estimate 
of -0.25. Thus, possible serial correlation among the baseline model (27) regressors has not 
affected our statistical inference on the ERPT into the Peripheral units’ import price. 
 
Our previous empirical findings for Sailboats are also robust to serial correlation, since we 
are unable to detect substantial differences between Tables 5 and 7 in terms of the size of 
the coefficient estimates. Thus, the estimated coefficients on the PPI, lower-regime 
exchange rate and upper-regime exchange rate equal 3.84, 0.16 and -0.44 for the baseline 
model (27) and 3.38, 0.16 and -0.46 for the modified regression (41), respectively. The 
only difference between these two cases lies in the statistical insignificance of the PPI 
coefficient estimate in Table 7, while previously PPI had a significant impact on the import 
price. However, in both cases, the PPI coefficient estimate lies at the boundary between the 
“no-rejection” region and the region of the rejection of the null hypothesis. In particular, 
the baseline (27) PPI coefficient estimate is significant at the 90% confidence level, while 
the modified (41) estimate is close to the rejection of the null hypothesis of no significance 
with a T-statistic of 1.60.  
 
Similarly, the omission of the price differential terms in the modified regression (41) for 
Sailboats did not impact significantly our statistical inference on the ERPT. Similarly to 
the baseline (27) case, we obtained a threshold parameter with a point estimate of -1.60. 
Although the associated p-value is lower than previously (Table 6), both p-values are 
insufficiently small to reject the null hypothesis of linear ERPT.  
 
The results of the robustness check of the ERPT into the import price of Stockings contrast 
our previous predictions, because the coefficients of the terms which we omitted in the 
modified regression (41),  *11 lnln  ktkt DMC and  
*
1ln ktD , were statistically significant 
(Table 5). The first difference between the baseline (27) and modified (41) model outputs 
lies in the statistical significance of the estimated PPI coefficient (Table 7), while 
previously it was not significantly different from zero (Table 5). We suggest that the 
coefficient on the log-transformed marginal cost,  *1ln ktMC , in the modified regression 
(41) may have absorbed the impact of the omitted interaction term,  *11 lnln  ktkt DMC , 
because the latter contained the marginal cost and was statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence level (Table 5). This hypothesis seems plausible when we note that the 
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marginal cost coefficient from Table 7 and the interaction term coefficient from Table 5 
are both large and positive. But the most striking difference between the baseline 
regression (27) output and modified regression (41) results is reflected in the statistical 
insignificance of both exchange rate coefficients, while the lower-regime exchange rate 
coefficient was previously significant at the 95% confidence level (Table 5). Thus, the 
omission of the variables that had a statistically significant impact on the import price, 
 *11 lnln  ktkt DMC and  
*
1ln ktD , affected the ERPT estimates. However, our previous 
statistical inference on the linearity of the ERPT (Table 6) has not been impacted. The 
bootstrap replications of the baseline (27) and modified (41) regressions yielded a positive 
and statistically insignificant estimate of the threshold parameter, although the baseline 
model p-value lies closer to the region of the rejection of the null hypothesis of no 
structural change at the 90% confidence level.  
 
We conclude the robustness check for potential serial correlation among regressors by 
examining the modified regression (41) results for Catalogues. Similarly to the baseline 
case (27), the point estimate of the ERPT coefficient is positive and statistically significant 
at the 99 % confidence level. Moreover, neither the baseline (27) nor modified (41) 
regression outputs could reject the null hypothesis that the PPI coefficient is insignificantly 
different from zero. Finally, the exclusion of price differential terms from the baseline 
regression (27) did not impact the size and statistical significance of the estimated 
threshold parameter. Both Tables 6 and 8 report a statistically insignificant threshold with a 
point estimate of 0.70. Thus, our findings suggest that potential serial correlation among 
regressors of the benchmark model (27) of Catalogues’ import prices did not undermine 
the robustness of ERPT estimates.  
 
This section concluded that, for the majority of product categories considered, potential 
serial correlation among regressors of the unrestricted import price model (27) does not 
impact the estimates of structural breaks in the ERPT. In order to enhance the robustness of 
our predictions on the ERPT, we run an additional robustness check in the next section, 
which examines the possibility of spurious correlations resulting from omitted variables 
bias. 
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2.6.2 Checks for possible bias from omitted variables 
 
In this section we are concerned with potential bias stemming from omitted variables. The 
import price definition (13a) suggests that the import price of good i  is affected by the 
marginal cost, exchange rate and the price differential between good i and its substitute. 
However, the import price definition (13a) may have omitted additional determinants of 
the import price. If these omitted variables are correlated with the included determinants of 
the import price, the coefficient estimates from the import price regression (27) may be 
biased and inconsistent. A suitable candidate for an omitted variable is a measure of 
technological improvement, since it affects both the regressor (marginal cost) and the 
dependent variable (import price) in the threshold regression (27). On the one hand, a more 
efficient technology lowers labour costs, as producers can substitute machinery for labour 
in some chains of the production process. On the other hand, technological advancement 
may affect the final price of the good by improving its quality.  
 
In order to alleviate omitted variables bias, Hansen (1999) proposes to augment the 
regression with quadratic and cubic terms of those variables which have a linear effect on 
the dependent variable. Therefore, we augment our baseline specification (27) of the 
import price with the powers of the log-transformed marginal cost and price differential:  
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The unrestricted model of the import price (43) allows us to infer non-linearities in the 
regression relationships. For instance, the statistical significance of the coefficient on the 
power of the marginal cost, i.e. 2  or 3 , suggests that the marginal cost has a non-linear 
influence on the import unit-value.  
The restricted regression corresponding to the augmented import price model (43) is 
represented by  
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Before discussing the results from estimating the unrestricted regression (43), let us 
determine the expected signs of the coefficients on the additional variables. The expected 
effect of the square (i.e. the second power) of the log-transformed marginal cost is 
positive, 02  . Specifically, an increase of the squared log of the marginal 
cost,   2*1ln ktMC , implies that either the negative log of the marginal cost has fallen or 
the positive log of the marginal cost has risen. However, in our data sample the log of the 
marginal cost may not be negative, because the marginal cost is measured by PPI whose 
value is always close to 100. Therefore, squared log of the marginal cost has a positive 
effect on the import price, because an increase of the marginal cost raises the import price 
(13a).  
 
Similarly, the coefficient on the cube (i.e. the third power) of the marginal 
cost,   3*1ln ktMC , unambiguously has a positive sign, since an increase in the cube of the 
log-transformed marginal cost is caused by a rise in the log-transformed marginal cost. 
Because the log of the import price increases in the log-transformed marginal cost, 
coefficient 3 exceeds zero. 
 
In contrast, the expected sign of the coefficient on the squared log of the price differential, 
5 , is ambiguous, since it depends on the sign of the log-transformed price differential. A 
rise in the second power of the log of the price differential,   2*1ln ktD , suggests that 
either  *1ln ktD has risen and   0ln
*
1 ktD  or  
*
1ln ktD has fallen and   0ln
*
1 ktD . For 
positive values of the log of the price differential, the log of the import price will fall in the 
square of the log-transformed price differential, i.e. 05  , because the price differential 
has a negative impact on the import price (see 14a). In contrast, for negative logs of the 
price differential, 05   holds because a fall in the price differential raises the import 
price. 
  
The coefficient on the cube of the log-transformed price differential,   3*1ln ktD , is 
unambiguously negative. Specifically, whether the log of the price differential is positive 
or negative, an increase of   3*1ln ktD implies that  *1ln ktD has risen. Therefore, the log 
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of the import price falls in   3*1ln ktD due to the negative impact of the price differential 
on the import price, i.e. 06  . 
 
Tables 9A, 9B and 10 in the Appendix report the results from estimating the augmented 
import price specification (43). They support our previous predictions on the extent of the 
ERPT into Spirits’ import prices and its non-linearity. In both the baseline (27) and 
augmented (43) regressions of the import price, threshold parameter estimate equals -0.14 
and is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. Moreover, in both cases, the 
upper-regime ERPT is negative and statistically insignificant, while the lower-regime 
ERPT is positive and significant at the 99% confidence level. In contrast, the marginal cost 
coefficient in the augmented regression (43) became statistically significant at the 5% level 
of significance, while previously it was not significantly different from zero (Table 5). 
However, the large magnitude of the estimated coefficients on the marginal cost and its 
powers, as well as substantial standard errors associated with these coefficients, suggest 
that these estimates may have been affected by the serial correlation among the first three 
regressors in the specification (43).   
 
The robustness check results for Cigarettes are also consistent with previous empirical 
findings (Table 5). Specifically, both baseline (27) and augmented (43) regression outputs 
deliver a linear ERPT with a statistically insignificant threshold estimate of -0.21. 
Furthermore, in both cases, the ERPT estimate is statistically insignificant in either upper 
or lower regime. Interestingly, the marginal cost coefficient lost its statistical significance 
after we augmented the baseline model (27) with non-linear terms. However, this 
difference from previous output (Table 5) is due to a small reduction of the absolute value 
of the T-statistic, which led to the statistical insignificance of the coefficient that was 
previously significant at the 90% confidence level. 
 
The case of Pigments did not generate significant deviations from previous empirical 
predictions (Tables 5 and 6). Both baseline (27) and augmented (43) regressions yielded a 
statistically significant structural break in the ERPT with a point estimate of 0.40. 
Moreover, in both cases, the lower-regime ERPT is negative and statistically insignificant, 
while the upper-regime ERPT is positive and statistically significant at the 99% confidence 
level. Similarly to Cigarettes, we observe that previously insignificant estimate of the 
coefficient on the log-transformed marginal cost (Table 5) became statistically significant 
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in the augmented regression (43). This finding is explained by a small increase in the 
absolute value of the T-statistic, which caused an insignificant coefficient to become 
statistically significant at the 10% level of significance.  
 
Our previous conclusion on the linearity of the ERPT into Footwear import prices (Table 
6) remains unchallenged. Thus, both baseline (27) and augmented (43) regression outputs 
report a positive and statistically insignificant estimate of structural break in the ERPT. 
Similarly, in both cases, the lower-regime ERPT estimate is positive and statistically 
insignificant. However, the upper-regime ERPT estimate from augmented model (43) 
became zero and insignificant, while previously it was positive and statistically significant 
at the 90% confidence level (Table 5). We attribute the significance of the upper-regime 
ERPT coefficient in the baseline case (27) to spurious correlations associated with omitted 
variable bias, because the baseline regression excluded the cubed price differential, whose 
coefficient is statistically significant (Table 9B). It is worth noting that previously 
insignificant coefficients on the price differential and interaction term became statistically 
significant (Tables 9A and 9B). However, this finding is not surprising, since the T-statistic 
values corresponding to these two estimates lie at the border between the “no-rejection” 
region and the critical region for the 90% confidence level. 
 
The robustness check results for Rubber also suggest that the ERPT estimates from the 
benchmark import price regression (27) may suffer from omitted variables bias.  
Specifically, the lower-regime ERPT estimate was statistically significant at the 99% 
confidence level (Table 5), but it is not significantly different from zero in the augmented 
regression (43). We argue that the lower-regime ERPT coefficient in the baseline case (27) 
may have spuriously reflected the non-linear impact of the omitted variable that is 
correlated with the exchange rate, namely   2*1ln ktD , whose coefficient is statistically 
significant (Table 9A). We are also surprised by the statistical insignificance of the PPI 
coefficient, while previously the marginal cost had a significant impact on the import unit-
value (Table 5). However, the large point estimates and standard errors of the coefficients 
on the marginal cost and its powers hint that these estimates may have been affected by the 
serial correlation among marginal cost terms.  
 
Our previous findings on the linearity of the ERPT into the Rubber import price remained 
valid after the addition of non-linear terms to the baseline regression (27), as both baseline 
and augmented (43) regressions delivered insufficiently small p-values that failed to reject 
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the null hypothesis of no structural change. Similarly, in both cases the upper-regime 
ERPT is not significantly different from zero, as both estimation outputs failed to provide 
evidence of non-linearities in the ERPT. 
 
Our initial findings on the ERPT of Joinery do not seem to be affected by omitted variables 
bias, because the parameter estimates from the augmented regression (43) are broadly 
consistent with the baseline regression (27) results. Thus, in both cases, the threshold 
parameter is statistically insignificant with a point estimate of -0.10, although both 
bootstrap p-values are close to the region of the null hypothesis rejection (i.e. pv < 0.2). 
The point estimates of the ERPT are also similar in size and statistical significance to our 
previous estimation results (Table 5). In both baseline (27) and augmented (43) models, the 
upper-regime ERPT is negative and insignificant, while the lower-regime ERPT is 
negative and statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.  
 
Our robustness check findings for Cartons also suggest that the initial ERPT estimates 
(Tables 5 and 6) are not sensitive to potentially omitted variables. Specifically, in both 
benchmark (27) and augmented (43) models the point estimate of the threshold parameter 
equals -0.10, but the large size of the associated bootstrap p-values does not allow us to 
reject the null hypothesis of the ERPT stability. Moreover, in both cases, the upper-regime 
estimate of the ERPT coefficient is statistically insignificant and equals 0.04, while the 
lower-regime ERPT is negative and significant at the 90% confidence level. Finally, in 
both benchmark (27) and augmented (43) regressions we failed to find evidence of the 
importance of the marginal cost for the import price, as both PPI coefficients are not 
significantly different from zero.  
 
Comparing our previous findings for Tubes (Table 5) to the ERPT predictions of the 
augmented regression (43) suggests that the import price specification (27) may suffer 
from omitted variables bias. Specifically, while previously the ERPT coefficients were not 
significantly different from zero, the upper-regime ERPT estimate became statistically 
significant at the 99% confidence level (Table 9B). Thus, the estimated ERPT coefficients 
of the baseline (27) regression may be subject to omitted variables bias, because the 
omitted non-linear terms,   2*1ln ktD and   
3*
1ln ktD , are statistically significant in the 
augmented regression (43). However, both regressions confirmed that the log-transformed 
marginal cost, log-transformed price differential and their product,  *11 lnln  ktkt DMC , are 
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significant determinants of the import price, since the estimated coefficients on these three 
variables are statistically significant. Furthermore, in both cases, the ERPT is proved to be 
linear, as the two bootstrap p-values are too large to reject the null hypothesis of parameter 
stability.  
 
Examining the augmented regression (43) results for Peripheral units does not indicate that 
previous ERPT estimates (Tables 5 and 6) contain omitted variables bias. Specifically, 
both augmented (43) and baseline (27) regressions suggest that the ERPT follows a one-
regime process, as the associated bootstrap p-values exceed the desired level of statistical 
significance. Moreover, in both cases, the point estimate of the ERPT is negative and 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. In contrast, we are surprised by the 
negative and statistically significant estimate of the marginal cost coefficient (Table 9A), 
while previous output (Table 5) suggested that the marginal cost has no impact on the 
import price. However, we doubt the reliability of this coefficient estimate, because the 
large size of the estimate and its standard error alludes to the serial correlation among the 
marginal cost terms in the augmented regression (43). 
 
Our previous conclusion about the linearity of the ERPT into Sailboats’ import prices 
(Table 6) could not be overruled after estimating the augmented regression (43) of the 
import price. Both baseline (27) and augmented (43) regressions report a negative and 
statistically insignificant estimate of the threshold parameter. Similarly, our previous 
empirical finding about the insignificance of the exchange rate coefficients is confirmed 
(Table 9B). We are disappointed by the statistical insignificance of the estimated 
coefficient on the marginal cost because previously it was significantly different from zero 
(Table 5) at the 90% confidence level. However, as its T-statistic exceeded the critical 
value by as little as 0.04, it is not surprising that the statistical significance of the marginal 
cost coefficient is not robust to the model specification. We also note that the coefficients 
on the price differential and the interaction term,  *11 lnln  ktkt DMC , became statistically 
significant, while previously they were not significantly different from zero (Table 5). 
However, given that these two regressors serially correlate with variables which were 
absent from the baseline regression (27), i.e.   2*1ln ktD ,   
3*
1ln ktD ,   
2*
1ln ktMC  and 
  3*1ln ktMC , the point estimates of 4 and 7 may not be reliable. 
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The estimation results of the augmented ERPT model (43) for Stockings did not conflict 
with the previous empirical findings (Table 5). Specifically, both baseline (27) and 
augmented (43) regressions report an estimated threshold parameter of 1.42 and a 
bootstrap p-value that lies outside the region of the rejection of the null hypothesis of no 
structural change. Moreover, in both cases the lower-regime ERPT is positive and 
statistically significant, while the upper-regime ERPT is not significantly different from 
zero. Similarly, in both baseline (27) and augmented (43) regressions the marginal cost 
coefficient is statistically insignificant, the price differential coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant, and the coefficient on the interaction term,  *11 lnln  ktkt DMC , is 
positive and statistically significant. 
 
The results from the augmented regression (43) on data for Catalogues support our 
previous predictions on the size and statistical significance of the parameter estimates 
(Tables 5 and 6). Thus, both augmented (43) and benchmark (27) regressions suggest a 
one-regime ERPT by delivering a statistically insignificant threshold estimate of 0.70. 
Moreover, in both cases, the lower-regime ERPT is positive and statistically significant, 
while the upper-regime ERPT is negative and insignificantly different from zero. 
Furthermore, both augmented (43) and benchmark (27) regressions deliver a statistically 
insignificant coefficient on the marginal cost and a positive coefficient on the price 
differential, which is significant at the 95% confidence level. Finally, in both cases, the 
estimated effect of the interaction term,  *11 lnln  ktkt DMC , is negative and statistically 
significant. 
 
In this section we examined the robustness of our predictions on the degree and stability of 
the ERPT to potential serial correlation among regressors and omitted variables bias. The 
former issue was tackled by removing from the import price regression the variables that 
might be serially correlated with the exchange rate. We dealt with the latter issue by adding 
the second and third powers of selected regressors to the import price regression. Running 
threshold regression on the modified specifications of the import price suggests that our 
initial findings on the size and stability of the ERPT effect are robust to serial correlation 
and omitted variables bias. For the majority of the products considered, the point estimates 
of the ERPT parameters and their statistical significance have not been affected by 
adjustments of the import price specification. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
 
This Chapter studied structural breaks in the ERPT into the US import prices of selected 
European goods. First, the study proposed a novel theoretical model that justifies threshold 
effects in the ERPT by structural breaks in the consumer’s incentive to switch to an 
alternative brand. Specifically, if the consumer’s switching incentive rises above the 
threshold, the ERPT falls since the exporter decreases the mark-up of price over the 
marginal cost to prevent the consumer from switching. Second, we employed the threshold 
regression and bootstrap simulation methodology by Hansen (1999) to test for threshold 
effects in the ERPT into the US import prices of twelve European goods in 1995-2011. Our 
estimation output suggests that, for the majority of traded commodities considered, either 
the LR test statistic rejects the null hypothesis of no structural change or it lies at the 
margin between the no-rejection and rejection regions. The point estimates of the threshold 
parameter are consistent with the proposed theoretic model. Specifically, a higher ERPT is 
observed in the region where the price advantage of the European exporters over 
competitors is large. Similarly, a lower ERPT characterizes the regime where the European 
exporters do not possess a significant price advantage over other suppliers. Finally, we 
checked that our predictions on the degree and stability of the ERPT are robust to serial 
correlation among regressors and omitted variables bias. 
 
However, our ERPT model has certain limitations. The most evident limitation relates to 
its reliance on the cost of switching between substitutes, since the switching cost represents 
a fundamental mechanism generating non-linearities in the ERPT. Some product categories 
may have substantial switching costs, while for other commodities such costs would be 
negligible. For example, it would be costly to switch to alternative model of the sailboat, 
since it requires an adequate training that would enable the user to operate the new model. 
However, switching to a substitute brand of cigarettes does not entail such training costs. 
Therefore, our model may not fit all products equally well. 
 
Another limitation of our framework lies in the absence of data on switching costs. To the 
best of the author’s knowledge, there is no survey reporting such costs, because the 
majority of customers do not normally record their switching expenses. Thus, we cannot 
judge whether threshold estimates represent a plausible estimate of switchings costs in the 
absence of ballpark figures on the switching cost. We are unable to deduce the role of the 
switching cost in generating thresholds in the ERPT, because there may be other reasons 
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for non-linear response of the import price to the exchange rate. For example, customer 
may be loyal to a certain product and hesitate to switch, even if the price of his preferred 
commodity is higher than that of a substitute. If this price differential is small, he may 
continue buying from the existing supplier, as his utility from consuming the favourite 
good outweighs the loss that he incurs by failing to switch to a cheaper substitute. However, 
if the price differential is sufficiently large, the willingness to save may prevail over 
loyalty and customer may abandon his preferred supplier.  
 
Similarly to the switching cost, customer’s loyalty may generate structural breaks in the 
ERPT. Suppose that a depreciation of the importer’s currency generated an increase in the 
import price of his favourite commodity. If the price differential between this commodity 
and its substitute is small, the importer is unlikely to abandon his existing supplier due to 
the brand loyalty. Therefore, the exporter producing the importer’s preferred commodity 
does not have the incentive to offset the increase in the local currency price of his good by 
limiting the ERPT, since he is unlikely to lose a loyal buyer. However, if his product 
becomes substantially expensive relative to the substitute, the importer may switch to a 
rival firm’s product. In order to prevent the customer from leaving, the existing supplier 
needs to offset the increase in the import price of his product by reducing the ERPT. 
Therefore, the ERPT is non-linear and follows a two-regime process. In the first regime, 
pass-through is high because the price differential between the preferred good and its 
substitute is small. In the second regime, ERPT is low since the price differential becomes 
sufficiently large to exceed its threshold level.  
 
Thus, using the price differential between substitutes as threshold variable does not allow 
us to determine whether structural breaks in the ERPT are caused by switching costs or 
brand loyalty. Although the switching cost represents a plausible theoretic mechanism that 
explains non-linearities in the ERPT, we are unable to confirm that causality runs from the 
switching cost to the import price in the absence of data on switching costs. Therefore, in 
the next Chapter we propose a new theoretic model of non-linear PTM and ERPT, which 
does not rely on the switching cost to justify structural breaks in the parameters. Instead of 
concentrating on switching costs, we discuss the role of the cost of “entering the market”. 
This concept was borrowed from Krugman (1986) who suggested that the demand for a 
product depends on the volatility of its price, since customers need time to choose among 
all affordable products in the market. For example, if fluctuations of a car price are large, 
customers may not find it reasonable to visit its showroom, because the price may exceed 
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their budget in the near future. Thus, they may not wish to invest into a costly product 
analysis, if at the end they may not be able to afford the product. Krugman (1986) argues 
that customers prefer avoiding the suppliers which fail to maintain a reasonable level of 
price stability. Therefore, due to the importer’s preference for price stability, a rational 
exporter should attempt to mitigate an increase in the import price of his good following 
the depreciation of the importer’s currency.  
 
Using Krugman’s proposition on the importer’s preference for price stability (Krugman, 
1986), in Chapter 3 we build a partial equilibrium model where the extent of the PTM is 
unstable, since it responds to the inconstant volatility of the import price. Intuitively, the 
extent of the PTM should be stronger during periods of high volatility of the import price, 
because importers are likely to switch to a supplier offering a higher price stability. 
However, during times of low volatility of the import price, limiting the ERPT into the 
import price may not be necessary, since the likelihood of losing potential or existing 
customers is smaller. Thus, the ERPT into import prices is likely to be unstable, since the 
volatility of the import price is inconstant due to currency fluctuations.  
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3. Chapter 3: Does Currency 
Volatility Generate Time Variation 
in the PTM? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
There exists abundant empirical research on the ability of the PTM models to explain the 
dynamics of export and import prices. Goldberg and Knetter (1997) offer a comprehensive 
review of empirical evidence on the international price discrimination by exporters and 
incomplete ERPT. Despite the abundance of empirical studies on the ability of exchange 
rate movements to explain price dynamics, the time variance of the model parameters has 
not been studied in depth, although the responsiveness of traded goods’ prices to currency 
movements may increase or decrease over time. For instance, Vigfusson et al. (2007) 
detect widespread instability in the responsiveness of export prices to exchange rate 
movements. Furthermore, Campa and Goldberg (2002) conduct tests of parameter stability 
in the relationship between exchange rates and prices. 
 
However, few attempts have been made to provide a theoretical justification behind the 
instability in the exchange rate elasticity of prices. Froot and Klemperer (1989) were 
among the first to point out the instability of the PTM over time. In a two-period setting, 
they show that the impact of an appreciation of the importer’s currency on the import price 
depends on the exporter’s perceptions of the duration of the appreciation. If the 
appreciation is perceived to be temporary, the exporter will not adjust the import price 
because the appreciation of the importer’s currency increases the value of the exporter’s 
profits in his currency. Thus, the exporter prefers keeping the import price intact in order to 
enjoy higher profit margins, because the exchange rate is believed to revert to the initial 
level in the next period and erode these profit margins. However, if the importer’s currency 
appreciation is perceived to be permanent, the exporter will unambiguously decrease the 
import price, since the value of his costs in the importer’s currency falls permanently as a 
result of a permanent appreciation. Thus, the degree of the ERPT into import prices is 
lower when the exchange rate changes temporarily, as opposed to a permanent currency 
movement. 
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In this chapter, we revisit the benchmark theoretic model of PTM (Gagnon and Knetter, 
1995; Knetter, 1995) and adjust it to introduce exchange rate volatility, which undermines 
the stability of the PTM coefficients
2
 due to customers’ preference for price stability. 
Specifically, in a volatile exchange rate environment, firms are expected to strongly reduce 
their export prices following the importer’s currency depreciation, because customers 
dislike large and frequent fluctuations in the import price (Krugman, 1986). In a stable 
exchange rate environment, exporters have a weaker incentive to decrease the export price 
after the importer’s currency depreciation, because the import price level is relatively 
stable.  
 
After introducing our theoretic model of unstable PTM, we test the stability of the PTM 
into the UK export prices using a selection of model mis-specification tests that are robust 
to varying degrees of parameter evolution (Rossi, 2006). Our test selection includes models 
with no adaptivity (fixed parameter models), models with moderate adaptivity (recursive 
tests, rolling regressions and random walk coefficient time varying parameter (RWCTVP) 
models with small coefficient evolution) and models with high adaptivity (RWCTVP 
models with large coefficient evolution). The adaptivity is defined as the robustness of a 
model to the time variation in its parameters. These tests enable us to detect structural 
breaks in the PTM parameters by examining the ability of a specification to forecast export 
prices. 
 
Although we could potentially apply structural break tests to the estimated PTM 
parameters, Rossi (2006) suggests that in a situation of parameter instability we should test 
jointly for both the significance of a coefficient and its instability. Thus, we should test a 
joint null hypothesis that implies both parameter constancy and coefficient insignificance. 
Specifically, the first part of the joint null hypothesis of the PTM test implies that the 
coefficient on the exchange rate in a regression of the export price equals some constant 
value, while the second part states that this constant value of the exchange rate coefficient 
equals zero. Rossi (2006) suggests that out-of-sample forecast test represents a superior 
methodology for jointly testing the significance and inconstancy of a parameter. Therefore, 
we conduct four out-of-sample forecasting tests – split, rolling, recursive and RWCTVP 
regressions. 
 
                                               
2 Pricing-to-market coefficients denote coefficients on exchange rate terms in the regression of the export 
price. 
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The novelty of this study is three-fold. First, this Chapter provides theoretical 
underpinnings for the instability of the PTM by extending the stylized PTM model 
(Gagnon and Knetter, 1995; Knetter, 1995). We show that the instability in the relationship 
between export prices and exchange rates may be caused by the volatility of the exchange 
rate, because currency volatility leads to the import price volatility. The importance of the 
import price volatility for export price-setting was suggested by Krugman (1986), who 
argued that consumers prefer credible suppliers that maintain a stable range within which 
import prices fluctuate. Specifically, since choosing an appropriate product may demand 
significant time and financial resources, customers need a stable price benchmark in order 
to determine whether the import price is significantly attractive to engage in a costly 
market research.  Using Krugman’s hypothesis on consumers’ preference for price stability 
(Krugman, 1986), we adopt a new function of the importer’s demand, which depends 
negatively on the volatility of the import price. The shape of the demand function 
represents the main distinction between our model and the stylized PTM framework 
(Knetter, 1995). The addition of the import price volatility to the arguments of the 
importer’s demand function introduces instability in the response of the export price to the 
exchange rate, because import price instability discourages consumers from starting to 
analyze the firm’s product. During periods of high exchange rate volatility, the exporter 
facing his currency appreciation may wish to correct large import price fluctuations by 
sharply cutting the export price. When the exchange rate volatility is low, the exporter may 
not need to reduce his export price substantially after the appreciation, because the range of 
fluctuations of the import price is likely to be narrow and insufficient to encourage the 
importer to avoid this product. Thus, in times of high exchange rate volatility, the increase 
of the import price following the importer’s currency depreciation is relatively low, since 
the exporter stabilizes the import price level by performing a relatively large decrease in 
the export price. In contrast, in the situation of low currency volatility, the increase in the 
import price following the exporter’s currency appreciation is relatively large due to 
relatively weak reduction of the export price. Therefore, the extent of the ERPT falls in the 
volatility of the exchange rate. 
 
Second, we use a recently developed forecast encompassing test (Clark and McCracken, 
2001) in order to test the statistical significance of the difference between the mean 
forecasting errors of two nested models. Specifically, we assess a model’s ability to 
forecast export prices in order to determine the most appropriate specification of the export 
price evolution. The forecasting ability of the model is described by the size of its average 
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forecasting error. When faced with two export price specifications, we should choose the 
model that delivers a lower mean forecasting error than alternative model. In order to 
determine whether the difference between the mean squared errors of the rival 
specifications is statistically significant, we employ the ENC-NEW forecast encompassing 
test by Clark and McCracken (2001). They show that ENC-NEW test is the most powerful 
out-of-sample forecast statistic for small samples.  
 
It is worth noting that Diebold and Mariano (1995) also developed a methodology for 
comparing predictive accuracy of competing models, but their methodology is not suitable 
for nested models. However, our econometric framework involves comparing the 
forecasting ability of nested models, because in order to test for PTM, we need to test the 
statistical significance of the exchange rate coefficient using two nested models of export 
price. The unrestricted specification includes exchange rate regressors and the restricted 
specification excludes them. If firms conduct the PTM by adjusting their export prices 
following currency movements, the inclusion of the exchange rate in the export price 
specification should significantly reduce the mean forecasting error. Thus, we need the 
forecast encompassing test by Clark and McCracken (2001) in order to determine the 
statistical significance of the difference between the average forecasting errors of the 
unrestricted and restricted models. 
 
Third, we attempt to design an econometric framework that has a superior ability to predict 
export prices. To the best of our knowledge, the recent empirical literature has not focused 
on assessing the forecasting performance of export price models. Although several studies 
implement rolling regressions to study time variance in the ERPT (Vigfusson et al., 2007), 
the significance of a model’s forecasting superiority has not been tested rigorously. We 
attempt to fill this gap in the empirical literature by running four types of out-of-sample 
tests, i.e. fixed, rolling, recursive and RWCTVP regressions. Out-of-sample tests enable us 
to assess the ability of the in-sample estimates of the model parameters to predict one-
period-ahead values of the export price. Thus, our estimation methodology simultaneously 
serves two purposes. First, it enables us to find the predictive content of exchange rates for 
determining export prices using a time varying parameter model. Second, it allows us to 
detect the specification that shows a superior ability to forecast export prices. Developing 
sound tools for predicting export prices will assist policy-makers in forecasting future 
levels of inflation, because the dynamics of the domestic price level depends on 
fluctuations of the export prices of imported goods.  
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This Chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the role of the exchange rate 
volatility on exporters’ pricing policies, since currency volatility represents the driver of 
the ERPT instability in our model. Specifically, we will present the assumptions that we 
make about the importer’s demand function, since the constancy of the PTM parameters in 
our framework depends on the shape of the buyer’s demand function.  
 
Section 3.3 presents a brief overview of three partial equilibrium models of the ERPT and 
PTM by imperfectly competitive firms, namely the frameworks by Knetter (1989), Gross 
and Schmitt (2000) and Benigno and Faia (2010). We discuss these particular theoretic 
models due to their ability to justify a time varying PTM and ERPT into import prices.  
 
Section 3.4 introduces our theoretical framework, which represents a partial equilibrium 
model featuring a representative exporting firm. This monopolistically competitive firm 
exports to a destination country whose consumers dislike the volatility of the import price 
of its good. Through solving the firm’s profit-maximization problem we show that the 
response of the export price to the exchange rate is unstable over time, since the export 
price depends on the time varying volatility of the import price.  
 
Section 3.5 presents our econometric framework, which represents a selection of out-of-
sample forecasting tests designed to detect the importance of the exchange rate for 
reducing the mean forecasting error of an export price model. The out-of-sample 
forecasting tests adopted in this study differ on the robustness to parameter evolution over 
time (i.e. the degree of the regression parameter evolution), in order to enable us to 
determine the degree of the instability in the PTM and ERPT.  
 
Section 3.6 describes the dataset used to estimate the forecasting performance of 
competing models of export price. Specifically, we retrieved data on UK manufactured 
exports to the EU from the Monthly Review of External Trade Statistics, since this database 
disaggregates export price indices by commodity group and offers a relatively high 
frequency (i.e. monthly). A higher level of product disaggregation increases the precision 
of the regression coefficient estimates, since various commodities may be subject to 
different degrees of the PTM and ERPT (Campa and Goldberg, 2002).  
 
Section 3.7 presents empirical results from running rolling, recursive, fixed and RWCTVP 
regressions of the UK export price indices on the PPI for the output of manufactured goods 
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and Broad Sterling Effective Exchange Rate Index. We report a Root Mean Squared 
Forecast Error (RMSFE) for each export price specification in order to determine the 
model that delivers a superior forecasting performance by offering the smallest forecast 
error. In addition, we present the values of the forecast encompassing test statistic by Clark 
and McCracken (2001) in order to infer whether the addition of the exchange rate to the 
export price model significantly reduces its RMSFE. 
 
Section 3.8 outlines an empirical methodology for checking the robustness of the 
estimation results to seasonal effects in export price series. First, we transform each 
variable in the export price regression into annualized inflation in order to remove potential 
seasonality observed over one year. Second, we repeat the estimation procedure from 
Section 3.7 by applying out-of-sample forecasting tests to the transformed data, which is 
represented by the annualized inflations of the UK export prices, PPI and exchange rates. 
Third, we report the resulting RMSFE and the values of the forecast encompassing test 
statistic by Clark and McCracken (2001), in order to compare the results from running the 
export price regression on seasonally adjusted data to the empirical findings presented in 
Section 3.7.  
 
Finally, Section 3.9 concludes this Chapter by summarizing its main empirical findings. 
Specifically, we will discuss whether models including exchange rates forecast export 
prices significantly better than the specifications which restrict the exchange rate 
coefficients to equal zero. We will also determine whether models that accommodate 
parameter evolution predict UK export prices better than models with a zero degree of 
robustness to parameter inconstancy.  
 
3.2 The effect of exchange rate volatility on the PTM  
 
The volatility of the exchange rate affects the exporting firm’s price setting policies by 
influencing international trade flows. For instance, Kenen (2000) suggests that increased 
exchange rate variability may adversely affect future trade volumes and investment due to 
the uncertainty generated by foreign currency exposure. In order to understand the risk 
resulting from an adverse movement of the exchange rate, consider a US firm that exports 
to the UK a good whose price is set in Great British Pounds. An appreciation of the Pound 
Sterling raises the US firm’s revenue expressed in USD, because the number of US dollars 
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that may be obtained for one Pound increases. Conversely, the depreciation of the Pound 
Sterling generates a fall in the USD revenue of the US exporter, as the conversion of one 
Pound into US dollars yields a smaller number of units. Thus, the uncertainty of future 
exchange rate movements implies the unpredictability of the exporter’s revenues. 
Therefore, exporting firms should incorporate the risk generated by the volatility of the 
exchange rate into their price-setting policies. For example, US exporters may wish to 
maintain in the current period large profit margins by charging sizeable mark-ups of price 
over the marginal cost, if they believe that in the next period the Pound Sterling will 
depreciate and erode the exporter’s profits expressed in USD.  
 
Not only does the volatility of the exchange rate affect exporters in the economy, but it 
may also influence importers’ behaviour. Krugman (1986) suggested that buyers dislike 
frequent fluctuations in the price of the product that they plan to purchase. He explains the 
buyer’s preference for price stability by noting that the purchase of foreign differentiated 
commodities follows a two-stage process. For instance, consider a differentiated good that 
possesses complex characteristics and demands a commitment to researching various 
options available in the market. Suppose that a buyer considers acquiring an imported car 
and has to choose between a BMW and alternative model. In the first stage of the decision-
making process, he must visit the venues displaying these cars, test-drive available items 
and study the terms and conditions of the deal. In the second stage, he may proceed to the 
actual purchase of the chosen car, after having matched his available budget resources to 
an affordable variety.  
 
However, since visiting the car showroom involves certain financial and time costs, 
customers need to decide whether it is beneficial to embark on the product analysis before 
conducting such visits. Specifically, the expected price should be sufficiently attractive to 
outweigh the costs of the product analysis, which the buyer incurs. Suppose that the 
exchange rate between the currencies of the importing and exporting countries is volatile. 
Let us hypothesize that after a costly marketing research, the buyer decided to import the 
BMW from Germany, but a sudden depreciation of the national currency with respect to 
the Euro led to a sharp increase of the BMW import price. Let us assume that the extent of 
the depreciation led the car’s import price to exceed the importer’s budget. Thus, after 
having incurred substantial costs associated with the product analysis, the importer was 
unable to afford the car. Therefore, Krugman (1986) suggests that customers consider the 
firm’s product only when they expect the exporter to maintain a previously announced 
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price level. If they observe that the BMW price is fluctuating frequently, they would rather 
refrain from visiting its showrooms, because they may be unable to afford the product at 
the end of the costly marketing research. 
 
Thus, Krugman (1986) justifies the stickiness of import prices by exporters’ efforts to 
maintain import price stability. He argues that the exporter prevents the fluctuations of the 
import price of his good from exceeding a stable price range in order to attract customers. 
If the commodity price is set in the exporter’s currency, the price expressed in the 
importer’s currency will fluctuate in response to exchange rate movements. Consequently, 
a sudden depreciation of the importer’s currency raises the import price and undermines 
the importer’s belief that in the future the exporter will keep the import price at a 
previously announced level. If the firm loses its reputation of a stable price-setter, in the 
future buyers will probably avoid its products and search for a producer with a more 
credible pricing policy. Therefore, the exporting firm should build its reputation of a 
credible supplier by maintaining a stability of the import price, in order to encourage 
customers to embark on the analysis of its product and attract those importers who find that 
the import price is sufficiently competitive to compensate them for product research costs.  
 
Thus, the volatility of the exchange may lead to a loss of the existing customers or failure 
to gain new importers due to fluctuations of the import price. Using Krugman’s assumption 
on the importer’s preference for price stability (Krugman, 1986), we build a consumer 
demand function that depends negatively on the import price volatility, which is induced 
by exchange rate fluctuations. Since the importer’s demand depends on the volatility of the 
exchange rate, the degree of the PTM is affected by currency volatility. Suppose that a 
monetary policy shock raised the volatility of the exchange rate between the importing and 
exporting countries. Since the import price represents a product of the export price and the 
exchange rate, the policy shock raises the volatility of the import price relative to the 
volatility of prices of domestically produced varieties. As the importer is likely to switch to 
products whose prices fluctuate less frequently, the exporter must maintain a stable range 
of the import price in order to prevent a fall of the demand for its good. Specifically, the 
exporter should limit an increase in the import price when the importer’s currency 
depreciates. Thus, the exporter should conduct the PTM by adjusting the mark-up of price 
over the marginal cost, in order to stabilize the import price level and prevent it from 
deviating substantially from the initially announced level. By limiting the degree of the 
ERPT into import prices, the exporter encourages potential customers to study the 
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characteristics of its product and prevents the existing importers from switching to 
alternative supplier.  
 
Moreover, since the importer’s demand depends on currency volatility, exporters should 
vary the response of the export price to exchange rate movements, depending on the level 
of the exchange rate volatility. Higher exchange rate volatility implies higher volatility of 
the import price, which lowers the demand for imports, since we assumed a negative 
relationship between the price volatility and the import demand. Conversely, the decrease 
in the exchange rate volatility leads to an increase in the importer’s demand, since 
importers will substitute the imported good for products that exhibit relatively high price 
volatility.  
 
Thus, as the volatility of the import price increases due to currency volatility, the firm 
should offset a larger fraction of the ERPT, since the increase of the import price as a result 
of the importer’s currency depreciation would further raise the volatility of the import price. 
A further increase in the import price instability as a result of the ERPT would decrease the 
demand for imports. In contrast, as exchange rate volatility falls, it may not be necessary to 
significantly limit the ERPT, because the increase in the import price volatility as a result 
of the ERPT is offset by the fall of the import price volatility following the decrease in the 
exchange rate volatility.  
 
Since the exporter limits the ERPT into import prices by conducting the PTM through 
adjustments of the mark-up of price over the marginal cost, both the ERPT and PTM 
respond to the volatility of the import price. Consequently, the degree of the ERPT and 
PTM is expected to be unstable, since the volatility of the exchange rate is not constant, 
unless the exporting country pegs its currency to the importing country’s currency, or vice 
versa. However, in the literature on the PTM and ERPT we only consider cases where the 
exchange rate between the importer and exporter fluctuates over time, because a time 
varying exchange rate is essential for estimating the response of export and import prices 
to currency movements.  
 
Before we proceed to modelling the instability of the PTM and ERPT using an inconstant 
volatility of the import price, in the next Section we briefly outline theoretic literature on 
the instability in the response of export and import prices to exchange rate changes. The 
next section reviews three partial equilibrium frameworks of the imperfect competition in 
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the international trade, which emphasize the role of three channels for generating an 
unstable PTM and ERPT: namely, the price elasticity of the demand, the cost of switching 
to a substitute product and the exporter’s market share in the importer’s country.   
 
3.3 Modelling a time variance in the PTM and ERPT 
 
In this section we outline three theoretic models that justify a time varying ERPT and PTM 
by exporters operating in an imperfect competition. The assumption of the imperfect 
competition is essential for analysing the PTM, because monopolistic competitors set 
prices as a mark-up over the marginal cost. Thus, the existence of the price mark-up allows 
the firm to engage in the international price discrimination by conducting the PTM. 
Essentially, the presence of the mark-up of price over the marginal cost explains the firm’s 
market power to discriminate among importers. For example, consider a British firm which 
exports its product to both the USA and Canada. Assume that the good’s price is fixed in 
the exporter’s currency. Suppose that the US dollar experienced depreciation with respect 
to the Great British Pound, while the exchange rate between the Pound Sterling and the 
Canadian dollar remained constant. In order to prevent an increase in the USD price of its 
good, the British exporter should decrease its export price of sales to the US. If the mark-
up of price over the marginal cost was absent, as in perfect competition, the decrease of the 
export price would not be possible, because the marginal revenue from selling the product 
should cover the marginal cost of producing it. However, the existence of the price mark-
up allows the firm to decrease the export price without causing the price to fall below the 
marginal cost. Thus, the decrease of the price of British exports to the US generates a price 
differential between the US and Canada, because the export price of the British good is 
lower for the US market, compared to Canada. Therefore, it is essential to allow for a 
mark-up of the export price over the marginal cost in order to explain the PTM, which 
represents the policy of monopolistically competitive firms to vary their export prices in 
response to movements in the exchange rate between the importer’s and exporter’s 
currencies.  
 
The purpose of a brief introduction to theoretic literature on the inconstancy of the PTM 
and ERPT is to provide additional motivation for using time varying parameter regressions 
for estimating export price models. Therefore, unlike Chapter 1 where we solved the 
agents’ optimization problems, this section will not offer a detailed derivation of model 
102 
 
 
equations. However, the model solutions can be easily verified by following the algorithm 
for the firm’s optimization problem, which was followed in Chapter 1 while solving the 
partial equilibrium models by Krugman (1986) and Campa and Goldberg (2002). First, we 
must provide the functions for the exporting firm’s profits and the importing consumer’s 
demand for its product. Second, we must maximize the exporter’s profit function subject to 
the importer’s demand, whereby the profit represents the objective function and the 
demand is the constraint equation. The solution to the profit-maximization problem of the 
exporting firm yields the optimal export price. Finally, in order to compute the degree of 
the PTM, we must differentiate the optimal export price with respect to the exchange rate, 
since the PTM represents the sensitivity of the export price to fluctuations in the exchange 
rate between the exporting and importing countries. 
 
Since this Chapter examines potential instability of the PTM degree over time, we present 
three dynamic multi-period set-ups which justify the time variance of the ERPT. We start 
by reviewing the seminal model of export price determination by Knetter (1989), because 
our theoretical framework represents an extension of his model. Therefore, it is beneficial 
to discuss the baseline model before extending it.  
 
Our interest in the second model (Gross and Schmitt, 2000) is explained by its two-period 
outlook, where the ERPT into import prices varies across periods due to the cross-period 
interdependence of price-setting decisions. Specifically, the first-period export price 
determines the firm’s profits in the second period, because a lower price in the first period 
allows firms to gain new customers. Moreover, some customers gained in the first period 
will continue importing from the firm in the second period, since importers face a cost of 
switching to an alternative supplier. Thus, the second-period profit increases as a result of 
the reduction in the first-period price. Since our model of time varying ERPT represents a 
multiple time period framework containing more than two periods, it is beneficial to start 
with a theoretic contribution that justifies ERPT variation across two periods. 
 
The motivation behind the discussion of the third model (Benigno and Faia, 2010) lies in 
its structure of the mark-up of price over the marginal cost. Specifically, mark-ups vary 
because the firm’s market share fluctuates over time. Intuitively, a variable market share 
implies an inconstant market power of the firm. Since the mark-up of price over the 
marginal cost reflects the firm’s market power, a variable market share leads to an unstable 
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mark-up. Consequently, the impact of the exchange rate on the import price becomes 
inconstant as a result of the variability of the price mark-up over the marginal cost. 
 
3.3.1 Benchmark model of the time varying PTM in the imperfect competition 
 
Knetter (1989) was among the first to model the PTM. He considers an imperfectly 
competitive firm which exports to a number of foreign countries indexed by i. The firm’s 
profits are denoted by Πt and calculated in each period t  Tt ,...,3,2,1 as follows: 
  tNi it
N
i ititt
qCqp    11 ,       (1) 
where itp denotes the price expressed in the exporter’s currency and itq stands for the 
quantity of product demanded by importing country, i. C defines a function which 
measures the exporter’s costs expressed in his own currency. The firm’s costs, C, depend 
positively on the quantity of goods sold, qit. The random variable, t , accounts for shifts in 
the cost function due to a number of unmeasured factors. For example, a positive shock to 
input prices, such as an oil price shock, will shift the cost function upwards . 
 
The optimal export price charged in each market is determined through maximizing the 
exporter’s profit function (1) subject to the importer’s demand 
  itititiit psq  .         (2) 
The quantity demanded by market i at time t , qit, is a function of the export price, pit, and 
the exchange rate, sit, defined as the number of units of the importer’s currency required to 
purchase one unit of the exporter’s currency. A random variable, it , is included to 
accommodate for unmeasured shifts in the demand function. For example, a shift of 
consumer tastes in favour of the imported product generates an upward shift of the demand 
function. 
 
Substituting the demand function (2) into the firm’s profit function (1) and differentiating 
profits with respect to the period-specific export price, itp , yields the following rule for 
determining the optimal export price:  








1it
it
tit cp


,           (3) 
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where tc denotes the marginal cost of production incurred at time t . Note that the marginal 
cost of producing an additional unit of output does not depend on the export destination. 
Specifically, Knetter (1989) assumes that the firm’s good sold to one importing country is 
identical to its good exported to another country. Therefore, the marginal costs of 
producing an additional unit of the good are equalized across export destinations. it stands 
for the country-specific elasticity of demand with respect to the import price. Unlike the 
marginal cost, the price elasticity of demand is specific to the importer, whereby the 
demand in one importing country may be more sensitive to a 1% increase in the import 
price than the demand of another country.  
 
Thus, similarly to the model by Krugman (1986) reviewed in Chapter 1, the export price 
(3) is set as mark-up over the marginal cost, where the mark-up, 





1it
it


, is a function of 
the price elasticity of the demand. The optimal export price (3) reflects the international 
price discrimination, since export prices vary across importers due to the destination-
specific nature of the demand elasticity, it , even though the marginal cost of production is 
common across destinations.  
 
The effect of the exchange rate on the export price is introduced through the dependence of 
the demand function, i (2), on the import price, itit ps . Since the import price is sensitive 
to the exchange rate, the importer’s demand is also affected by currency fluctuations, 
because a depreciation of the importer’s currency raises the import price, while its 
appreciation generates a decrease of the import price. Since the importer’s demand 
fluctuates with currency movements, the elasticity of the demand with respect to the import 
price also responds to changes in the exchange rate. The response of the demand elasticity 
to currency fluctuations depends on the assumptions that we make about the demand 
schedule. If the importer’s demand becomes more elastic when the import price increases, 
the depreciation of the importer’s currency leads to a rise in the demand elasticity. In 
contrast, if the importer’s demand elasticity falls in the import price, the depreciation of the 
importer’s currency decreases the demand elasticity, it .  
 
By affecting the elasticity of demand with respect to the import price, a change in the 
exchange rate impacts the mark-up of the export price over the marginal cost. Specifically, 
let us assume that the elasticity of the importer’s demand increases in the import price. 
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Therefore, a depreciation of the importer’s currency, i.e. a rise in its , raises the value of the 
demand elasticity, it , by increasing the import price. From the optimal export price 
definition (3) it is obvious that the export price, pit, falls in response to the importer’s 
currency depreciation due to a decrease of the price mark-up over the marginal cost. Since 
the degree of the PTM represents the response of the export price to currency movements, 
the extent of the PTM is negative in the case when the elasticity of the importer’s demand 
rises in the import price.  
 
Thus, in this model the PTM arises from the link between the exchange rate and the price 
elasticity of demand, which represents an argument of the optimal export price function (3). 
If the demand elasticity is constant and unresponsive to the import price, the magnitude of 
the PTM will be zero, because exchange rate movements will not impact the optimal mark-
up of the export price over the marginal cost. 
 
As far as the extent of the ERPT is concerned, it also depends on the firm’s perceptions of 
the response of the importer’s demand elasticity to an increase in the import price. With a 
constant elasticity of the demand with respect to the import price, a depreciation of the 
importer’s currency by 1% leads to an increase of the import price by 1%, because the 
mark-up of the export price over the marginal cost is unresponsive to currency fluctuations. 
If the demand elasticity increases in the import price, a 1% depreciation of the importer’s 
currency raises the import price by less than 1%, because the mark-up of the export price 
(3) over the marginal cost falls in the demand elasticity. Finally, a negative relationship 
between the import price and the price elasticity of the importer’s demand implies that a 
1% depreciation of the importer’s currency raises the import price by more than 1%, 
because the price mark-up over the marginal cost increases following a fall in the demand 
elasticity. 
  
Knetter’s model shows that the degree of the PTM and ERPT varies over time if the 
elasticity of the importer’s demand with respect to the import price is inconstant. 
Specifically, the size of the PTM and ERPT depends on the response of the mark-up of the 
export price over the marginal cost to the exchange rate. Since the mark-up of the export 
price (3) represents a function of the price elasticity of demand, the instability of the 
demand elasticity leads to a time variance of the PTM and ERPT. While this model 
successfully justifies the instability of the PTM and ERPT by the inconstancy of the price 
elasticity of the importer’s demand, it does not explain the causes of unstable demand 
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elasticity. The export price-setting framework by Gross and Schmitt (2000) suggests that 
the sensitivity of the demand to prices may vary across periods due to the existence of 
consumers’ costs of switching to a substitute good.  
 
3.3.2 Time varying PTM in dynamic oligopolistic competition with switching 
costs 
 
One of the limitations of the model by Knetter (1989) lies in the absence of the competition 
between alternative producers of the same good. However, the exporter cannot ignore the 
existence of the competitors which sell a close substitute for his good, because importers 
may switch to a producer offering a more attractive price. Specifically, a decrease of the 
export price set by a competitor may cause a fall in the exporter’s market share in the 
importing country. Therefore, the exporter’s price-setting behaviour depends on rivals’ 
pricing strategy due to the risk of losing the market share in the face of competition. 
 
Gross and Schmitt (2000) address the importance of pricing interactions among 
competitors for the ERPT relationship. They build a two-period model featuring two 
foreign producers denoted by A  and B . Customers who wish to switch to a substitute 
good must incur a cost of switching. The model assumes that foreign producers sell to a 
market where local production is absent. The discounted profits for producer 
k  BAk , are modelled as follows: 
    kBABAkkkkkBAkkk XppppseXppeV 222112211111 ,,,,,,    .   (4) 
Thus, the exporter’s discounted profits represent a sum of the profits earned in the first 
period and the second-period profits discounted using a discount 
factor, k . kte  2,1t denotes the exchange rate in period t , which is expressed as the 
number of units of exporter sk   currency per unit of the importer’s currency. The 
discounted profit function (4) hints cross-period interdependence of price-setting decisions. 
Specifically, note that the import prices charged in the first period by the two rivals, Ap1  
and Bp1 , affect their current and future profits,
k
1 and
k
2 . The relationship between the 
first-period prices and the second-period profits is due to the effect of the initial price 
levels on the firms’ market shares, ks .3 A reduction in the import price of the first period 
allows the firm to increase its market share by attracting new customers and boost its 
                                               
3 Note that all prices are expressed in the importer’s currency, as opposed to Knetter’s set-up (Knetter, 1989). 
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future profits. ktX denotes a vector of exogenous variables which determine 
contemporaneous profits for each supplier, e.g. costs of production and exchange rates. 
 
The algorithm for determining the optimal import prices set in the first and second periods 
is performed in two steps. First, we find the second-period import price by maximizing the 
second-period profits, k2 , with respect to the second-period price,
kp2 , conditional on the 
import price which was observed in the first period, kp1 . Second, the firm’s total profits (4) 
are maximized with respect to the first-period import price, kp1 , in order to determine the 
optimal import price for the first period. The functional forms of the optimal import prices 
for each period and supplier are defined as follows: 
 BABAA XXppfp 221122 ,,,ˆ  ,        (5a) 
 BABAB XXppgp 221122 ,,,ˆ  ,        (5b) 
 BABAA XXXXfp 221111 ,,,ˆ  ,        (5c) 
 BABAB XXXXgp 221111 ,,,ˆ  .        (5d) 
Thus, the first-period import price set optimally by firm A (5c) is determined by the 
exchange rates and costs of production faced by the two exporters in the first and second 
periods. The optimal import price charged by firm B in the first period (5d) is determined 
by the same set of variables as the optimal price of firm A in the first period. Similarly, the 
optimal import prices set by the two competitors in the second period (5a and 5b) are 
determined by a common set of variables. This variable set is composed of the first-period 
import prices charged by the two firms and the second-period vectors of exogenous 
variables faced by the two competitors. 
 
Since prices are expressed in the importer’s currency, differentiating the price with respect 
to the exchange rate yields the degree of the ERPT. If prices were expressed in the 
exporter’s currency, the derivative of the price with respect to the exchange rate would 
give the degree of the PTM. However, the degree of the ERPT provides an insight into 
both ERPT and PTM, since these two phenomena operate in opposite directions. 
Specifically, an incomplete pass-through may be explained by the PTM, whereby the 
exporter lets his profit margin absorb the exchange rate movement and limits the increase 
in the import price following the importer’s currency depreciation by a downward mark-up 
adjustment (Knetter, 1989).  
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Consider a movement in firm sA  first-period exchange rate, Ae1 , which is one of the 
elements comprised by the vector of exogenous variables,
AX1 . The movement in firm A’s 
first-period exchange rate affects the current and future import prices set by the two 
competitors, kp1  and
kp2 . Specifically, current exchange rate determines future import prices, 
because kp2 is affected by the previous import price,
kp1 , which is sensitive to 
Ae1 . In order 
to determine the response of the first-period import price to the contemporaneous exchange 
rate, the exporter’s profit function (4) must be totally differentiated.4 The solution to this 
total differentiation problem yields the following set of comparative static equations which 
provide an insight into the ERPT of firm A’s exchange rate into the first-period import 
prices set by producers A and B: 
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k
tD denotes the importer’s demand faced by firm k  in period t , 
k
t is the elasticity of 
demand for imports from firm k at time t with respect to the current import price. Gross 
and Schmitt (2000) prove that the sign of the ERPT (6) into both import prices depends on 
the price elasticity of demand, kt . If demand is inelastic  1kt , the ERPT into the import 
prices of both producers is positive. In contrast, an elastic demand  1kt would yield a 
negative ERPT of firm A’s first-period exchange rate into the import prices set by 
producers A and B in the initial period.  
 
The intuition behind the importance of the price elasticity of demand for the extent of the 
ERPT is straightforward, since the demand elasticity measures a proportionate reduction of 
sales as a result of the import price increase. An appreciation of firm A’s currency suggests 
that Ae1  decreases. Consequently, the exporter’s production costs expressed in the 
importer’s currency, 
A
A
e
c
1
, increase, where Ac denotes firm sA  constant marginal cost of 
production expressed in its own currency. Therefore, the producer should increase the 
import price, Ap1 , in order to offset the loss of his first-period profits, 
                                               
4 For a full exposition of the total differentiation of the discounted profits, refer to Gross and Schmitt (2000). 
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i.e. A
A
A
AA D
e
c
p 1
1
11 )(  , which he suffers due to an increase of production costs. As a 
result of the cost effect, the first-period import price of firm A increases following the 
exporter’s currency appreciation. Consequently, the derivative of the first-period import 
price with respect to the contemporaneous exchange rate, 0
1
1 
A
A
de
dp
, is negative.  
 
Following an increase in Ap1 , firm B’s import price,
Bp1 , also rises since the two pricing 
strategies are strategic complements by assumption. In game theory, strategic complements 
imply that a player prefers to be more aggressive, when the other player acts more 
aggressively (Bulow et al., 1985). Price increase represents an example of aggressive price 
strategy. Thus, when firm A plays aggressively by raising its import price, firm B mimics 
this aggressive move by increasing its own price. 
 
However, apart from affecting the exporter’s first-period profits, Ap1 also influences his 
second-period profits due to the presence of consumer costs of switching to a substitute 
good. Switching costs imply that some of the customers of firm A are locked within their 
first-period consumption pattern and unable to switch to alternative supplier. The existence 
of the “locked-in customers” suggests that the demand for firm A’s product is inelastic with 
respect to the import price. Firms may exploit this type of consumers and attract them in 
the first period by a decrease in the import price despite the increase in production costs 
expressed in the importer’s currency as a result of the appreciation of the exporter’s 
currency, i.e. 0
1
1 
A
A
de
dp
. Due to a lower first-period import price, firm A will lose in the 
short-run by suffering smaller first-period profits. However, in the long run, firm A will 
gain additional revenues from those consumers who started purchasing its product in the 
first period because of its price reduction and remained attached to the current supplier in 
the second period as a result of substantial switching costs. Therefore, the reduction in the 
first-period import price is essentially firm A’s investment in its second-period profits, 
because the market share gained in the first period increases the next period’s profits 
thanks to the existence of “locked-in customers” (Klemperer, 1987). 
 
Since the first-period import price affects the exporter’s profits in both periods, a change in 
the first-period exchange rate, Ae1 , affects the import price set by firm A in both first and 
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second periods. Moreover, firm A’s first-period exchange rate also affects the second-
period import price set by firm B through the effect of Ae1 on firm A’s second-period price, 
because each producer mimics the pricing strategy of its competitor. Specifically, each 
firm responds to a price reduction (increase) of the competitor by reducing (raising) its 
own price. A non-zero effect of the current exchange rate on the future import prices can 
be confirmed by differentiating the second-period prices (5a and 5b) with respect to Ae1 : 
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Thus, the reaction of firm A’s import price to a change in the past exchange rate, Ae1 , is the 
sum of two effects: an own price effect and a strategic effect. The own price effect implies 
that the past exchange rate, Ae1 , affects  the current import price of firm A by influencing 
the firm’s import price in the first period. The strategic effect suggests that the past 
exchange rate, Ae1 , is relevant to the second-period import price set by producer A by 
affecting the competitor’s past price. The derivative of the second-period import price of 
firm B with respect to the past exchange rate of firm A also represents the sum of an own 
price effect and a strategic effect. However, the sign of the second-period ERPT (7) is 
ambiguous because the own price and strategic effects have opposite signs (see proof in 
Gross and Schmitt, 2000). Thus, the direction of the exchange rate effect on future import 
prices cannot be predicted with certainty. 
 
The model by Gross and Schmitt (2000) delivers a dynamic ERPT relationship, because 
the assumption of the cost of switching between substitute goods allows them to justify a 
time variation in the relationship between the exchange rate and the import price. 
Specifically, the first-period ERPT is different from that of the second period, because the 
first-period import price only responds to contemporaneous exchange rate, while the 
second-period price absorbs the effects of both current and past exchange rates. Moreover, 
the firm’s import price is also affected by the exchange rate between the currencies of the 
importer and the competitor. Since the firm’s import price absorbs fluctuations of multiple 
exchange rates, unambiguous predictions on the degree of the ERPT cannot be delivered. 
 
Another limitation of this model lies in the constancy of the firm’s market share, which is 
fixed at the first-period level and determined by the current import prices set by the two 
competitors. Benigno and Faia (2010) offer a more realistic price-setting scenario, where 
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firms’ market shares evolve over time and induce an instability in the response of the 
import price to currency fluctuations. 
 
3.3.3 Time variance of the ERPT in the context of unstable market shares 
 
Benigno and Faia (2010) remove the assumption of a sticky market share adopted in Gross 
and Schmitt (2000) and analyze the effect of a dynamic market share on the optimal import 
price. The globalization of the international trade leads to a continuous change in the 
number of suppliers in the market. Therefore, the market share of any producer is likely to 
evolve over time. Since the firm’s market share affects its profits, swings in the market 
share affect its optimal import price. Thus, Benigno and Faia (2010) explain time variation 
in the ERPT into import prices by fluctuations in market shares. 
 
Benigno and Faia (2010) build a two-country model with multiple production sectors. 
There exists a total of N differentiated goods available in the domestic market, of which 
fN are supplied by foreign producers and hN are produced by home firms. In all 
subsequent relationships, subscript f denotes foreign suppliers from Country F and 
subscript h refers to domestic firms from Country H. The optimal demand of the home 
country for good i produced in sector k is defined as: 
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 ,        (8) 
where defines the elasticity of substitution among the differentiated goods which belong 
to sector k and  stands for the elasticity of substitution across production sectors. 
iP denotes the price of good i , kP defines the aggregate price for sector k , P refers to the 
aggregate price index for the entire economy and Y stands for the economy-wide demand.  
 
Similarly to the ERPT framework by Gross and Schmitt (2000), this study incorporates the 
exporter’s market share, i ,  into the firm’s profit maximization problem. The effect of the 
market share on the optimal import price is modelled via the elasticity of demand for good 
iY with respect to its price, iP :  
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where the demand definition (8) was substituted for iY . The absolute value of the price 
elasticity of demand (9) can be expressed as follows: 
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~  ,         (10) 
where i denotes the market share gained by firm i in sector k :  
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           (10a) 
Let us assume that the cross-variety demand elasticity exceeds its cross-sector elasticity in 
absolute terms, i.e.   . Thus, a greater market share, i , leads to a lower i
~ , which 
denotes the responsiveness of the demand for a good to a change in its price. Intuitively, 
when the firm has a large market share, there are few substitutes available to consumers 
who wish to switch. Therefore, an increase in the firm’s price would not lead to a 
significant reduction in the demand for its product, because customers do not have many 
alternative suppliers. 
 
Since the size of the market share determines the price elasticity of demand (10), it is 
crucial for the degree of the PTM and ERPT. Intuitively, a higher market share gives the 
firm a monopoly power and enables it to vary export prices in response to exchange rate 
shocks. In order to observe the implications of the market share for the extent of the ERPT, 
the optimal export price for good i must be determined. Similarly to Knetter’s set-up 
(Knetter, 1989), a domestic firm in country H  chooses the optimal price which maximizes 
its profits subject to the demand for its product (8). The solution to the firm’s profit 
maximization problem yields a price expression which is analogous to the price definition 
(2): 
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where tW stands for nominal wage in country H’s labour market and th,
~ denotes the price 
elasticity of the demand for domestic good. tA denotes shifts in the productivity level of the 
economy and was absent from the optimal price definition (2). 
 
Firm in country F, which supplies the good market of country H, solves an analogous 
profit maximization problem, although the latter is affected by the nominal exchange rate, 
St, between the currencies of countries F and H. The optimal import price set by the 
foreign firm is defined as follows: 
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The nominal exchange rate, tS , is defined as the number of units of country H’s currency 
per unit of country F’s currency. *tW stands for the nominal wage determined in country 
F’s labour market. *tA represents a productivity shifter for the economy of country F. 
tf ,
~ denotes the price elasticity of the demand for foreign good. 
 
Thus, the optimal prices set by firms in countries F (12) and H (11) represent a time 
varying mark-up over the marginal cost expressed in the buyer’s currency, where the mark-
up is a function of the elasticity of the demand for the firm’s good with respect to its price.  
The existence of the mark-up enables the firm to vary the export price in response to 
shocks to the exchange rate, tS . 
 
In order to understand the sign of the exchange rate effect on the optimal import price (12), 
Benigno and Faia (2010) conduct a log-linear approximation of (12) using the following 
definition of the market share: 
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 ,         (10b) 
where Yh and Yf represent outputs of home and foreign firms, respectively. The log 
deviation of the import price (12) from its steady-state level is defined as follows:
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Thus, the import price of the foreign good is affected positively by the nominal exchange 
rate, the foreign nominal wage and the price differential between the domestic good and its 
foreign substitute. The import price is impacted negatively by the foreign shifter of the 
productivity level, since an increase in the productivity reduces production costs.  
 
The extent of the ERPT into the import price (13) is determined by the derivative of the 
price, tfP ,
ˆ , with respect to the nominal exchange rate, 
t
tf
S
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,


. The degree of the ERPT 
depends crucially on the level of the domestic firm’s market share. If the home firm’s 
market share is zero  0hs , foreign firms fully dominate the domestic market, which 
                                               
5 The symbol “^” denotes the log-deviation of a variable from its steady-state level.  
 
114 
 
 
enables them to fully pass-through exchange rate changes into the import price without 
losing their market share. Therefore, foreign firms can afford a complete ERPT into the 
import price, i.e. 1
ˆ
ˆ
,



t
tf
S
P
.  
 
However, the case of a full dominance of the home market by foreign suppliers is not 
plausible. For most goods and markets, the home market is divided between domestic and 
foreign producers. Thus, the market shares of the firms from Countries H and F, hs and fs ,  
exceed zero. Consequently, the degree of the ERPT into the import price is different from 
one. Consider the effect of the appreciation of Country F’s currency, i.e. an increase in St. 
A large increase in the import price, tfP ,
ˆ , generated by the appreciation of the exporter’s 
currency might lead to a loss of the market share by the foreign firm, since the market 
share (10a) depends on the good’s price. A fall in the firm’s market share increases the 
price elasticity of demand (10) and lowers the mark-up of the import price (12) over the 
marginal cost. Consequently, a fall in the price mark-up generates an incomplete ERPT 
into the import price, which fails to increase by 1% in response to a 1% appreciation of the 
exporter’s currency. The incomplete ERPT is caused by the PTM reflected in a downward 
adjustment of the price mark-up over the marginal cost as a result of the fall of the 
exporter’s market share. 
 
The response of the import price to exchange rate shocks is also affected by the price 
differential between the domestic and foreign varieties. The appreciation of the foreign 
exporter’s currency increases the import price of his product (12) and lowers the price 
gap,  tfth PP ,, ˆˆ  . Since the decrease of the price differential has a negative impact on the 
import price (13), the responsiveness of the price differential to currency fluctuations 
prevents the import price from moving one-to-one with the exchange rate, i.e. 1
ˆ
ˆ
,



t
tf
S
P
. 
Intuitively, the appreciation of the foreign country’s currency makes the imported goods 
expensive relative to the domestically produced output. Thus, the appreciation provides the 
importer with an incentive to switch to a domestic supplier, which depresses the exporter’s 
market share. Since a fall in the market share increases the price elasticity of demand (10) 
and reduces the mark-up of the import price (12) over the marginal cost, the degree of the 
ERPT falls in the price differential between the domestic and foreign goods,  tfth PP ,, ˆˆ  . 
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Moreover, the effect of the price differential increases in the market share of the domestic 
firms, hs , because a higher share of domestic suppliers implies a lower market share of 
foreign firms.  
 
The definition of the optimal import price (12) suggests that the degree of the PTM and 
ERPT is time varying due to fluctuations in the price mark-up over the marginal cost. 
Specifically, Benigno and Faia (2010) suggest that the extent of the pass-through varies 
following a shift in the fraction of foreign varieties in the market. Given the increasing 
globalization of the world economy and the geographic disintegration of production 
processes, it is reasonable to expect a continuous variation in the number of foreign firms 
supplying the market. For instance, a continuous outsourcing of the domestic production to 
countries which offer lower labour costs leads to a stable increase in the number of 
varieties that are imported from abroad. The resulting instability of the market shares of 
domestic producers undermines the constancy of the relationship between the exchange 
rate and the price of exports and imports. The inconstancy of the PTM and ERPT in 
Benigno and Faia (2010) provides an additional justification for using the out-of-sample 
forecasting tests adopted in this study, since these tests account for instability in regression 
coefficients by estimating the export price equation recursively over time. 
 
In this section we reviewed three partial equilibrium set-ups which explain structural 
breaks in the response of export and import prices to fluctuations in the exchange rate 
between the exporter’s and importer’s currencies. The model of price-setting by 
imperfectly competitive exporters (Knetter, 1989) explained variations in the PTM over 
time by an inconstant elasticity of the importer’s demand for the foreign firm’s product 
with respect to its import price. The set-up of the dynamic oligopolistic competition with 
switching costs (Gross and Schmitt, 2000) argued that the value of the ERPT into import 
prices may vary across time periods because firms may invest in their future market shares 
by offering a lower import price in the initial period. The framework of monopolistic 
competition with variable market shares (Benigno and Faia, 2010) suggests that the extent 
of the ERPT into the optimal import price is unstable because of the inconstancy of the 
market shares of foreign suppliers.  
 
The next section builds a new partial equilibrium set-up that justifies time variance in the 
response of the export price to currency movements. The difference between our 
framework and the three partial equilibrium models reviewed in this section lies in the 
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channel which induces instability into the PTM. Specifically, we argue that the response of 
the export price to currency fluctuations depends on the volatility of the exchange rate, 
which is usually inconstant, if we discard the cases of pegged currency regimes. Thus, the 
instability of the exchange rate volatility undermines the stability of the relationship 
between the export price and currency movements. 
 
3.4 Model 
 
The following model of the PTM builds on the stylized model of export pricing (see 
Gagnon and Knetter, 1995 and Knetter, 1995). We extend the conventional approach to the 
incomplete ERPT by exploiting the link between consumer demand and import price 
volatility, which is driven by the exchange rate volatility. We will show that shifts in the 
volatility of the nominal exchange rate between the currencies of the exporter and importer 
contribute to the response of the optimal export price to a depreciation of the importer’s 
currency. This section is structured as follows. First, we describe the two building blocks 
of the firm’s optimization problem: namely, the exporter’s profit function, which 
represents the objective function, and the importer’s demand function, i.e. the constraint 
subject to which the profit should be maximized. Second, we solve the firm’s optimization 
problem by choosing the profit-maximizing level of the export price. Finally, we 
differentiate the optimal export price with respect to the nominal exchange rate and trace 
the role of the exchange rate volatility in determining the degree of the PTM. 
 
3.4.1 Producers 
 
Consider an exporting firm that produces a differentiated product and uses both domestic 
and foreign inputs. Foreign inputs are purchased from the country that imports the firm’s 
final good. The exporter’s profits can be expressed by the following equation: 
tttttt qeMCqp )( ,        (14) 
where tp denotes price at time t , which is expressed in the exporter’s 
currency. tq represents the period-specific quantity of sales and tMC  is the marginal cost of 
producing the exported good at time t . tMC is assumed to vary in response to the 
contemporaneous exchange rate, te , since the firm is using foreign inputs whose prices 
expressed in the exporter’s currency fluctuate with the exchange rate. For example, if the 
price of an imported input is fixed in the seller’s currency, the depreciation of the firm’s 
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currency causes an increase in the marginal cost.
6
  Nominal exchange rate, te , is defined as 
the number of units of the importer’s currency, which is required to purchase one unit of 
the exporter’s currency. An increase in te indicates an appreciation of the exporter’s 
currency. The profit function (14) represents the objective function that must be 
maximized subject to the constraint which is defined in the next section. 
 
3.4.2 Consumers 
 
The exporting firm faces a demand from the foreign country, which is represented by the 
following equation: 
  rtrtrtrtprtt pppppQq 1221 ,...,,,,   ,      (15) 
where
d
t
ttr
t
P
ep
p  . The quantity demanded, tq , depends on the relative import price of the 
firm’s good, rtp , which represents the ratio of the import price of the product, tt ep , to the 
aggregate price level for this commodity in the importing country, dtP .
d
tP is affected by 
prices charged by the firms which produce close substitutes for the exporter’s good. 
 
In addition, the importer’s demand (15) is a function of p which denotes the annual 
average volatility of the exporter’s relative import price. For computational simplicity, we 
assume that the importer’s demand, Q, is a linear function of the annual average volatility 
of the import price, p . Adopting a more sophisticated functional form for the importer’s 
demand will not affect this section’s main finding, i.e. the destabilizing impact of the 
volatility of the import price on the degree of the PTM. Similarly, the choice of the time 
span does not affect the main result of this section. Specifically, replacing the annual 
volatility with a quarterly or monthly volatility still yields an unstable value of the PTM. 
However, the annual volatility has the advantage of a greater time span in econometric 
estimation. Denote the relative import price in the first month of the second year in the 
sample by rp13 . Then p can be interpreted as the annual average volatility of the relative 
import price over the period spanning 1t  through 13t .  
                                               
6 The output level, qt, is absent from the marginal cost function, MC, for computational simplicity. Thus, the 
marginal cost is assumed to remain constant as the level of production grows. The constancy of the marginal 
cost with respect to the output is a conventional assumption in the PTM models (see Gross and Schmitt, 
2000). Rowntree (1941) provides a rigorous discussion of the validity of the assumption of a constant 
marginal cost. 
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In addition to the current relative import price, the price volatility, p , depends on historic 
realizations of the relative import price, because the importer cares about past observations 
on the exporter’s price-setting behaviour. If the exporter failed to maintain a stable range 
of the import price over the past year, the resulting high volatility of the relative import 
price, p , undermines the firm’s reputation and the importer’s trust in the exporter’s 
intention to maintain price stability. A rise in p strengthens the importer’s incentives to 
switch to a substitute good and causes a fall in the quantity demanded, tq .  
 
Note that the demand (15) is different from the demand functions which are employed in 
stylized PTM models, which do not accommodate the role of the price instability (Knetter, 
1989). We include a measure of the price volatility into the demand function, in order to 
reflect Krugman’s assumption on the importer’s preference for price stability (Krugman, 
1986). Since we follow Krugman (1986) by assuming that the importer’s demand is 
negatively affected by the volatility of the import price, the function (15) appears to be a 
more accurate analytical description of the importer’s demand. Due to a negative 
relationship between the price volatility and the importer’s demand, the volatility of the 
import price determines the optimal export price, which is described in the next section. 
 
3.4.3 Optimal export price determination 
 
The exporter maximizes the profits (14) subject to the demand (15) that it faces in the 
importer’s market. Let us substitute the constraint (15) into the objective function (14), 
differentiate (14) with respect to the export price, tp , and set the derivative to zero. In 
describing the firm’s optimization problem, we dropped the arguments of the functions for 
expositional convenience. Thus, the first order condition associated with the exporter’s 
problem of profit maximization can be represented as follows: 
  
0




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t
tt
t
t
p
MCpQ
p
.        (16) 
Using the chain rule of the differentiation yields the following first order condition: 
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Solving the first order condition (16a) for the export price, tp , yields the following profit-
maximizing level of the export price: 
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Thus, the optimal export price (16b) increases in the marginal cost. Intuitively, an increase 
in the marginal cost leads the exporter to raise the export price in order to cover the cost of 
production and protect his profit margin. In addition to the marginal cost, the optimal 
export price is affected by the nominal exchange rate through three channels. First, an 
appreciation of the exporter’s currency leads to a fall in his marginal cost, since the 
imported inputs become relatively cheap when converted to his currency. As a result of the 
appreciation, the export price falls due to a lower cost of production. Second, the 
appreciation of the exporter’s currency means the depreciation of the importer’s currency 
(i.e. an increase in te ) , which increases the import price of the good and depresses the level 
of the import demand (15). The optimal export price must be adjusted downwards in order 
to prevent this fall in the importer’s demand. Third, the depreciation or appreciation of the 
importer’s currency increases the volatility of the exchange rate, which negatively affects 
the import demand (15). The exporter must impede potential decrease in the importer’s 
demand by decreasing the export price. Let us label these three channels of the exchange 
rate effect by the cost channel, price channel and volatility channel, respectively. 
 
The overall response of the export price to the nominal exchange rate is determined jointly 
by the cost, price and volatility channels. The effect of the exchange rate on the export 
price is given by the derivative of the optimal export price (16b) with respect to the 
exchange rate, 
t
t
e
p


. Dropping time subscripts and the implicit definitions of functions for 
the clarity of exposition yields the response of the export price to currency movements
7
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Dividing the numerator and denominator of the second term on the right hand side of the 
derivative (17) by
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The first term on the right hand side of the derivative (18) defines the cost channel of the 
exchange rate effect, i.e. the response of the marginal cost, MC, to currency movements. 
The second and third terms on the right hand side of the equation (18) define the extent of 
the PTM, because they represent an exchange rate effect which cannot be explained by the 
change of the marginal cost. Consequently, an export price adjustment which is described 
by the second and third terms must be due to the PTM, since the latter is associated with 
the adjustment of the mark-up over the marginal cost.   
 
For computational simplicity, let us describe the importer’s demand by a mathematical 
function which yields a zero value when differentiated twice with respect to the nominal 
exchange rate, i.e.
 
0
/

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e
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. Using this assumption, the derivative of the export price 
with respect to the exchange rate (18) is reduced to 
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Finally, let us substitute the definition of the optimal export price (16b) for tp  and restore 
time subscripts and the implicit definitions of functions. The response of the export price to 
the nominal exchange rate is given by 
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Finally, grouping the terms that have a common factor in the equation (19a) yields the 
following derivative: 
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The sign of the derivative of the export price with respect to the nominal exchange rate, 
which is jointly determined by three ratios on the right hand side of the equation (20), is 
unambiguously negative. The first ratio represents the response of the marginal cost to the 
appreciation of the exporter’s currency. The sign of this derivative is negative, since the 
appreciation of the exporter’s currency implies that fewer units of the own currency are 
required to purchase the inputs whose prices are fixed in the foreign currency, 
i.e. 0


t
t
e
MC
. The sign of the second term on the right hand side of the equation (20) is 
also negative, since both marginal cost and nominal exchange rate are positive values. The 
last term of the derivative (20) is also unambiguously negative. The numerator of this term 
is positive, as the aggregate price level and the importer’s demand are both positive values. 
The denominator of this term is negative, because higher volatility of the import price 
leads to a lower import demand
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. Thus, the export price is reduced as a result of the depreciation of 
the importer’s currency.  
 
Thus, the extent of the export price adjustment following currency movements depends on 
the effect of the nominal exchange rate on the marginal cost, MCt, and the sensitivity of the 
importer’s demand to 
r
tp and p , which denote the relative import price and the volatility 
of the import price, respectively. This conclusion is conditional upon two important 
assumptions that we make about the schedule of the importer’s demand. First, the importer 
switches to a substitute good when the relative import price of the foreign good increases. 
Second, the importer switches to alternative supplier when the volatility of the import price 
rises.  
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Since the response of the export price to the nominal exchange rate (20) depends on the 
link between the volatility of the import price and the importer’s demand, we can deduce 
that shifts in the volatility of the exchange rate induce instability in the PTM. Specifically, 
since the relative import price,
r
tp , is a function of the product of the export price and the 
exchange rate, ptet, an instable exchange rate implies a volatile relative import price. When 
the import price is volatile, the importer is more likely to switch to a substitute good with a 
more stable range of price fluctuations. Therefore, the exporter needs to adjust his export 
price more vigorously during times of a volatile exchange rate in order to protect his 
market share in the importer’s country. The next section examines the sources of potential 
instability in the PTM. 
 
3.4.4 Instability of the degree of PTM 
 
The volatility of the relative import price, p , is determined by the nature of the exchange 
rate regime, since the latter influences the exchange rate volatility (Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger, 2003). Intuitively, a higher degree of flexibility of the exchange rate regime 
causes a higher volatility of the exchange rate, which increases the variability of the 
relative import price, rtp . Suppose that either the exporting or the importing country 
implemented a new exchange rate regime, which increased both the volatility of the 
exchange rate and the volatility of the relative import price, p .
8
 In order to find whether a 
change in p  affects the response of the export price to currency movements, the 
derivative (20) should be differentiated with respect to the price volatility, p . 
 
First, let us transform the derivative (20) into 
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8 One may argue that a change of the exchange rate regime is not the only factor that affects the volatility of 
the relative import price. The diversity of the causes of the import price volatility remains beyond the scope 
of our study. The purpose of this chapter is to show that the volatility of the import price represents one of 
the reasons of the PTM instability. We leave the discussion of other causes of the import price volatility for 
subsequent research. 
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. The derivative (21) can be 
differentiated with respect to the volatility of the import price as follows: 
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Equation (22) gives the effect of a change in the volatility of the import price on the 
response of the export price to a movement of the exchange rate. If the volatility of the 
import price had no effect on the importer’s demand, i.e. 0


p
Q

, the response of the 
export price to the exchange rate would be insensitive to the price volatility, i.e. 
0


pt
t
e
p

. However, since we assume the sensitivity of the importer’s demand with 
respect to the variability of the import price, the derivative (22) is not equal to zero. 
Consequently, a shift in the price volatility, p , leads to a change in the relationship 
between currency movements and the export price,
t
t
e
p


. Note that the volatility of the 
import price, p , is unstable due to the inconstancy of the exchange rate volatility, unless 
the exporter pegs its currency to the importer’s currency or vice versa. Thus, our model 
generates instabilities in the link between the exchange rate and the export price thanks to 
the destabilizing role of the import price volatility.  
 
In this section we determined that the export price unambiguously falls following the 
appreciation of the exporter’s currency, 0


t
t
e
p
. First, the appreciation of the exporter’s 
currency leads to a decrease in the export price due to a fall in the cost of imported inputs. 
However, a negative effect of the import price volatility on the importer’s demand leads to 
a further fall of the export price. Intuitively, the exporter wishes to protect his market share 
in the importer’s country and prevent him from switching to a substitute good, since the 
consumer dislikes price instability generated by currency movements. Therefore, the firm 
decreases the export price following the depreciation of the importer’s currency in order to 
offset at least a portion of the increase of the import price, which was induced by currency 
change.  
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We also showed that the extent of the PTM is unstable, because it depends on the 
inconstant volatility of the import price. Since the response of the export price to the 
exchange rate is indicated by the coefficient on the exchange rate in the regression of the 
export price, we must adopt an econometric framework which embeds potential instability 
of the regression parameters.  Thus, our partial equilibrium model of the export price 
justifies the use of the out-of-sample forecasting methodology which focuses on the 
instability of the regression coefficients over time. The next section describes the out-of-
sample forecasting tests which we employ in order to answer two empirical questions. In 
the first question, we test whether goods exported from the UK to other EU countries are 
subject to the PTM. The answer to the second question will determine the stability of the 
response of the UK export price to the exchange rate between the Pound Sterling and the 
currencies of the UK’s trade partners. 
 
3.5 Econometric Methodology 
 
This section discusses the out-of-sample forecasting framework that we design in order to 
test the significance of the exchange rate for determining the export price and the 
instability of the link between the export price and the exchange rate. First, we define two 
nested models, whose ability to forecast export prices must be compared in order to choose 
the specification that best fits the UK data. Second, we describe four tests of out-of-sample 
forecasting, namely split, rolling, recursive and RWCTVP regressions. The purpose of 
these tests is to examine the ability of the coefficient estimates to predict the one-step-
ahead values of the export price, whereby the predictive ability is reflected in the average 
forecasting error. Finally, we outline the computation of the ENC-NEW forecast 
encompassing test by Clark and McCracken (2001), which enables us to determine 
whether the inclusion of the exchange rate significantly reduces the forecasting error of the 
export price model. If the addition of the exchange rate leads to a significant improvement 
in the forecasting ability of the model, we interpret this finding as evidence of the PTM by 
exporters. Likewise, if the regressions allowing the exchange rate coefficient to evolve 
over time predict export prices better than the models that imply a constant link between 
the export price and the exchange rate, we conclude that the degree of the PTM is unstable 
over time. 
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3.5.1 Estimation framework 
 
This section outlines the logarithmic specification of the export price, which we designed 
in order to estimate the size and the stability of the impact that the exchange rate has on the 
export price. We start the discussion by describing the set of independent variables that we 
include into the regression of the export price. In particular, we explain the similarities and 
differences between our econometric model of the export price and the theoretic definition 
of the optimal export price (16b).  
 
After defining the baseline regression of the export price, we describe the procedure for 
testing the presence of the PTM by the UK exporters. Within an out-of-sample forecasting 
framework, the test of PTM consists of searching for the predictive power of the exchange 
rate for the export price. Specifically, for goods that are subject to PTM, the exchange rate 
should significantly improve the ability of the model to predict the export price, because 
the PTM implies that the export price is adjusted in response to the depreciation or 
appreciation of the importer’s currency (see 21). We test the predictive power of the 
exchange rate by estimating a regression of the export price where coefficients on the 
exchange rate terms are restricted to equal zero. Evidence of the PTM is provided by 
rejecting the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the exchange rate equals zero. 
 
Finally, we describe the algorithm for testing the stability of the link between the exchange 
rate and the export price. We follow the methodology of Stock and Watson (1994) who 
propose to compare the forecasting performance of models which vary in their robustness 
to the evolution of the regression parameters over time. They suggest that the forecasting 
superiority of adaptive models serves as evidence of the parameter instability, where 
adaptivity implies the robustness to parameter instability. Thus, we will compare the 
average prediction errors delivered by four forecasting tests - split, rolling, recursive and 
RWCTVP models. If relatively adaptive models of the export price deliver significantly 
lower average forecasting errors, we may conclude that the degree of the PTM is unstable 
over time.  
 
3.5.2 Baseline regression of the export price  
 
We propose to test for the presence of PTM by running the regression of the following 
logarithmic specification: 
126 
 
 
,lnlnln
lnlnlnln
261524
132211
ttttttt
tttttttt
eeMC
MCppp





      (23a) 
which defines the export price as a function of the marginal cost and the exchange rate.  9 
t denotes the regression error term. In order to apply a recently developed framework for 
testing the forecasting performance of a model and the instability of its parameters (see 
Clark and McCracken, 2001; Rossi, 2006; Stock and Watson, 1994), we adopt a second-
order autoregression of the export price, which is augmented with four lagged exogenous 
regressors. Specifically, the export price is regressed on the past realizations of the export 
price, lagged values of the marginal cost and previous values of the exchange rate. 
 
The tendency in the forecasting literature (Rossi, 2006; Stock and Watson, 1994) to 
explain the behaviour of the dependent variable with a number of its lags and past values 
of exogenous explanatory variables is not the only reason behind choosing a second-order 
autoregression with lagged exogenous regressors. Most importantly, the regression (23a) 
takes into account the price stickiness which underpins the modern open macroeconomic 
theory (Benigno and Faia, 2010) and implies that some firms in the industry are unable to 
exercise an instantaneous adjustment of their price. As a result of price stickiness, the 
current price level of the industry is affected by prices that were set in previous periods by 
those firms, who were not able to re-set their prices in the current period. Therefore, we 
include the lagged values of the export price, pt-1 and pt-2 , into the regression (23a) in order 
to highlight the dependence of the current export price on past realizations of the price. 
 
Moreover, instead of including contemporaneous values of the marginal cost and the 
exchange rate, MCt and et, the model (23a) controls for the lagged values of these 
regressors due to the aforementioned delay in the adjustment of the export price. 
Specifically, since the industry level of the export price is determined by the past values of 
the export price, the current price level is largely determined by past marginal costs and 
exchange rates. Thus, the current level of the export price is a function of the past export 
price, which represents a function of the past realizations of the marginal cost and 
exchange rate. The gradual adjustment of export and import prices to the exchange rate and 
marginal cost has already been highlighted in the empirical literature. For example, Campa 
                                               
9
 Note that the PTM coefficients, t5 and t6 , have an additional subscript t , which indicates that the 
response of the export price to the exchange rate may vary over time. 
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and Goldberg (2002) estimate the degree of the ERPT into import prices by augmenting 
the regression of the import price with lagged exchange rates and costs of production. 
 
The specification (23a) is slightly different from the theoretic definition of the export price 
(16b), since the aggregate price level of the destination market, dtP , has not been included. 
Section 3.6 of this Chapter explains the alternative way in which we controlled for the 
effect of this variable. Note that the primary role of the aggregate price level, dtP , is to 
measure the relative import price of the UK good, 
d
t
tt
P
ep
. However, we control for 
fluctuations in the relative price of the UK exports by adopting the Broad Sterling Effective 
Exchange Rate Index, which measures the price competitiveness of the UK goods in the 
importer’s market. Including both the Broad Sterling Effective Exchange Rate Index and 
the aggregate price level may induce an unnecessary multicollinearity into the regression 
(23a). 
 
Another distinction between the theoretic model of the export price (16b) and its 
econometric counterpart (23a) is reflected in the absence of a proxy for the volatility of the 
import price, p . The derivative (22) shows that the impact of the price volatility, p , is 
represented by a structural break in the relationship between the exchange rate and the 
export price. Therefore, fluctuations in the volatility of the import price shift the 
coefficients on the exchange rate terms, t5 and t6 . Since the instability in the regression 
coefficients is induced by a shift in the volatility, p , the test of parameter instability will 
allow us to detect the effect of the price volatility without explicitly including p  into the 
equation. Moreover, the inclusion of the volatility of the import price into the regression 
(23a) is not desirable due to multicollinearity issues. Since p represents a function of the 
past values of the export price, 1tp and 2tp , we will introduce multicollinearity into the 
model (23a) through the correlation among three regressors, namely 1ln tp , 2ln tp and 
pln .  
 
Furthermore, the exclusion of the volatility of the import price from the regression (23a) 
should not impact the results of our test of PTM, because the presence of the PTM is 
indicated by the effect of the exchange rate on the forecasting performance of a model of 
the export price. Specifically, for the goods that are subject to PTM, a model which 
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contains the exchange rate (i.e. the unrestricted model) must forecast the export price 
significantly better than a model which excludes it (i.e. the restricted model). Thus, in the 
case of PTM, the average forecasting error of the unrestricted model of the export price 
must be significantly lower than the average prediction error of the restricted model. If we 
add a measure of the import price volatility to the model, both the restricted and the 
unrestricted (23a) models of the export price must be augmented with the regressor pln . 
An additional regressor will change the size of each model’s forecasting error, but it should 
not affect the difference between these two errors. Since we test for the presence of PTM 
by examining the size and the significance of the difference between the average 
forecasting error of the unrestricted model and the mean prediction error of the restricted 
model of the export price, the addition of the import price volatility to the regression (23a) 
should not impact the test of PTM.  
 
Having described the intuition behind our approach to the estimation of the PTM by the 
UK exporters, we outline the formal algorithm for testing the predictive power of the 
exchange rate in the next section. 
 
3.5.3 Testing for the presence of PTM 
 
The presence of PTM essentially implies the importance of changes in the exchange rate 
for explaining the export price. The intuition behind the PTM lies in the exporter’s desire 
to prevent the import price from significantly fluctuating in response to a change of the 
exchange rate. For example, if the importer’s currency depreciates, the firm should adjust 
the export price downwards in order to offset at least a portion of the import price increase 
resulting from the depreciation (see 20). The firm’s failure to protect the import price from 
increasing substantially may result in a loss of its market share, since the importer may 
locate a cheaper substitute for the exporter’s good. Therefore, under the PTM hypothesis, 
fluctuations of the exchange rate should have a significant effect on the export price. Using 
the terminology that is employed in the forecasting literature, the exchange rate should 
have predictive power for the export price.  
 
In order to determine the importance of a variable tX  for explaining the variable of interest 
using an out-of-sample forecasting technique, we need to compare the out-of-sample 
forecasts of the dependent variable, which are delivered by two rival models. In the 
unrestricted model, the set of regressors is augmented with the variable tX which has a 
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putative predictive content, while the restricted model excludes tX . Therefore, the out-of-
sample forecasting test of PTM is performed in three steps. First, we should obtain two 
series of forecasts of the export price using the unrestricted and restricted models. Second, 
we should compute forecasting errors delivered by two nested models of the export price. 
Finally, we should compare the forecasting abilities of the restricted and unrestricted 
models using either a test of equal forecast accuracy or a forecast encompassing test. 
 
In this chapter, we use the forecast encompassing test by Clark and McCracken (2001), 
because they prove that their ENC-NEW test (i.e. New Encompassing Test) is the most 
powerful out-of-sample forecast statistics for small samples. ENC-NEW test statistic 
enables us to test the null hypothesis of no predictive power of the exchange rate using 
asymptotic critical values generated numerically. 
 
In order to test for the presence of PTM, the forecasting ability of the unrestricted model of 
the export price (23a) must be compared to the predictive power of its restricted version:  
ttttttttttt MCMCppp    24132211 lnlnlnlnln .   23(b) 
The model (23b) is labelled as the restricted model nested within the unrestricted 
specification (23a), because we impose the restriction that the coefficients on the exchange 
rate terms, t5 and t6 , equal zero in the set-up (23a). Thus, the null hypothesis suggests 
that the unrestricted model (23a) includes two excess parameters, t5  and t6 , while the 
alternative hypothesis implies that the exchange rate coefficients are statistically different 
from zero: 
oH : 05 t and 06 t (no PTM)    
aH : 05 t and 06 t (PTM).       (24) 
Under the null hypothesis, the restrictions on the coefficients of the exchange rates are 
true and the correct specification of the export price is (23b). In contrast, the alternative 
hypothesis suggests that the parameter restrictions implied by the null hypothesis are 
false and the behaviour of the export price should be modelled according to the 
unrestricted equation (23a).  
 
The restricted model (21b) corresponds to the hypothesis of a complete ERPT and zero 
PTM. If the exporter does not undertake the PTM by decreasing the log-transformed export 
price, tpln , following the depreciation of the importer’s currency (a rise in 1ln te or 2ln te ), 
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the export price should be insensitive to currency fluctuations, i.e. 065  tt  . 
Consequently, a 1% depreciation of the importer’s currency leads to a 1% increase of the 
import price, since the exporter does not limit the ERPT by a downward adjustment of the 
export price.  
 
In contrast, the unrestricted model (23a) is associated with the hypothesis of PTM. The 
statistical significance of the coefficients on the previous values of the exchange rate 
suggests that the exporter undertakes PTM by adjusting the export price following 
fluctuations of the exchange rate. Consider a depreciation of the importer’s currency, 
which raises the import price of the good whose price is denominated in the exporter’s 
currency. If the firm conducts PTM by decreasing the export price in order to protect the 
importer from a large increase of the import price, the degree of the ERPT into the import 
price is limited. In particular, a 1% depreciation of the importer’s currency does not cause 
a 1% increase of the import price. 
 
Although in our theoretical model the derivative of the export price with respect to the 
nominal exchange rate (20) is unambiguously negative, the export price may also rise 
following the depreciation of the importer’s currency. For example, Knetter’s model 
reviewed in Section 3.3.1 (Knetter, 1989) suggests that the exporter raises the export price 
(3) in response to the depreciation of the importer’s currency, if he believes that the 
importer’s demand becomes less elastic as the import price increases. Since empirical 
literature reports both positive and negative effects of the importer’s currency depreciation 
on the export price (Knetter, 1989), we do not impose restrictions on the sign of the 
coefficients on the past realizations of the exchange rate. 
 
In order to prove the existence of the PTM among the UK exporters, we must provide 
evidence that the forecasting accuracy of the unrestricted model (23a) outperforms that of 
the restricted equation (23b). The forecasting superiority of the unrestricted model (23a) 
would imply that the model (23a) represents a more accurate description of the dynamics 
of the UK export prices, as opposed to the specification (23b). In order to show the 
forecasting dominance of the unrestricted model (23a), we must prove that the value of the 
ENC-NEW test statistic of forecast encompassing by Clark and McCracken (2001) is 
sufficiently large to reject the null hypothesis of no difference between the mean 
forecasting errors of the models (23a) and (23b). 
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Since the degree of PTM is unstable in our theoretic model (22), we assess the predictive 
ability of an export price model by methods which re-estimate the regression coefficients 
over time. We believe that a recursive estimation of coefficients is the most appropriate 
econometric tool for studying the PTM in the situation of coefficient instability, because a 
researcher is less likely to reject the model implying the significance of the coefficient on 
the variable of interest if the parameter instability is accommodated (Rossi, 2006). Thus, 
by modelling the instability of the regression parameters, we hope to increase the 
likelihood of the rejection of the null hypothesis that the exchange rate has a zero effect on 
the export price. Specifically, since a re-estimation of the regression parameters using the 
out-of-sample forecasting tests ensures the robustness of the estimation methodology to the 
parameter instability, our estimation technique may detect the PTM in situations where 
non-robust empirical models fail to detect it. 
 
An additional motivation for the use of out-of-sample forecasting tests for analyzing the 
relationship between the exchange rate and the export price originates from Stock and 
Watson (1994). They suggest that a regression applied to a full sample may fail to deliver 
statistically significant estimates of coefficients if the regression parameters are unstable 
over time. However, if we apply the regression to a subsample drawn from the full sample, 
we may find a robust link between the dependent variable and the independent variable of 
interest. Using the terminology adopted in the forecasting literature, the relation between 
two variables might have a predictive content in at least one subsample in the situation of 
the parameter instability, even if we fail to find the predictive content of the forecasting 
relation over the full sample. Therefore, if we fail to confirm the statistical significance of 
the exchange rate coefficients by running the unrestricted regression (23a) over the full 
sample, we may still prove the presence of PTM by confirming the predictive power of the 
exchange rate over a subsample.  
 
Since models exploiting the parameter instability use subsamples of the full sample for re-
estimating regression coefficients over time, these models are able to detect those 
forecasting relations that are not evident from running fixed parameter models. Thus, by 
re-estimating the regression parameters of the unrestricted (23a) and restricted (23b) 
models, we hope to increase the number of goods for which there is statistically significant 
evidence of the PTM by the UK exporters.  
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A recursive estimation of the regression coefficients is conducted through running a 
selection of out-of-sample forecasting tests, which represent an effective method to decide 
between two nested models when the constancy of the regression parameters is uncertain. 
The recursive estimation of the coefficients over time ensures the robustness of a model to 
the instability of its parameters, because the estimates of the regression parameters are 
updated with the availability of new data.  
 
The out-of-sample forecasting tests are conducted in two steps. First, the model 
coefficients are estimated on a portion of sample. Second, the obtained estimates are used 
in constructing one-period-ahead forecasts of the dependent variable. In this chapter, we 
will run four types of the out-of-sample forecasting tests, which vary in the method for 
updating the regression coefficients: 
(1) In Split tests, the estimates that were obtained from running the unrestricted model 
(23a) on a portion of sample are used for forecasting the export price at all subsequent time 
periods. Thus, the estimates of the regression parameters are not updated as new data 
becomes available; 
(2) In Recursive tests, the sample that is used for estimating the regression parameters is 
augmented with new data as the forecasting advances through time. Therefore, the 
estimates of the regression coefficients are updated each time when we enlarge the sample 
employed for the coefficient estimation; 
(3) In Rolling tests, we use a rolling window of R most recent observations on the 
regressors for obtaining the estimates of the regression coefficients, which are employed in 
subsequent forecasting. Similarly to the recursive tests, the estimates of the coefficients are 
adjusted as the R-observation window advances through time; 
(4) In Random Walk Coefficient Time Varying Parameter (RWCTVP) tests, the 
regression parameters are estimated by recursive least squares and follow a random walk 
process with zero drift. Using the first-step estimates of the regression coefficients, Kalman 
filter recursions are conducted in order to obtain one-period predictions of the export price. 
 
The out-of-sample test of PTM is performed in four stages. First, we recursively estimate 
the regression coefficients of the unrestricted (23a) and restricted (23b) models of the 
export price using fixed, rolling, recursive and RWCTVP regressions. Second, using the 
estimated coefficients, we compute one-step-ahead forecasts of the export price. Third, we 
construct the out-of-sample Root Mean Squared Forecast Errors (RMSFE) of the 
unrestricted (23a) and restricted (23b) models. RMSFE represent a function of the 
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difference between the predicted values of the export price and its actual values. Finally, 
we plug the RMSFE values corresponding to the unrestricted (23a) and restricted (23b) 
equations of the export price into the formula for the ENC-NEW test statistic of forecast 
encompassing by Clark and McCracken (2001).  
 
Although the predictive ability of a forecasting model is indicated by the size of its mean 
forecasting error, we need a formal test that proves the statistical significance of the 
forecasting superiority of the model. Therefore, finding the model that delivers the lowest 
average forecasting error is not sufficient for determining the correct specification of the 
export price. Even when the unrestricted model of the export price (23a) delivers a lower 
RMSFE than the restricted model (23b), we need to prove that the difference between the 
two RMSFE is statistically significant. The ENC-NEW test of forecast encompassing by 
Clark and McCracken (2001) allows us to reject the null hypothesis that the difference 
between the out-of-sample RMSFE of the unrestricted (23a) and restricted (23b) models of 
the export price is zero. The rejection of the null hypothesis suggests that the forecasting 
performance of the model containing the exchange rate (23a) dominates the predictive 
ability of the restricted model (23b) by delivering a significantly lower RMSFE.  
 
Therefore, the existence of PTM is confirmed by rejecting the null hypothesis of the ENC-
NEW test of forecast encompassing by Clark and McCracken (2001). The size of a 
model’s out-of-sample mean forecasting error also serves as the primary tool for analyzing 
the stability of the extent of PTM. The next section explains the algorithm for using the 
RMSFE series to test for structural breaks in the size of PTM. 
 
3.5.4 Testing for structural breaks in the PTM coefficients 
 
After testing the power of the specification (23a) to predict the UK export prices, we 
examine the stability of the coefficients on the past exchange rates, since our theoretic 
model suggests an unstable degree of the PTM (22).  Stock and Watson (1994) propose the 
following algorithm for detecting instability in the regression parameters. They classify all 
forecasting models into three groups according to their adaptivity, where the adaptivity 
implies the robustness of a model to the evolution of its parameters over time:  
(1) Models with no adaptivity (e.g. fixed parameter models); 
(2) Models with moderate adaptivity (e.g. recursive and rolling regressions, RWCTVP 
models with small coefficient evolution); 
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(3) Models with high adaptivity (e.g. RWCTVP models with large coefficient 
evolution. 
Stock and Watson (1994) suggest estimating the model using a selection of out-of-sample 
forecasting tests which vary in their degree of parameter adaptivity. After obtaining the in-
sample estimates of the regression parameters, the researcher should compare the 
forecasting ability of the fixed, rolling, recursive and RWCTVP models by examining their 
out-of-sample RMSFE. The forecasting superiority of adaptive models over models whose 
parameters are fixed may be interpreted as the indication of parameter instability. Note that 
a superior forecasting model should deliver the smallest value of the out-of-sample 
RMSFE. In contrast, the dominant  forecasting performance of fixed parameter models 
implies parameter constancy.  
 
Following the algorithm by Stock and Watson (1994), we increase the degree of parameter 
evolution in each round of the estimation of the unrestricted model (23a) of the export 
price. We start with the split test, a.k.a. fixed parameter regression, which does not 
accommodate any adaptivity in the regression parameters. After running the fixed 
parameter test, we estimate the regression coefficients using models with moderate degree 
of parameter adaptivity, namely rolling and recursive regressions. Finally, we apply set-ups 
with high degree of parameter evolution, i.e. RWCTVP models.  
 
The test of PTM stability consists of comparing the RMSFE series delivered by the fixed, 
rolling, recursive and RWCTVP regressions of the unrestricted model (23a) of the export 
price. The empirical finding, which confirms that adaptive models forecast the export price 
with a lower out-of-sample RMSFE than fixed parameter regressions, is consistent with 
our theoretical model of unstable PTM (22). In contrast, the forecasting dominance of 
fixed parameter models serves as evidence of the stability of the PTM coefficients, t5 and 
t6 . 
 
3.5.5 Testing the hypotheses on the parameter vector in the situation of 
parameter instability 
 
In order to illustrate the poor forecasting performance of non-adaptive models, the 
empirical output of this chapter reports the results from running fixed parameter 
regressions of the export price. However, Rossi (2006) shows that split regressions are not 
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appropriate for testing the null hypothesis on an unstable parameter. In particular, the 
parameter instability underpinning data relationships leads to fundamental changes in the 
null hypothesis that compares two nested models.  
 
Consider the following two autoregressions of the dependent variable, ln yt , on the log of 
the past exchange rate, ln et-1: 
tttt eyy    1211 lnlnln ,       (25) 
tttttt eyy    1211 lnlnln ,       (25a) 
where t denotes the regression error term. The model (25) corresponds to the case of 
parameter stability, since the coefficient on the previous exchange rate, 2 , remains 
constant over the full sample. In contrast, the parameters of the model (25a) evolve over 
time, since the regression coefficients, t1 and t2 , contain the time subscript, t . Thus, the 
response of the dependent variable to the past exchange rate varies across time periods. 
 
The fixed parameter model (25) and its time varying parameter version (25a) generate 
different null hypotheses on the coefficient of the previous exchange rate, oH : 
oH  (25): 02  ,           
oH (25a): 
c
t  2 and 0
c .       (25b) 
In the fixed parameter model (25), the researcher tests the restriction that the coefficient on 
the previous exchange rate equals zero. In contrast, the time varying parameter model 
(25a) suggests testing a joint null hypothesis on the exchange rate coefficient. The first part 
of this null hypothesis implies that the PTM coefficient, t2 , is stable and equals a constant 
value, c . The second part of the null hypothesis sets the constant value of the coefficient 
on the past exchange rate, c , to zero. 
 
Since the instability of the model parameters dramatically modifies the null hypothesis on 
the parameter vector, the results delivered by the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test, which is only 
applicable to fixed parameter models, are not valid in the presence of the inconstancy of 
regression coefficients (Rossi, 2006).
10
 In contrast, out-of-sample forecasting tests are 
appropriate for discriminating between the joint null hypothesis on t2  (25b) and the 
                                               
10 The LR test is the conventional test for model misspecification, which is employed in the empirical 
literature in order to compare nested models (Rossi, 2006). 
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alternative hypothesis suggesting that the exchange rate coefficient is significantly 
different from zero and unstable (Rossi, 2006).  
 
The additional advantage of out-of-sample forecasting tests lies in their ability to detect a 
misspecification of a model. Specifically, they enable us to choose between the restricted 
(23b) and unrestricted (23a) models of the export price by producing the average squared 
forecast errors. Thus, in order to determine whether the unrestricted model (23a) represents 
an accurate specification of the export price, we must check that it delivers a significantly 
lower RMSFE than the restricted version (23b). Unlike the LR test, which is frequently 
used to test the misspecification of a model, the results delivered by out-of-sample 
forecasting tests are robust to the coefficient instability, since the regression parameters are 
updated as the sample size increases.  
 
Thus, the ability of out-of-sample forecasting methods to detect the accurate specification 
of the export price in the presence of parameter instability represents the primary 
motivation behind our decision to use the forecasting methodology for testing the PTM by 
UK exporters. The next section describes the computation algorithm of out-of-sample 
forecasting tests. 
 
3.5.6 Description of the out-of-sample tests of predictive ability 
 
This section describes the algorithm for running split, rolling and recursive regressions. 
First, we explain the method for constructing the sample used to obtain the in-sample 
estimates of regression coefficients. Second, we describe the process for computing the 
one-step-ahead predictions of the dependent variable with the in-sample coefficient 
estimates. Third, we provide the formula for the average forecasting error of a model, 
which indicates the predictive power of the specification. 
 
Out-of-sample tests represent an effective tool for detecting a superior model for 
forecasting the variable of interest. These tests are performed in two steps. First, a portion 
of sample is used to obtain the in-sample estimates of regression coefficients. In the second 
step, the coefficient estimates are applied to the remaining observations in the sample in 
order to generate out-of-sample forecasts of the dependent variable. The difference 
between the actual value of the dependent variable and its predicted value represents the 
forecasting error of the model and highlights its predictive accuracy. In order to determine 
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the specification that performs the best in forecasting the dependent variable, one-period-
ahead RMSFE are computed for each model and used as the formal measure of its 
predictive ability. The best performing forecasting model should deliver the smallest 
RMSFE. 
 
Consider two competing (nested) models explaining the behaviour of the dependent 
variable, tY : 
tttt XXcY   2211 ,        (26) 
tt
aa
t XcY   11 ,         (26a) 
where c and c
a
 denote constants. tX1 and tX 2 stand for exogenous regressors. Variable 
t represents the error term of the regression and “a” denotes the parameters of the 
alternative specification (26a). 
 
The algorithm for running an out-of-sample forecasting test consists of the following five 
steps:
11
 
 
In the first step, we split the sample into two parts - the in-sample and the out-of-sample 
portions. Suppose that there are R+P time-series observations in the sample. Let the in-
sample portion of the sample contain the observations that span 1 to R. Therefore, the out-
of-sample portion consists of the observations that span R+1 through R+P.   
 
In the second step, the first R observations in the sample are used to obtain the in-sample 
estimates of the regression coefficients. Specifically, we run the OLS regression of the 
unrestricted (26) and restricted (26a) models on the in-sample portion of the sample in 
order to obtain the estimated parameters,  *1**2*1* ,,,, aacc  . 
 
In the third step, we must use the in-sample coefficient estimates to compute the one-
period-ahead forecasts of the dependent variable, ftY
 
and fatY , for the 
periods PRRRt  ,...,2,1 . For example, in order to compute fRY 1
 
and faRY 1 , the in-
sample coefficient estimates must be applied to the regressor values corresponding to the 
period t = R + 1. Thus, the estimated coefficients, *1**2*1* ,,,, aacc  , must be inserted 
                                               
11 See Clark and McCracken (2001) for a detailed exposition of the computation algorithm that corresponds 
to the out-of-sample forecasting. 
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into equations (26) and (26a) as follows: 12
*
211
*
1
*
1   RR
f
R XXcY   
and
11
*
1
*
1   R
aafa
R XcY  . 
 
In the fourth step, we generate the one-step-ahead RMSFE for the unrestricted (26) and 
restricted (26a) models:  
 
P
YY
RMSFE
f
ttt  

2
11
,         
 
P
YY
RMSFE
fa
ttta   
2
11
,       (26b) 
where t = R, R+1, R+2,…, R+P-1. RMSFE represents a function of the one-step-ahead 
forecasting error defining the difference between the true value of the dependent variable 
and its forecast. 
 
Finally, we compare the RMSFE of the unrestricted (26) and restricted (26a) models and 
choose the specification delivering the lowest out-of-sample RMSFE, since the model that 
minimizes the out-of-sample prediction error offers the “best” description of data. 
 
The most commonly used tests of out-of-sample forecasting are split, rolling and recursive 
regressions. These tests follow the same method for constructing the one-step-ahead 
predicted values of the dependent variable, but differ in the algorithm for obtaining the in-
sample coefficient estimates: 
 
Split tests (a.k.a. fixed parameter models): Split tests estimate the model parameters on a 
fixed portion of the sample and employ these coefficient values in forecasting the 
dependent variable in all subsequent periods. Thus, the model parameters are estimated 
only once and are not revised as the forecasting proceeds to the next time period. The five-
step forecasting algorithm described at the beginning of this section represents an outline 
of the split test; 
 
Recursive tests: In recursive regressions, the parameter estimates are updated as new data 
becomes available. For instance, in order to compute the one-step-ahead forecast, faRY 1 , at 
time Rt  , we run the OLS regression of the restricted model (26a) using the observations 
spanning 1 to R  and obtain the estimated coefficients, *ac and *1
a . In order to predict the 
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value of the dependent variable for the subsequent period, fa
RY 2 , we employ the coefficient 
estimates obtained from running the OLS regression of the equation (26a) 
on 1R observations of the sample. Thus, each time when the forecasting advances 
through time, the subsample which is used for obtaining the in-sample estimates of the 
regression coefficients is enlarged. Unlike split tests, the recursive forecasting exploits 
possible time variation in the regression coefficients, since recursive tests re-estimate the 
model parameters over time; 
 
Rolling tests: Rolling forecasting explicitly accommodates the idea of time varying 
parameters (Stock and Watson, 1994). Similarly to the recursive forecasting, the sample 
which is used for estimating the in-sample coefficients is not stable over time. However, 
while in the recursive test the size of the estimation sample increases as the forecasting 
progresses through time, in the rolling forecasting the regression is run on a fixed window 
of the most recent observations. For instance, in order to obtain the one-period-ahead 
forecast of the dependent variable, faRY 1 , at time Rt  , we run the restricted regression (26a) 
on observations that span periods 1 to R . In order to obtain the one-period-ahead forecast 
for the subsequent period, faRY 2 , the window of observations used for the parameter 
estimation is moved forward by one period, i.e. the new rolling window 
equals 1,...,4,3,2  Rt . Thus, the size of the window, which is measured by the number 
of observations, is kept fixed as the forecasting moves forward through the time. 
 
Since split, rolling and recursive tests differ in their algorithms for re-estimating the 
regression coefficients, their average forecasting errors (RMSFE) are not equal to each 
other. The parameter updating scheme that minimizes the size of the one-period-ahead 
RMSFE represents the best performing forecasting technique.  
 
However, split, rolling and recursive regressions follow the same method for testing model 
misspecification. Specifically, we should compare one-period-ahead RMSFE from the 
unrestricted (26) and restricted (26a) regressions. For example, if the RMSFE of the 
unrestricted (26) model is smaller than that of the restricted (26a) regression, the 
unrestricted model may have a superior predictive power. However, even if the RMSFE of 
the restricted (26a) regression exceeds that of the unrestricted (26) specification, the 
difference between the two RMSFE may not be statistically different from zero. In order to 
determine the statistical significance of the difference between the one-period-ahead 
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RMSFE of nested models, we use the ENC-NEW test statistic of forecast encompassing 
(Clark and McCracken, 2001), which is described in the next section. 
 
3.5.7  ENC-NEW test of forecast encompassing (Clark and McCracken, 
2001) 
 
While Stock and Watson (1994) suggest comparing out-of-sample forecast errors of rival 
specifications in order to determine the “best” forecasting model, several recent studies 
designed formal test statistics to detect the superior forecasting model (Clark and 
McCracken, 2001; Diebold and Mariano, 1995). For instance, suppose that the mean 
squared forecast error of the restricted regression (26a) exceeds the RMSFE generated by 
the unrestricted model, i.e. RMSFE
a 
> RMSFE. In order to conclude that the unrestricted 
model (26) offers a superior forecasting performance, the difference between the average 
prediction errors of the nested models,  RMSFERMSFE a  , must be positive and 
statistically significant. The statistical significance of the difference in the forecasting 
abilities of models can be tested using two types of tests, namely tests for equal prediction 
accuracy and tests of forecast encompassing of nested linear models (Clark and 
McCracken, 2001).  
 
Clark and McCracken (2001) show that, in small samples, the most powerful out-of-
sample forecast statistic is their New Encompassing Test, ENC-NEW. It represents a 
function of one-step-ahead forecast errors delivered by the OLS regression of two nested 
models: 
 



 

t t
t ttt
u
uuu
PENCNEW
2
1,2
1,21,1
2
1,1
,      (27) 
where P denotes the number of one-step-ahead predicted values of the dependent 
variable. 1,1 tu and 1,2 tu denote one-period-ahead forecast errors from the restricted (26a) and 
unrestricted (26) models, respectively: 
fa
ttt YYu 111,1   .         (28) 
f
ttt YYu 111,2   .         (28a) 
Under the null hypothesis, one-period-ahead prediction errors from the unrestricted (26) 
and restricted (26a) regressions are equal for each forecasting period, i.e. 1,21,1   tt uu . In 
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order to test this null hypothesis on forecasting error terms, the value of the ENC-NEW test 
statistic (27) must be compared to the appropriate critical value.
12
  
 
In order to determine whether the variable 2X has predictive content for the dependent 
variable, the value of the ENC-NEW test statistic (27) must be computed using one-step-
ahead forecast errors of nested models (26) and (26a). If the statistic value fails to exceed 
the numerically generated critical value, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis 
that 2X does not have predictive power.
13
 If the value of the ENC-NEW test statistic 
surpasses the critical value, one can conclude that the regressor 2X  has predictive content 
for forecasting the dependent variable. 
 
The asymptotic critical values for the ENC-NEW test statistic were generated numerically 
in Clark and McCracken (2001) for rolling, recursive and fixed regressions. Therefore, we 
are unable to test the statistical significance of the difference between the average 
prediction errors of nested RWCTVP regressions. However, since RWCTVP models are 
the most robust to parameter evolution among the four out-of-sample tests run in this 
chapter, we also report RMSFE from the unrestricted (23a) and restricted (23b) regressions 
of the RWCTVP model of the export price.  
 
Similarly to the fixed, rolling and recursive tests, the RWCTVP test suggests computing 
one-step-ahead predictions of the dependent variable. However, RWCTVP tests use 
Kalman filter to correct the estimates of regression coefficients. The next section describes 
the algorithm for obtaining the filtered estimates of the RWCTVP regression coefficients.  
 
3.5.8 Random walk coefficient time varying parameter (RWCTVP) estimation 
 
RWCTVP methodology enables us to vary the magnitude of the coefficient evolution. 
Time varying parameter models represent a common tool to study linear relationships 
which may suffer from abrupt regime switches (Gamble and LeSage, 1993). The regime 
                                               
12 The limiting distribution of the ENC-NEW test is non-normal and depends on two parameters – 2k  and . 
The parameter equals
R
P
and 2k denotes the number of restrictions, i.e. the number of excess parameters in 
the unrestricted model. In our case, the number of parameter restrictions equals 1, since the unrestricted 
model (26) contains one excess parameter, 2 .  
13 The alternative definition of the null hypothesis states that the restricted model forecast encompasses the 
unrestricted model forecast. This definition has been reflected in the test’s name. 
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switch implies the presence of structural breaks in the regression coefficients. Since time 
varying parameter tests estimate model parameters by recursive least squares, the 
instability in the relationships between the dependent variable and regressors is explicitly 
embedded in the RWCTVP methodology. 
 
The main difference between the RWCTVP model and other out-of-sample tests lies in the 
procedure for obtaining the in-sample estimates of the regression coefficients, which are 
subsequently used in constructing one-period-ahead forecasts of the dependent variable. 
Specifically, each coefficient estimate obtained by running the regression on a portion of 
the sample is corrected with Kalman filter in order to alleviate the prediction error that 
results from using the uncorrected in-sample estimates. 
 
The RWCTVP model is specified by the following system of equations: 
tttt uxy    s.t. tu ~  2,0 N ,         
ttt   1  s.t. t ~  Qdii 22,0...  ,       (29)        
where
1




  tt xxEQ . The dependent variable, ty , is regressed on a vector of 
regressors, tx . The error term, ut , is assumed to follow a normal distribution with zero 
mean and constant variance, 2 . The vector of the model parameters, t , evolves over time 
according to a random walk process with zero drift. The error term, t , represents a 
random variable that is independent and identically distributed with zero mean and 
variance Q22 .  
 
Thus, the variance of the error term from the equation describing the evolution of the 
model parameters, t , is a function of the error variance from the regression of the 
dependent variable, ty . Moreover, the variance of t depends on the parameter  that 
governs the degree of the coefficient evolution in the model. In the current study, we 
consider the following range of possible values of in order to account for various degrees 
of coefficient adaptivity:  02.0,015.0,01.0,0075.0,005.0,0025.0 . Large values of the 
parameter  indicate high adaptivity of the regression coefficients, t .  
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The time varying parameter model (29) may also include lags of the regressors, i.e. ltx  . In 
this study, we choose the value of the adaptivity parameter, , and the number of lags of 
the regressors, l  2,1l , recursively by searching for the values that minimize the 
RMSFE of the model (29). 
 
We conduct Kalman filter recursions of the equation system (29) in order to obtain the 
corrected estimates of the regression coefficients and compute one-period-ahead 
predictions of the dependent variable. The computation algorithm can be intuitively 
summarized into seven steps (for a more rigorous analytical exposition, see Garbade, 1977 
and Lutkepohl, 2005): 
 
In the first step, we initialize the recursive estimation by assuming that the parameters of 
the model (29) equal zero, i.e. 0o
14
, and equating the state covariance matrix to I , 
where   is an arbitrarily large scalar. 
 
In the second step, we estimate the conditional expectation of the model 
parameters,  1321 ,...,,,| tt yyyyE  , by running the regression on all past observations. 
Essentially, since these parameter estimates are subsequently used for constructing one-
step-ahead predictions of yt, we assume the equality of the following two conditional 
expectations:  1321 ,...,,,| tt yyyyE  =  13211 ,...,,,|  tt yyyyE  . 
 
In the third step, we estimate the conditional covariance matrix,  1321 ,...,,,| tt yyyyCov  , 
using all past observations. Thus, we assume that the conditional covariance of the current 
parameters of the model can be obtained from the conditional covariance of the past 
parameters using the following rule: 
 1321 ,...,,,| tt yyyyCov  =   QyyyyCov tt
2
13211 ,...,,,|   . 
 
In the fourth step, we compute one-step-ahead predictions of the dependent variable using 
the estimates of the conditional expectations of the model 
parameters,  1321 ,...,,,| tt yyyyE  , which were obtained in the second step. Applying the 
                                               
14 Alternatively, Kalman recursions may be initialized by setting the parameter θ0 to its in-sample estimate 
which is obtained using the OLS regression (Stock and Watson, 1994). 
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parameter estimates to the one-step-ahead values of the explanatory variables gives one-
step-ahead forecasts of yt: 
   13211321 ,...,,,|,...,,,|   ttttt yyyyExyyyyyE  . 
 
In the fifth step, we correct the coefficient estimates obtained in the second step by adding 
the information which is delivered by observation ty . The corrected estimates of the model 
parameters,  tt yyyyE ,...,,,| 321 , are referred to as filtered estimates and represent the 
estimated expectation of parameters conditional upon all past and current 
observations:
      13211321321 ,...,,,|,...,,,|,...,,,|   tttttttt yyyyyEyKyyyyEyyyyE  , 
where tK defines Kalman filter gain,
1



ttt
tt
t
xRx
xR
K . Rt represents a function of the 
estimated conditional covariance of the model parameters, which was obtained in the third 
step:  13212 ,...,,,|
1
 ttt yyyyCovR 

. Kalman filter gain increases the precision of the 
coefficient estimates by adding the information which is absent from the observations used 
for obtaining the parameter estimates. Specifically, Kalman filter gain exploits the 
information delivered by observations for time t, while the coefficient estimates are 
generated by observations spaning the periods 1 to t-1. The information added by filtering 
the parameter estimates is reflected in the difference between the true value of the 
dependent variable and its one-step-ahead forecast:   1321 ,...,,,|  ttt yyyyyEy . 
 
In the sixth step, we correct the estimated conditional covariances obtained in the third step. 
In particular, we use Kalman filter in order to estimate the covariances of the model 
parameters conditional upon all past and current observations: 
   tttttt RxKRyyyyCov 
2
321 ,...,,,|  .  
 
In the seventh step, we conduct Kalman recursions for the next time period, t+1, by 
repeating the first six steps of this algorithm. Specifically, we use the filtered estimates of 
the regression coefficients from the fifth step,  tt yyyyE ,...,,,| 321 , in order to estimate 
the expectations of the model parameters conditional upon the observations for all periods 
that preceeded t+1:  tt yyyyE ,...,,,| 3211 . 
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Although the RWCTVP test follows a different method for obtaining the in-sample 
estimates of regression coefficients compared to split, rolling and recursive regressions, the 
choice of a superior forecasting model is analogous. In particular, the forecasting 
performance of the unrestricted (23a) and restricted (23b) models of the export price is 
examined by evaluating their RMSFE. The RMSFE of the RWCTVP model (29) is 
computed using the following formula:  
  
F
yyyyEy
RMSFE
tttt 

2
121 ,...,,
, where F denotes the number of forecasts. The 
regression which delivers the lowest RMSFE is considered a superior forecasting model. 
 
Running the RWCTVP regression is particularly useful for testing the stability of the PTM 
coefficients, since it accommodates a higher degree of coefficient evolution than rolling 
and recursive tests. Therefore, the forecasting superiority of RWCTVP tests indicates that 
the PTM parameters from the unrestricted regression (23a) of the export price are unstable. 
Specifically, the test of PTM instability is conducted by analyzing the differences among 
the average forecast errors of split, rolling, recursive and RWCTVP regressions. If the 
RWCTVP model of the export price delivers a smaller RMSFE than less adaptive 
forecasting techniques, model parameters are susceptible to instability. 
 
This section presented the econometric methodology that we designed in order to test for 
the presence of PTM and its instability. First, we explained that the presence of PTM may 
be tested by examining the predictive content of the exchange rate for forecasting export 
prices. Second, we suggested testing the stability of PTM by varying the degree of the 
evolution of a model’s parameters. Third, we described the procedure for estimating the 
model parameters using split, rolling, recursive and RWCTVP tests of out-of-sample 
forecasting. Finally, we showed the algorithm for detecting the misspecification of a model 
through examining its average prediction error.  
 
3.6 Data 
 
This study employs monthly figures on export price indices of the UK trade in 
manufactures with the EU. Export price data was retrieved from the Monthly Review of 
External Trade Statistics released by the Office for National Statistics. The sample spans 
the period from January 1999 to April 2010 and yields 136 monthly observations.  We 
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chose this particular data source, because it provides detailed time series data 
disaggregated by commodity group in accordance with the Standard International Trade 
Classification.  
 
It is important to use disaggregated data, since empirical evidence suggests that the extent 
of PTM varies substantially across commodities (Campa and Goldberg, 2002). Specifically, 
producers of differentiated goods are more likely to conduct PTM compared to firms 
producing homogeneous goods, because differentiated goods are produced by monopolistic 
competitors with market power. The market power of firms allows them to charge a mark-
up of price over the marginal cost. In contrast, homogeneous goods are produced by 
perfectly competitive firms that set prices at the level of marginal cost due to the absence 
of market power. Without the price mark-up over the marginal cost, firms are unable to 
limit an increase of the import price following the depreciation of the importer’s currency, 
because a reduction of the export price would not allow firms to cover their production 
costs. Therefore, homogeneous goods are unlikely to be subject to PTM. 
 
Thus, this study examines disaggregated data on export prices and marginal costs, in order 
to avoid averaging across the price series whose regression parameters are fundamentally 
different. Moreover, we chose the Manufactures category, since manufactured goods 
possess more characteristics of the product differentiation, relative to raw materials. 
Therefore, manufactured goods are more likely to be susceptible to PTM. Furthermore, 
product differentiation is essential for testing our theoretic model, since it assumes the 
existence of substantial costs of researching product characteristics. Specifically, 
manufactured products are more likely to generate significant costs of choosing among 
varieties due to the product differentiation,  as opposed to basic commodities (e.g. wheat, 
corn, crude oil).  
 
The marginal cost of production is frequently approximated in the ERPT literature by the 
Producer Price Index, which is commonly abbreviated as PPI (Vigfusson et al., 2007). 
Therefore, we collected data on the PPI for the output of manufactured products from the 
PPI First Release 2005=100, which is provided by the Office for National Statistics.  
 
In order to ensure a sufficient variation in the degree of the product differentiation, we use 
data on export price indices and PPI for 10 product categories, namely Food, Wood and 
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Cork Manufactures, Chemicals, Machinery, Electrical Machinery, Clothing, Paper and 
Paperboard, Miscellaneous Metal Manufactures, Tobacco, and Road Vehicles. 
 
The exchange rate between the Great British Pound and the currencies of its trade partners 
from the EU is approximated by series on Broad Sterling Effective Exchange Rate Index 
(BSEERI), which is obtained from the Financial Statistics Freestanding release by the 
Office for National Statistics. Lynch and Whitaker (2004) offer a detailed explanation of 
the methodology followed by the Bank of England in constructing this index. The BSEERI 
summarizes the value of the Pound Sterling vis-à-vis a basket of the currencies of the UK’s 
main trading partners by assigning a time varying trade weight to each partner. Since 
Europe receives the largest weight in the BSEERI, we ensure a measurement consistency 
between the dependent variable and the regressors in the unrestricted (23a) and restricted 
(23b) regressions of the export price. Specifically, we regress the export price indices of 
the UK trade with the EU on the Effective Exchange Rate Index, which is mainly 
determined by the bilateral exchange rates between the Pound Sterling and individual 
European currencies. 
 
The unique feature of the BSEERI is reflected in its ability to account for the competition 
among producers selling in the importer’s market. In particular, the index incorporates the 
proportion of the importing country’s market, which is supplied by local producers. If local 
producers supply a greater proportion of the importer’s market, the market share of the UK 
exporters falls. Moreover, in addition to considering the competition between the UK and 
local producers, the BSEERI measures the degree of the competition between the UK and 
any exporting country that supplies the EU market. Since the degree of the competition in 
the importer’s market can make an important contribution to the size of the PTM by the 
UK exporters, preference was given to the BSEERI. 
 
Suppose that the competition in the EU market intensifies and the market share of the 
British exporters falls. As a result of an increased competition, the UK exporters are 
expected to exercise PTM more actively by limiting potential increase of the import prices 
of the UK exports, in order to protect their vulnerable market shares. Therefore, we believe 
that the response of the export price to the depreciation of the importer’s currency is 
stronger when the level of the competition among international suppliers of the EU market 
intensifies. Consequently, through employing the BSEERI we expect to detect PTM in the 
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situations where the nominal exchange rate index fails to reveal the predictive power of the 
exchange rate for forecasting the export price. 
 
The additional advantage of measuring fluctuations in the exchange rate with the BSEERI 
lies in its ability to pick up the effect of the aggregate price level in the importer’s 
market, dP , which we do not include among the regressors of the unrestricted (23a) and 
restricted (23b) models of the export price. This exchange rate index accommodates 
fluctuations in the price level, dP , by taking into account depreciations and appreciations 
of the currencies of countries whose firms compete with the UK exporters in supplying the 
EU market. Specifically, import prices of goods exported to the EU increase (fall) 
following the appreciation (depreciation) of the exporter’s currency. Since the aggregate 
price level of a good consists of the prices of all varieties of this good, the use of the 
BSEERI enables us to reflect dP movements by measuring the values of producers’ 
currencies.  
 
The data series described in this section are seasonally unadjusted. However, potential 
seasonality in price data may impact estimation results. Specifically, prices of some 
products may vary substantially across seasons due to seasonal swings in the product 
demand. For example, since the demand for summer clothing is stronger in summer, as 
opposed to winter, summer clothing prices may be systematically higher in summer than in 
winter. In the case of winter clothing, prices observed in cold seasons are likely to exceed 
prices recorded in warm seasons. Therefore, in Section 3.8 we remove potential seasonal 
variation from the data, in order to disentangle the effect of each explanatory variable on 
the export price more accurately. Before we proceed to analyzing the PTM parameters 
estimated on seasonally adjusted data, we report in Section 3.7 the estimation results from 
running the unrestricted (23a) and restricted (23b) regressions of the export price on the 
series that have not been adjusted for seasonal effects.  
 
3.7 Empirical results 
 
This section reports out-of-sample RMSFE obtained by running the unrestricted (23a) and 
restricted (23b) models of the export price using four methods for estimating the in-sample 
regression coefficients, namely split, rolling, recursive and RWCTVP regressions. The 
purpose of this section is to determine whether the model containing the exchange rates, i.e. 
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PTM model (23a), forecasts the export price better than the non-PTM model (23b) that 
omits currency fluctuations. The unrestricted model (23a) represents the PTM model, 
because it accommodates the response of the export price to the importer’s currency 
depreciation. In contrast, the restricted model (23b) is defined as the non-PTM model, 
because it does not incorporate the effect of the exchange rate on the export price. The 
PTM model (23a) delivers a superior forecasting performance if its out-of-sample RMSFE 
is significantly smaller than the average forecast error of the non-PTM model (23b) of the 
export price.  
 
This section also reports whether the difference between the RMSFE corresponding to the 
PTM (23a) and non-PTM (23b) models of the export price is significantly different from 
zero. The statistical significance of the difference between the average forecasting errors of 
nested models is tested using the asymptotic critical values of the ENC-NEW test statistic 
of forecast encompassing by Clark and McCracken (2001). They generated asymptotic 
critical values for split, rolling and recursive regressions by conducting 5000 simulated 
draws from the statistic’s limiting distribution.  
 
Table 11 displays the RMSFE from estimating the PTM (23a) and non-PTM (23b) models 
of the export price on the monthly UK data on export price indices of manufactured 
products, PPI and BSEER. We apply eight forecasting models to the UK seasonally 
unadjusted data: rolling PTM, rolling non-PTM, recursive PTM, recursive non-PTM, split 
PTM, split non-PTM, RWCTVP PTM, and RWCTVP non-PTM.  For each level of the 
product disaggregation, the forecasting superiority of the PTM (23a) model over the non-
PTM model (23b) of the export price is indicated by symbols c, b or a. These symbols 
show the statistical significance of the difference between the RMSFE of the PTM and 
non-PTM models, i.e. (RMSFE
Non-PTM
-RMSFE
PTM
), at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of 
significance, respectively. If the absolute value of this error differential is not significantly 
different from zero, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of the ENC-NEW test, 
which implies that the exchange rate has no power for predicting the export price. The 
rejection of this null hypothesis and the excess of RMSFE
Non-PTM 
over RMSFE
PTM
 jointly 
imply that the UK exporters conduct PTM by adjusting the export price following 
fluctuations in the Sterling effective exchange rate. 
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Our estimation results enable us to test the predictive ability of the PTM (23a) and non-
PTM (23b) models of the export price for 11
15
 levels of the product disaggregation. 8 
forecasting models applied to 11 levels of disaggregation yield 88 average forecast errors 
and 44 cases for comparing predictive accuracies of the PTM (23a) and non-PTM (23b) 
models.  
 
Our estimation results suggest that the PTM (23a) model has a strong ability to forecast the 
aggregate index of export prices of Manufactured products, since its out-of-sample 
RMSFE is smaller than the average forecast error of the non-PTM (23b) model in all out-
of-sample tests. Moreover, the forecasting superiority of the PTM (23a) model is 
statistically significant in rolling, recursive and split regressions, since the numeric value of 
the ENC-NEW test statistic of forecast encompassing is significant at the 99% confidence 
level. Consequently, the exchange rate has a statistically significant effect on the aggregate 
export price of manufactured goods. The RMSFE of the PTM (23a) model is also lower 
than the average forecasting error of the non-PTM (23b) model of the export price when 
the RWCTVP regression is run. However, the statistical significance of this error 
differential cannot be verified, since the asymptotic critical values of the ENC-NEW test 
statistic are only applicable to split, rolling and recursive regressions (Clark and 
McCracken, 2001). 
 
In the majority of the out-of-sample forecasts of the export price, the PTM model (23a) 
performs better than the non-PTM (23b) model. Specifically, in 27 cases out of 44, the 
PTM (23a) model of the export price delivers a lower out-of-sample RMSFE, as opposed 
to the non-PTM (23b) model. This empirical finding indicates that the product categories 
comprising these 27 cases are subject to the PTM by the UK exporters. Moreover, in 19 
cases out of 44, the difference between the predictive abilities of the non-PTM (23b) and 
PTM (23a) models is statistically significant, since the difference between their average 
prediction errors, (RMSFE
Non-PTM
-RMSFE
PTM
 ), is positive and significantly different from 
zero, according to the asymptotic critical values of the ENC-NEW test. 
 
In 17 of the 44 cases, the PTM model (23a) is an inferior tool for forecasting export prices 
of the Manufactures, since it delivered larger out-of-sample RMSFE than the non-PTM 
model (23b). However, for each level of the industry disaggregation, except the Paper and 
                                               
15 10 product categories and one aggregate series, which encompass all goods in the Manufactures industry, 
give 11 levels of the product disaggregation. 
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Paperboard, there exists at least one forecasting test which displays the dominant 
predictive ability of the PTM (23a) model. Only the out-of-sample forecasts of Paper and 
Paperboard export prices could not deliver statistically significant evidence on the 
forecasting superiority of the PTM (23a) equation. Although the out-of-sample RMSFE 
from the RWCTVP regression suggests that the PTM (23a) model forecasts export prices 
of Paper and Paperboard more precisely than the non-PTM (23b) model, the statistical 
significance of this finding cannot be confirmed due to the unavailability of asymptotic 
critical values of the ENC-NEW test for nested RWCTVP models.  
 
Table 11 reports the failure of split, rolling, recursive and RWCTVP regressions to deliver 
the same prediction on the relative forecasting ability of the PTM (23a) model of export 
price. For example, the rolling and recursive regressions of the Machinery export price 
suggest that the PTM (23a) model delivers a lower out-of-sample RMSFE, compared to the 
non-PTM (23b) model. In contrast, the split and RWCTVP regressions show that the 
average prediction error of the non-PTM (23b) model is smaller than that of the PTM (23a) 
model of export price. Failure of these four out-of-sample tests to deliver the same 
prediction is caused by differences in their robustness to the underlying instability of the 
regression parameters, which induce a divergence among their forecasting errors.  
 
Split, rolling, recursive and RWCTVP regressions were designed for different degrees of 
parameter evolution. For example, the speed of parameter evolution in the RWCTVP 
model with high degree of coefficient evolution is likely to exceed the actual speed of the 
evolution of data relationships. In contrast, the speed of parameter updating in rolling and 
recursive regressions is likely to approach the “true” degree of coefficient evolution, since 
they follow a moderate speed of coefficient updating. Consequently, forecasting models 
with high adaptivity may accumulate larger forecasting errors than rolling and recursive 
regressions. Similarly, split tests are likely to generate larger out-of-sample forecasting 
errors than adaptive models, because fixed parameter tests fail to accommodate the 
evolution of regression coefficients over the sample period. 
 
The divergence among the parameter updating techniques of split, rolling, recursive and 
RWCTVP regressions leads to differences among their out-of-sample RMSFE. Therefore, 
their predictions on the choice of the most appropriate forecasting model are different. 
Specifically, failure of a model to update regression parameters at an accurate pace may 
accumulate large forecasting errors and undermine the ability of the test to assess the 
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predictive powers of nested models. Consequently, rolling, recursive, split and RWCTVP 
out-of-sample tests are not equally successful at detecting the predictive content of the 
exchange rate for forecasting export price indices. 
 
In order to detect the estimation technique that minimizes forecasting errors in predicting 
export prices of manufactured goods, we should compare the RMSFE of an export price 
model across split, rolling, recursive and RWCTVP tests. In order to visualize the best 
PTM model for forecasting export prices, Figure 13 displays the RMSFE delivered by split, 
rolling, recursive and RWCTVP regressions of the PTM (23a) equation of export price. 
The format of the graph is continuous, in order to facilitate a simultaneous exposition of 
four series of out-of-sample RMSFE.  
 
Figure 13 allows us to rank the four out-of-sample tests according to their forecasting 
performance. The best performing models for forecasting the UK export prices are 
recursive least squares and rolling regressions. These techniques deliver the smallest 
RMSFE among all out-of-sample methods considered in this study. RWCTVP regressions 
show a lower accuracy in predicting the export prices of all manufactured goods tested in 
this chapter. The average prediction errors of RWCTVP tests exceed the RMSFE of rolling 
and recursive regressions for all product categories. Split regressions offer the worst 
forecasting performance among the four out-of-sample tests of model misspecification. At 
each level of the product disaggregation, split RMSFE exceed the average forecast errors 
obtained by running recursive and rolling regressions. In half of the industries considered, 
the RMSFE of fixed parameter regressions overshoot the mean forecasting errors 
generated by the RWCTVP method.  
 
Thus, according to our empirical results displayed in Figure 13, out-of-sample tests that 
accommodate moderate adaptivity in their regression parameters (i.e. rolling and recursive 
regressions) offer a superior forecasting performance, as opposed to tests with no 
parameter adaptivity (i.e. split tests) and models with high degree of coefficient evolution 
(i.e. RWCTVP models). These empirical findings are consistent with Stock and Watson 
(1994) who documented a poor performance of fixed parameter models in forecasting 
macroeconomic time series. They also reported that models with small degrees of 
adaptivity forecast the dependent variable better than more adaptive models with time 
varying parameters. 
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The inferior forecasting performance of models with high degree of coefficient evolution 
can be intuitively justified with a trade-off between the forecast accuracy and the extent of 
parameter instability. If regression parameters are updated frequently, the accuracy of 
coefficient estimates may be damaged. Specifically, by incorporating a high degree of 
coefficient evolution, we are likely to exceed the actual degree of parameter instability in 
data relationships and accumulate large forecasting errors. Thus, imprecise estimates of the 
regression coefficients obtained with RWCTVP tests may lead to substantial out-of-sample 
RMSFE.  
 
In contrast, since models with moderate adaptivity offer a slower degree of parameter 
evolution, they are likely to approximate the “true” pattern of parameter instability more 
accurately than models with high adaptivity. By offering a more precise estimation of 
regression coefficients, moderately adaptive methods ensure a reduction of the out-of-
sample forecasting error. This trade-off between the precision of regression parameter 
estimates and the degree of coefficient evolution may explain the superior performance of 
recursive and rolling tests in predicting the UK export prices of manufactured goods. 
 
Finally, our empirical findings indicate a substantial degree of instability in the PTM 
coefficients, i.e. coefficients on the exchange rates in the PTM model (23a). In order to 
visualize the degree of the instability of the PTM by the UK exporters, Figure 14 plots the 
PTM coefficients estimated with rolling and recursive regressions that were run on 
aggregate data on the UK trade in manufactures with the EU. We plot the rolling and 
recursive estimates of the PTM coefficients, since these two out-of-sample tests were 
identified as the most accurate tools for forecasting the UK export prices. The Appendix 
also contains the graphs of the PTM coefficient estimates obtained using disaggregated 
data for the ten product categories selected in this study. Figures 14 and 16-25 effectively 
illustrate the time varying nature of the PTM by British exporters, since for each product 
category they display significant fluctuations in the PTM coefficients over time. 
 
Since adaptive forecasting models (e.g. rolling and recursive regressions) show a better 
performance in forecasting the UK export prices, as opposed to fixed parameter (split) tests, 
we may conclude that the degree of PTM is not constant over time. Following Stock and 
Watson (1994), the superior forecasting performance of models accommodating parameter 
evolution over time indicates that the regression coefficients of a forecasting model are 
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characterized by a time varying structure which cannot be captured by fixed parameter 
regressions. 
 
This section provided strong statistical evidence in favour of the PTM by the UK exporters 
of manufactured goods through showing that the exchange rate has significant predictive 
content for the export price. Moreover, we determined that the degree of PTM is unstable 
over time for all product categories analysed in this chapter, since adaptive models predict 
the UK export prices more precisely than fixed parameter models. In the next section we 
conduct the robustness checks of our empirical findings, in order to determine whether our 
estimation results are robust to potential seasonality of the UK export price indices. 
 
3.8 Robustness check 
 
This section examines the sensitivity of the estimation results reported in Section 3.7 to 
potential seasonal effects in data on the UK export price indices. Seasonal effects in 
monthly price series is a common phenomenon in the time series econometrics. In order to 
understand possible causes of the seasonality of price data, let us consider the product 
category Food. Suppose that the current season yielded an amount of crop which is 
insufficient to satisfy the aggregate demand for agricultural output. As a result of the 
reduced supply of basic commodities, prices of food items are likely to increase in the 
absence of government interventions in the market. Therefore, export prices of Food may 
be abnormally high in “bad” seasons and relatively low in seasons offering a large harvest. 
In addition to factors pertaining to weather and climate, seasonal fluctuations in the 
demand for a product may also cause seasonal jumps and falls of a product price. For 
example, the demand for electric machinery used for heating is higher in cold seasons, as 
opposed to warm periods of a year. Therefore, this type of machinery is expected to be 
more expensive in cold times of a year than in warm seasons. 
 
Thus, export prices may vary depending on the season in which a time-series observation 
is recorded. We propose to remove potential seasonal effects from data on the UK 
manufactured exports to the EU by transforming each variable from the PTM model (23a) 
into an annualized inflation rate. Annualized inflation rates represents a convenient tool to 
alleviate possible seasonality in export price indices. Note that both dependent and 
independent variables in the PTM (23a) and non-PTM (23b) regressions represent price 
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indices. The dependent variable is the export price index, the marginal cost is measured by 
the Producer Price Index and the exchange rate is approximated by the Broad Sterling 
Effective Exchange Rate Index, which summarises the value of the Pound Sterling. Since 
all variables in the PTM (23a) and non-PTM (23b) models represent price indices, each 
index can be modified using the following formula for the annualized inflation over the h-
month period, htXˆ : 
 htt
h
t PP
h
X 





 loglog
1200ˆ ,       (30) 
where tP stands for the value of a price index in month t . In order to obtain annualized 
inflation rates of the export price index, PPI and BSEERI, each variable must be 
substituted for tP in the formula (30).  
 
Therefore, the transformed variables from the PTM (23a) and non-PTM (23b) models of 
export price equal 
 12
12 loglog100ˆ  ttt ppp ,          
 12
12 loglog100ˆ  ttt MCMCCM ,         
 12
12 loglog100ˆ  ttt eee ,               (31) 
where we substituted a value of 12 for parameter h in the annualized inflation rate formula 
(30). The purpose of this substitution is to remove from data any seasonality observed over 
a year. Thus, we aim to remove those price fluctuations which occur due to a coincidence 
between the time of an observation and a specific season.  
 
In addition to possessing the power to alleviate seasonality, annualized inflation rates have 
the ability to remove potential non-stationarity in time series data since the levels of 
variables are transformed into annualized differences (Byrne et al., 2013). Note that the 
estimation in first differences was not conducted due to the nature of the data sample. 
Specifically, in some instances, the value of the dependent variable as well as those of 
regressors remain fixed for several consecutive months. Consequently, an application of 
the first-difference transformation yields zero entries which undermine the reliability of 
regression estimation. Table 12B illustrates this undesirable property of first-differenced 
series which we avoid by employing annualized inflation rates. 
 
After transforming all data in the sample into annualized inflation rates, we re-estimate the 
PTM (23a) and non-PTM (23b) models of export price using split, rolling, recursive and 
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RWCTVP tests. By reaching the same empirical conclusions as in Section 3.7, we can 
prove the robustness of our previous findings to seasonal effects. First, we must show that 
the PTM (23a) model has a dominant power in predicting the seasonally adjusted series on 
the UK export prices of manufactured goods. Second, we must illustrate that adaptive 
models offer a superior forecasting performance, as opposed to the tests which do not 
embed the time variance of regression parameters.  
 
Table 12 reports the average forecasting errors of the PTM (23a) and non-PTM (23b) 
models estimated using split, rolling, recursive and RWCTVP regressions with seasonally 
adjusted data. In order to judge the robustness of the estimation results reported in Section 
3.7 to seasonal effects on the UK export prices, the estimation output summarised in Table 
12 must be compared to the empirical results given in Table 11.    
 
The output of the rolling and recursive regressions of the PTM (23a) model for the 
aggregate price indices of the UK manufactured exports is consistent with the estimation 
results corresponding to seasonally unadjusted data. Specifically, Tables 11 and 12 show 
that the out-of-sample RMSFE of the PTM (23a) model are significantly lower than the 
average forecast errors of the non-PTM (23b) model, when rolling and recursive tests are 
applied. However, the ENC-NEW test of forecast encompassing rejects the null hypothesis 
of no difference between the recursive RMSFE of the PTM (23a) and non-PTM (23b) 
models at a lower level of statistical significance than the ENC-NEW test applied to 
seasonally unadjusted data. 
 
Table 12 reports that the split regression of the PTM (23a) model estimated with aggregate 
price data delivers a lower RMSFE than the fixed-parameter non-PTM (23b) model, 
although the statistical significance of the forecasting dominance of the PTM model cannot 
be confirmed by the ENC-NEW test of forecast encompassing. This finding can be 
explained by the aforementioned poor performance of fixed parameter tests in predicting 
macroeconomic time series (Stock and Watson, 1994), which generates large forecasting 
errors. Similarly, although the RMSFE of the RWCTVP PTM (23a) model exceeds the 
average forecasting error of the RWCTVP non-PTM (23b) model, we need not reject the 
PTM hypothesis due to our inability to test the statistical significance of the error 
differential. Moreover, out-of-sample tests with large degrees of coefficient evolution may 
not be reliable, since their algorithm for re-estimating the model parameters is likely to 
underestimate or overestimate the actual degree of parameter evolution, which underpins 
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our data. Therefore, given potential forecasting inaccuracy of fixed parameter tests and 
excessively adaptive models (e.g. RWCTVP regressions), we may conclude that the UK 
exports of manufactured goods to the EU are subject to PTM, since the rolling and 
recursive regressions strongly support the predictive power of the exchange rate. 
 
After the data has been adjusted for seasonal effects, the number of cases where the PTM 
(23a) model forecasts the UK export prices better than the non-PTM (23b) model has been 
reduced. Specifically, in 22 cases out 44, the out-of-sample RMSFE of the PTM (23a) 
model is lower than the average prediction error of the non-PTM (23b) model. In contrast, 
the results from the out-of-sample tests applied to seasonally unadjusted data suggest that 
the PTM (23a) model shows a dominant forecasting power in 27 cases. The number of 
cases where the ENC-NEW test confirmed that the forecasting superiority of the PTM 
(23a) model is statistically significant has also been reduced from 19 to 13. However, for 
all product categories, except Road Vehicles, there exists at least one out-of-sample test 
confirming that the PTM (23a) model forecasts export prices significantly better than the 
specification which excludes exchange rates (23b). This finding is consistent with the 
estimation output corresponding to seasonally unadjusted data, where for all levels of 
product disaggregation, except Paper and Paperboard, the PTM (23a) model displayed a 
significantly superior predictive performance.  
 
Thus, the PTM (23a) model forecasts the UK export prices of the majority of manufactured 
products with a reasonable precision. In order to observe the most suitable out-of-sample 
test for predicting the UK export prices, Figure 15 displays average prediction errors 
generated by the PTM model (23a) using rolling, recursive, split and RWCTVP tests 
applied to 11 levels of product disaggregation. Similarly to our previous findings from 
seasonally unadjusted data (Figure 13), recursive and rolling regressions deliver the lowest 
RMSFE among the four out-of-sample tests. However, in contrast to the earlier empirical 
conclusions reported in Section 3.7, the RWCTVP test is the worst performing out-of-
sample test, since its out-of-sample RMSFE exceeds the average prediction errors of split, 
rolling and recursive tests for all product types.  
 
The poor ability of the RWCTVP model to predict the annualized rate of the export price 
inflation can be intuitively explained by the increase in the number variables that need to 
be forecasted. In order to construct a one-step-ahead prediction of the annualized inflation 
rate,  111
12
1 loglog100
ˆ
  ttt PPX , using the set of past observations,  12122121 ˆ,..,ˆ,ˆ tXXX , we 
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need to forecast the annual price differential,  111 loglog100   tt PP , which contains two 
variables, i.e. 1log tP and 11log tP . However, with seasonally unadjusted data, only one 
variable is predicted, i.e. 1log tP . Given the increase in the number of forecasts that need 
to be constructed, out-of-sample forecasting errors are likely to increase. Therefore, an 
unexpected increase in the RMSFE of the RWCTVP model can be explained by a rise in 
the number of variables whose predictions must be computed. 
 
A comparison of Figures 15 and 13 suggests that the adjustment of the UK trade data for 
seasonal effects led to an overall increase in the average forecasting errors of the PTM 
(23a) model. The reduction of the predictive accuracy of out-of-sample tests is due to the 
aforementioned increase in the number of one-step-ahead forecasts, since in each 
forecasting step we need to predict the export price at both the start date and the end date 
of the one-step-ahead annual period. However, despite the overall increase in the out-of-
sample RMSFE of the PTM (23a) model, it remains significantly lower than the average 
forecast error of the non-PTM (23b) model for the majority of the manufactured products 
considered. Thus, our empirical findings suggest that the addition of the exchange rate to a 
model’s set of explanatory variables significantly improves the accuracy of the predicted 
values of the export price. 
 
While our estimation results suggest the existence of the PTM and its instability, the role of 
the exchange rate volatility has not been built into the econometric framework (23a), 
because the out-of-sample forecasting methodology only allows us to test the significance 
of an excess parameter in the nesting model. However, the reason for the coefficient 
instability remains beyond the scope of the out-of-sample method which assumes that both 
restricted and unrestricted models have a time varying parameter structure.  
 
In order to determine whether the exchange rate volatility causes structural breaks in the 
degree of the PTM, we may run the following regression using OLS: 
tttttttt
tttt
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.  (32) 
The main difference between the baseline PTM model (23a) and the specification (32) lies 
in the inclusion of two interaction terms, 11 ln  tt e and  22 ln  tt e . The annual average 
volatility of the exchange rate, t , is computed as variance of the exchange rate observed 
over the past year: 
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where e denotes the annual mean of the exchange rate. 
 
While in the baseline specification (23a) the degree of the PTM was measured by 5 and 
6 , in the modified regression (32) the response of the export price to the exchange rate is 
given by 175  t and 286  t . If the volatility of the exchange rate generates a 
shift in the degree of PTM, coefficients 7 and 8 should be significantly different from 
zero. Table 12A reports the estimation results from running the PTM model (32). 
 
The predictions of the augmented export price model (32) are broadly consistent with our 
initial findings from Section 3.7. Specifically, over half of the product categories 
considered exhibit a PTM pattern, since the coefficient on the first lag of the log-
transformed exchange rate, 5 , is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. The 
impact of the second lag of the log of the exchange rate is less important, since 
coefficient 6 is statistically significant at the 99%, 95% or 90% confidence levels for 3 out 
of 11 series.  
 
Thus, although the export price specification (32) does not accommodate potential 
instability of regression parameters, it still captures the effect of the exchange rate on the 
export price. However, the number of products that were found to be subject to the PTM is 
smaller compared to the results from running the baseline model (23a), since the PTM 
model (32) does not account for the evolution of regression parameters over time. This 
finding confirms Rossi’s proposition that the likelihood of the rejection of the null 
hypothesis on the parameter of interest increases following the adoption of an estimation 
methodology that is robust to parameter instability (Rossi, 2006). 
 
In contrast, the importance of the exchange rate volatility for the PTM is less evident. The 
estimation results reported in Table 12A suggest that the second lag of the exchange rate 
volatility reduces the degree of the PTM of food export prices, since 8 is negative and 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. This finding is consistent with our 
theoretic hypothesis from Section 3.4 which suggested that during periods of a high 
exchange rate volatility exporters need to exercise the PTM more actively, since customers 
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are likely to switch to a supplier offering a less volatile import price. However, we cannot 
confirm the importance of the exchange rate volatility for the PTM of other products.  
 
It is worth noting that the annual average volatility of the exchange rate (33) is computed 
from past realizations of the exchange rate, i.e. 1221 ,...,,  ttt eee . The resulting correlation 
between ite ln and it , where 1i or 2i , induces multicollinearity into the export price 
specification (32). An undesirable consequence of the multicollinearity is the increase in 
the standard errors of parameter estimates (Belsley, 1976), which reduces the likelihood of 
rejecting the null hypothesis of the statistical insignificance of the coefficient of interest. 
Specifically, the effect of the exchange rate volatility may not be captured by coefficients 
7 and 8 , because the coefficients on past exchange rates, 5 and 6 , absorb the impact 
of any variable that is highly correlated with the exchange rate. Therefore, even though 
coefficients 7 and 8 are predominantly insignificant in Table 12A, the exchange rate 
volatility may still affect the extent of the PTM. We will be able to analyze the link 
between the exchange rate volatility and the instability of the PTM parameters in the 
baseline model (23a) when the out-of-sample forecasting literature enables the forecasting 
algorithm to accommodate the source of coefficient instability. 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we developed several PTM tests which are robust to the instability of model 
parameters. Ensuring the robustness of the PTM coefficient estimates to possible time 
variation is essential, since the response of the export price to the exchange rate is likely to 
be unstable over time. In order to justify the instability of PTM, we developed a partial 
equilibrium framework of export price, which uses Krugman’s suggestion that consumers 
dislike the volatility of prices (Krugman, 1986). Through solving the representative 
exporter’s profit maximization problem, we showed that the response of the export price to 
a depreciation of the importer’s currency is volatile, because the mark-up of the export 
price over the marginal cost varies with exchange rate volatility. We used four out-of-
sample forecasting tests (i.e. rolling, recursive, split and RWCTVP) in order to test the 
sensitivity of the UK monthly export price indices to the value of the Pound Sterling vis-à-
vis the currencies of the UK’s trade partners. Out-of-sample tests represent a robust tool to 
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test the significance of regression coefficients when model parameters are likely to be 
unstable, since these tests recursively estimate coefficients (Rossi, 2006).  
 
We compared out-of-sample average forecasting errors of a model across various 
specifications of the export price and used the ENC-NEW test of forecast encompassing by 
Clark and McCracken (2001) in order to determine whether the difference between the 
average prediction errors of nested models is significantly different from zero. Our 
empirical findings argue in favour of the two major implications of our theoretic model. 
First, we discovered that an addition of the exchange rate to a forecasting model 
significantly reduces its mean error in predicting the export prices of nearly all product 
categories considered. Since the exchange rate has predictive content for the UK export 
prices, the UK exports of manufactured goods are subject to PTM. Second, we found 
substantial evidence of the instability in the degree of PTM, because forecasting models 
with time varying parameters predict future export prices with a lower mean forecasting 
error than fixed parameter models. This finding implies that the degree of the PTM by the 
UK exporters is unstable over time. However, overestimating the degree of the instability 
of the exchange rate coefficients may generate an inaccurate forecast of the export price, 
since highly adaptive models (i.e. RWCTVP tests) yielded larger mean forecasting errors 
than moderately adaptive regressions (i.e. rolling and recursive tests). Therefore, our 
empirical findings suggest that the degree of the evolution of the PTM parameters must be 
moderate, in order to minimize the average prediction error of an export price model. 
 
It is worth noting that Krugman’s proposition (Krugman, 1986) on consumers’ preference 
for price stability is based on the assumption that it is costly to analyse an imported product. 
Thus, the import price volatility mainly affects the demand for those imports whose 
characteristics are sufficiently complex to necessitate a costly decision-making process. 
However, in the absence of product analysis costs, we are unable to justify the time 
variance of PTM, because the price mark-up over the marginal cost is insensitive to the 
import price volatility. In the next chapter, we propose a general equilibrium model, which 
generates the instability of the price mark-up without relying on the assumption of a costly 
product research. 
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4. Chapter 4: Reassessing the 
Stylized Facts about the PTM and 
ERPT Using Time varying Mark-
ups 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapters 2 and 3, we argued that the response of import and export prices to the 
exchange rate between the currencies of the exporter and importer may be unstable over 
time. The time variance of the PTM and ERPT was justified with the instability of the 
mark-up of the export price over the marginal cost. In this chapter, we continue exploring 
the time variance of the price mark-up within a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
(DSGE) framework. Moreover, we use a time varying mark-up of price over the marginal 
cost in order to reassess selected stylized facts about the PTM and ERPT.  
 
We build a two-country DSGE framework with subsistence points in consumption and 
investment. A consumption subsistence point represents a fixed fraction of a good’s 
consumption, which is necessary in order to sustain the life of a household. An investment 
subsistence point defines a fixed proportion of a good’s investment, which is required to 
sustain an investment process. In order to trace the dependence of the ERPT and PTM on 
the currency in which prices are invoiced, we analyse two types of firm, namely Producer 
Currency Pricing (PCP) and Local Currency Pricing (LCP). We attempt to offer a new 
perspective on several stylized facts about the international price discrimination. First, we 
will argue that setting a good’s price in the importer’s currency does not always stabilize 
its import price, because the variation of the price mark-up over the marginal cost leads to 
the volatility of the import price. Second, we will show that invoicing the price in the 
exporter’s currency does not necessarily lead to a complete ERPT, since movements of the 
price mark-up prevent the import price from increasing one-to-one with a depreciation of 
the importer’s currency. Finally, we will attempt to resolve the empirical puzzle which is 
frequently documented in the literature, namely the situation when the export price 
increases despite the importer’s currency depreciation (Knetter, 1989). Specifically, we 
will justify this rise in the mark-up with a pro-cyclical price elasticity of the demand. 
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Since the definitions of the ERPT and PTM vary across the literature, let us clarify the 
definitions adopted in this chapter. The ERPT is defined as the response of the domestic 
price level to changes in the nominal exchange rate (Devereux and Yetman, 2002). The 
PTM represents the response of the export price to currency fluctuations (Rangan and 
Lawrence, 1993). Therefore, the degree of ERPT reflects the extent of PTM. For instance, 
if the importer’s currency depreciates, a downward adjustment of the export price by firms 
reduces the degree of the import price increase caused by the depreciation. 
 
After Krugman (1986) introduced the phenomenon of PTM, numerous studies attempted to 
model and estimate the ERPT. Their empirical findings may be neatly summarized by 
three stylized facts that are reassessed in this chapter. The first stylized fact specifies that, 
in the short run, the ERPT is complete for PCP goods, i.e. goods that are priced in the 
producer’s currency (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995 and Chari et al., 2002). For example, if 
the price is fixed at X units of the exporter’s currency, a 1% depreciation of the importer’s 
currency leads to a 1% increase in the number of units of the importer’s currency, which is 
required to purchase X units of the exporter’s currency.  
 
The second stylized fact, which logically follows from the first fact, states that the ERPT 
equals zero for LCP commodities, i.e. products whose prices are invoiced in the importer’s 
currency (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995 and Chari et al., 2002). Specifically, when the price is 
fixed at Y units of the importer’s currency, the depreciation of the importer’s currency has 
no effect on the import price.  
 
The third stylized finding concerns an empirical consensus suggesting that PCP firms 
decrease the export price when the importer’s currency depreciates, in order to mitigate the 
rise in the import price (Marston, 1990). Therefore, evidence reflecting an increase of the 
export price despite the exporter’s currency appreciation is considered as counterintuitive 
and "puzzling" (Knetter, 1989). This chapter attempts to resolve this empirical puzzle and 
demonstrates alternative interpretation of the abovementioned stylized facts about the PTM 
and ERPT.  
 
There are three main differences between our DSGE framework and the seminal general 
equilibrium study by Betts and Devereux (1996). First, we employ a distinct consumption 
function, which includes subsistence points borrowed from Ravn et al. (2006). Thus, a 
household’s consumption of a good is composed of two parts. The first component is time 
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variant and falls in the relative price of the good. The second component is constant and 
independent of the price. This fixed portion of the good’s consumption represents a 
minimum amount of the good, which is required for the survival of the household. Second, 
the export price is modelled as a time varying mark-up over the marginal cost, while the 
mark-up in Betts and Devereux (1996) is constant. The time variance of the mark-up 
originates from the existence of the subsistence consumption, which leads to pro-cyclical 
fluctuations in the price elasticity of the importer’s demand. Pro-cyclical nature of the 
demand elasticity implies that the elasticity increases in the aggregate demand. Finally, our 
general equilibrium model incorporates stochastic elements, e.g. shocks to preferences and 
technology. The existence of these stochastic shocks allows us to simulate the response of 
the mark-up to positive shocks to the consumption and output.  
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the solutions to the optimization 
problems of households and firms. Specifically, through maximizing the profits of the 
representative LCP and PCP firms, we derive the optimal mark-ups of price over the 
marginal cost and compare the mark-ups of the two firm types. Section 4.3 computes the 
ERPT into the aggregate price level in the importer’s country and examines the degrees of 
the good-specific ERPT into the PCP and LCP good prices. In particular, we analyse the 
effect of the time variance in the price mark-up on the ERPT and PTM. Section 4.4 
compares our main findings to the aforementioned three stylized facts about the ERPT and 
PTM. In order to visualize this contrast, we simulate the response of the PCP and LCP 
mark-ups to positive technology and preference shocks. Finally, Section 4.5 summarizes 
the main contributions of this study to the literature on the international price 
discrimination. 
 
4.2 Model 
 
This study concentrates on one particular type of consumer preferences, namely a utility 
function with subsistence levels of consumption of each good. It extends the one-country 
framework developed by Ravn et al. (2006) into a two-country model with two types of 
firms (LCP and PCP), in order to introduce the exchange rate and explore its pass-through 
into export and import prices. Specifically, for each firm type, we derive the responses of 
the import and export prices to currency changes. We show that the depreciation of the 
importer’s currency is followed by the variability of the import price irrespective of 
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whether the firm sets its price in local currency or producer’s currency. Even if firms 
invoice prices in the importer’s currency, the import price will be inconstant due to mark-
up movements.  
 
The presence of subsistence points in consumption and investment determines the extent of 
the PTM and ERPT. We will show that, in the absence of the good-specific subsistence 
consumption and investment, the mark-up of price over the marginal cost is constant and 
the ERPT of PCP goods is complete. However, the introduction of the subsistence 
absorption induces a time variance of the mark-up, which prevents the PCP good’s import 
price from increasing one-to-one with the depreciation of the importer’s currency.  
 
The model consists of two building blocks: utility-maximizing households owning physical 
capital and monopolistic firms setting prices in either domestic or foreign currency. First, 
the household’s optimization problem is solved to determine the optimal conditions that 
govern the intertemporal allocation of consumption, the demand for real money balances 
and the supply of labour. Second, the solution to the monopolist firm’s profit maximization 
problem is presented separately for the LCP and PCP cases. Specifically, we analyse the 
optimal mark-ups of the export price over the marginal cost, which determine the degree of 
the PTM and ERPT. 
 
4.2.1 Household’s optimization problem 
 
A representative household in the home country has the following utility function, U: 
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The preferences of foreign consumers are analogous to those of domestic consumers. Thus, 
the foreign utility function is presented by placing a superscript f (i.e. “foreign”) over each 
variable in the utility function (1). The utility of the household is a function of a composite 
consumption good, ctx  , preference shock,  t , labour, th , and real money 
balances,




t
t
P
M
, where Mt stands for nominal money balances. Parameter defines the 
sensitivity of the utility to a marginal increase in the composite consumption, ctx . Similarly, 
parameters  and  define the response of the utility to a fall in the labour effort, th . 
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Finally, parameters  and  determine the elasticity of the utility with respect to real 
money holdings.  denotes a subjective rate of discount. 
 
The exogenous and stochastic preference shock, t , is modelled in both countries according 
to a univariate autoregressive process: 
ttvt   1 ,         (1a) 
where the persistence parameter, v , falls within the range [0,1) and the innovation, t , is 
 viid ,0 .  
 
The composite consumption good embeds the mechanism which induces time variance 
into the mark-up of price over the marginal cost: 
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The composite consumption good (2) is composed of a continuum of differentiated 
products denoted by i, where  1,0i . The composite consumption is determined by a time 
varying demand for individual goods, itc , and a fixed level of the subsistence consumption 
of good i, *ic . Parameter determines the elasticity of the demand for good i with respect to 
its price.  
 
The demand for individual goods, itc , is derived by minimizing the consumption 
expenditure, 
1
0
dicp itit , subject to the composite consumption good’s definition (2). The 
Lagrangean associated with this minimization problem is expressed as follows: 
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where t represents the Lagrange multiplier. Differentiating the Lagrangean (3) with 
respect to the good-specific demand, itc , and setting the resulting derivative to zero yields 
the following function of the demand for individual goods: 
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where tP is a nominal price index defined over a continuum of goods comprising the 
consumption basket: 
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The aggregate price index, Pt, is comprised of prices of both domestic and foreign goods.  
 
Thus, the demand function (4) represents a sum of two terms. The first term, *ic , is time-
invariant and price-inelastic. *ic represents the amount of subsistence consumption, which is 
insensitive to price fluctuations, because the household needs to consume a minimum level 
of the good in order to sustain its living standard, irrespective of the price level. Any 
excess of consumption over the subsistence consumption, *ic , is governed by the relative 
price, 





t
it
P
p
. Therefore, the time varying portion of the demand (4), i.e. ct
t
it x
P
p







, varies 
with relative price movements. An increase of the relative price leads to a fall in the 
demand (4).   
 
Since in this set-up the time variance of the price mark-up over the marginal cost is caused 
by the pro-cyclical nature of the price elasticity of the demand (4), let us derive the demand 
elasticity. The elasticity of demand with respect to price is defined as the relative change in 
the demand, 
it
it
c
c
, which results from a relative change in the price level, 
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p
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Thus, the demand elasticity (6) is pro-cyclical. Specifically, an economic boom (i.e. an 
increase in cit) raises the price elasticity of the demand (4), due to the existence of good-
specific subsistence points in consumption, *ic .  
 
If there was no subsistence consumption, i.e. 0* ic (see Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997), 
the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand for good i would be constant and equal 
to  1 . However, in a model featuring subsistence consumption, the demand elasticity 
(6) is different from   due to modifications in the consumption function (2). The 
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introduction of the constant subsistence consumption, i.e. 0* ic , leads to a reduction in 
the price elasticity of demand (6), compared to the case of 0* ic . Moreover, an increase 
of the subsistence level of consumption of good i, *ic , decreases the demand elasticity (6). 
Thus, subsistence points in consumption induce a time variation in the demand elasticity 
with respect to price (6).  
 
The time varying profile of the demand elasticity (6) has important implications for the 
degree of PTM and ERPT in this model, because variations in the demand elasticity imply 
a volatility of the market power of firms. The link between the variability of the demand 
elasticity and the time variance of the PTM and ERPT will become evident from the 
solution to the firms’ profit maximization problems presented in the next section. 
 
Following Ravn et al. (2006), a composite investment good that is analogous to the 
composite consumption good (2) is introduced: 
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The investment process (7) is introduced in order to complete the law of motion (10) for 
the capital stock, kt. The composite investment good (7) represents a continuum of 
differentiated investment goods indexed by i. Similarly to the composite consumption good 
(2), the investment composite good (7) contains a time-invariant level of investment, *ii , for 
each variety in the continuum. *ii  can be interpreted as a minimum amount of investment 
good i, which is required to produce the composite capital good (7). Essentially, the 
subsistence points in investment, *ii , are determined by investment technology. 
 
The time varying level of good-specific investment, i.e. iti , can be found analogously to the 
case of the consumption demand (4) by choosing the level of iti that minimizes the 
investment expenditure. This minimization problem implies a Lagrangean of the following 
form: 
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The solution to the investment expenditure minimization problem is symmetric to the 
consumption demand (4). Specifically, differentiating the Lagrangean (8) with respect 
to iti and equating the resulting derivative to zero yields the following demand function for 
investment good i: 
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Thus, the demand for investment good (9) has a time-invariant subsistence component that 
is unresponsive to price fluctuations, *ii , and a time varying portion falling in the relative 
price of good i. Maintaining a symmetry across various components of the aggregate 
demand (i.e. consumption and investment) facilitates isolating the effect of subsistence 
points (Ravn et al., 2006). 
 
The household’s optimization problem implies maximizing utility (1) subject to a budget 
constraint. The household receives income from several sources. First, households are 
entitled to pure profits, t , which are earned by firms in their ownership. Second, they 
receive rental income, tt ku , from firms that borrow from households capital, tk , at rate tu . 
Capital evolves over time according to the following law of motion: 
i
ttt xkk  )1(1  ,         (10) 
which suggests that the capital depreciates at the rate  and grows with the composite 
investment, itx . Third, households generate a real wage income, tt hw , through labour effort, 
where wt denotes the real wage rate. Fourth, households receive a payoff, dt, from trading 
in a complete contingent claim market. Finally, each period households inherit nominal 
money holdings from the previous period, 1tM .  
 
As far as the household’s expenditures are concerned, households allocate their income 
among the real consumption and investment,  diic
P
p
xx ii
t
iti
t
c
t
**
1
0
  , nominal money 
holdings, Mt, and asset holdings that pay dt+1 in the next period. Random future payments 
are discounted using a stochastic factor, 1, ttr , where 11,  tttt drE  denotes the current price of 
a random future payment, dt+1. 
 
The domestic household’s decision problem is to choose the time paths for composite 
consumption, ctx , composite investment,
i
tx , labour supply, th , capital, tk , and the holdings 
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of money and assets, Mt and dt+1. Thus, the household maximizes the utility (1) subject to 
the following budget constraint 
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where the processes ttttt urwv ,,, 1,   and t are given. Foreign households’ budget constraint 
is defined by placing a superscript f over each variable in the constraint (11).  
 
The domestic household’s utility maximization problem is solved by equating to zero the 
derivatives of the following Lagrangean with respect to ctx  ,
i
tx  , th , tk , tM ,and 
td : 
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 . The equilibrium conditions for consumption, investment, 
labour supply, capital and the holdings of assets and  money are defined as 
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Combining the conditions (13) and (17) yields the following equation for the optimal 
intertemporal allocation of consumption: 
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Iterating the condition (19) forward by one period gives 
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The optimality condition (19a) represents the Euler condition, which governs the optimal 
intertemporal allocation of consumption by equalizing the marginal utilities of 
consumption across time.  
 
Using the condition for money holdings (18), the definition of the Lagrange multiplier (13) 
and the intertemporal allocation of consumption (19a), the following identity for the 
optimal money balances may be derived: 
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which states that the demand for real money balances increases in consumption and the 
stochastic discount factor. Intuitively, a higher discount factor, 1, ttr , implies a higher 
current price of the future random payment, 11,  tttt drE . Therefore, the attractiveness of 
money balances relative to the complete contingent claims increases in the discount factor, 
which determines the opportunity cost of holding money.  
 
Substituting the Lagrange multiplier definition (13) for  t in the labour supply condition 
(15) yields:    
       tcttt vxwh1 .        (21) 
The condition (21) states that leisure is falling in the real wage rate, since the latter 
represents the opportunity cost of leisure. A higher wage rate encourages the labour effort 
and reduces the leisure time. 
 
Finally, combining the Lagrange multiplier definition (14) with the capital condition (16) 
and the consumption allocation (13) imposes an additional restriction on the intertemporal 
allocation of consumption: 
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Iterating the condition (22) forward by one period yields 
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The condition (23) states that the current consumption falls in the discounted rate of 
interest, 1ttuE . Intuitively, a higher interest rate generates a greater return on investment 
and encourages the household to shift its resources from consumption to savings. 
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Following Betts and Devereux (1996), domestic and foreign households are assigned 
homogeneous preferences. Therefore, the foreign household’s optimization problem is 
analogous to the domestic household’s utility maximization problem. Thus, the foreign 
household’s optimality conditions are expressed by adding a superscript f to each variable 
in equilibrium conditions (13)-(23). 
 
4.2.2 Firms’ optimization problem 
 
There is a continuum of monopolistic firms in the economy. Each firm produces its own 
variety denoted by  1;0i  and follows a Cobb-Douglas production technology with a 
Hicks-neutral technological progress. The firm’s output of good i must be sufficient to 
satisfy the aggregate demand for this product: 
f
it
f
itititititt icichkA 
 1 ,        (24) 
where At refers to an aggregate technology shock. Labour, ht, and capital, kt, represent two 
inputs of the production process (24). The left hand side of the condition (24) represents 
the output of a given variety, while the right hand side defines the aggregate demand for 
this differentiated good. The aggregate demand is composed of the domestic demand for 
investment and consumption goods, itit ic  , and the foreign demand,
f
it
f
it ic  . Parameter 
 denotes the elasticity of output with respect to capital: 
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where 10  . 
 
Similarly to households, firms solve their respective optimization problems. The firm’s 
optimization problem depends on the type of firm. Following Betts and Devereux (1996), 
we assume that PCP firms set a single price for both home and foreign markets, while LCP 
firms charge a unique price in each market. The currency in which prices are invoiced 
differs across the PCP and LCP cases. Specifically, in the PCP case, price is set in the 
exporter’s currency, while the LCP case implies that prices are invoiced in the importer’s 
currency.  
 
In an economy with no subsistence points in the aggregate absorption, this distinction 
between two types of firm matters for the degree of ERPT. Consider a foreign PCP firm 
that fixes the price of its good, fitp , in the exporter’s currency. The price paid by the 
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domestic importer is given by
f
itt pe , where et denotes the exchange rate in units of the 
domestic currency per one unit of the foreign currency. Assuming no movement in the 
export price, fitp , the depreciation of the importer’s currency (i.e. an increase in et) by 1% 
increases the import price,
f
itt pe , by 1%. Thus, the ERPT into the import price is complete. 
In contrast, the LCP firm fixes prices in the importer’s currency. Suppose that the foreign 
firm sets a price of fitq  for the domestic market. Since the price is fixed in the importer’s 
currency, it is entirely insensitive to movements of the exchange rate, et. Therefore, the 
extent of the ERPT into the import price is zero. 
 
In an economy with subsistence points in consumption and investment, the ERPT is no 
longer complete in the PCP case, because the export price, fitp , varies with currency 
movements. Similarly, the ERPT into the LCP good’s import price is different from zero, 
because the import price varies with fluctuations in the exchange rate. In order to show that 
the ERPT is unstable irrespective of firm type, this section solves firms’ optimization 
problems and obtains the equilibrium conditions governing the behaviour of the optimal 
export price. The LCP firm’s profit maximization problem is different from the PCP firm’s 
optimization problem. However, in both cases, subsistence points in the aggregate 
absorption generate time varying mark-ups of export price over the marginal cost, which 
induce deviations from the complete ERPT (PCP) and zero pass-through (LCP). 
 
4.2.2.1 LCP firm’s optimization problem 
 
This section derives the optimal export price set by an LCP firm. Consider a domestic LCP 
firm, i, which sells a portion of its output at home and exports the remainder abroad. It sets 
a distinct nominal price for each market by charging pit at home and qit abroad. pit is 
expressed in the home currency, while qit is invoiced in the foreign currency. Thus, the 
firm is receiving revenue etqit from selling the good abroad. The firm’s optimization 
problem implies choosing the optimal levels of capital, kit, labour, hit, and nominal prices 
for each market, pit and qit. The firm must maximize the present discounted value of real 
profits subject to three constraints, namely consumption good demand (4), investment 
good demand (9) and the inequality (24) containing the production technology and the 
resource constraint.  
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Profits represent the difference between the revenues from domestic and foreign sales and 
joint costs of production: 
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where the processes t
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t
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t
i
t
c
ttttt exxxxAuwr ,,,,,,,,,0 are given and foreign demands for 
consumption and investment goods are defined, respectively, as follows: 
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Variable
f
tP denotes price level in the foreign country.  
 
The Lagrangean associated with the domestic LCP firm’s profit maximization problem is 
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Note that we substituted the demands for consumption and investment goods into the 
Lagrangean (28). Lagrange multiplier on the constraint (24) is denoted by itMC , which 
stands for marginal cost.  
 
In order to check that the Lagrange multiplier represents the marginal cost, let us derive the 
first order conditions with respect to capital and labour:  
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Combining the conditions (29) and (30) gives the marginal cost definition: 
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The marginal cost definition (31) suggests that MCit equals the derivative of the input cost 
with respect to total output, yit: 
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Solving the marginal cost identity (31) for 
it
it
k
h
defines the optimal labour-to-capital ratio 
for the production process: 
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Thus, the optimal labour-to-capital ratio (32) for producer i is proportionate to the ratio of 
payments attributed to each factor of production. Equation (32) implies that producers 
prefer the cheapest input in the production process. Specifically, an increase of the wage 
rate (wt) relative to the cost of renting the capital stock (ut) raises the size of capital (kit) 
relative to the amount of labour employed (hit). 
 
The first order conditions with respect to the nominal prices charged in the domestic and 
foreign markets are obtained by differentiating the Lagrangean (28) with respect to pit and 
qit: 
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The conditions (33) and (34) describe the LCP firm’s price-setting policy governed by the 
mark-up of the nominal price over the marginal cost. Solving the first order conditions (33) 
and (34) for the reverse of the price mark-up over the marginal cost gives 
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In order to facilitate the analysis of the mark-up dynamics, let us simplify the definitions 
(35) and (36) using the demand functions (4), (9) and (27):  
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Finally, denoting the subsistence absorptions at home and abroad by *** iii icy  and 
f
i
f
i
f
i icy
***  , respectively, yields a more convenient representation of the optimal mark-
ups of the domestic LCP firm: 
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The identity (39) shows the mark-up of price for the domestic market, while the equation 
(40) represents the mark-up set for the foreign market. Since the profit-maximization 
problem of foreign LCP firms is analogous to that of the domestic LCP firm, foreign LCP 
mark-ups set for the domestic and foreign markets also equal 1 and 2 , respectively. 
 
Both mark-ups are expressed in the exporter’s currency and consist of two components. 
The first component is a constant fraction determined by the demand elasticity 
parameter, . Note that parameter  describes the price elasticity of both domestic and 
foreign demands, since we assume that the domestic and foreign households have identical 
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preferences. Therefore, the constant component of the reverse of the mark-up,

 1
, is 
identical in both locations. However, the second component of the price mark-up is 
market-specific. It is determined by the ratio of the aggregate local demand,    fit
f
it ic  , to 
the subsistence country-specific absorption,  fiy
* . An increase of the share of the 
subsistence absorption in the aggregate demand for good i, 
 
   f
it
f
it
f
i
ic
y

*
, leads to a rise in the 
mark-up.  
 
The introduction of good-specific subsistence points in consumption and investment leads 
to fundamental changes in the optimal mark-up of the export price over the marginal cost. 
Intuitively, a rise of the subsistence consumption from zero to a positive constant leads to a 
fall in the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand (6). A lower demand elasticity 
implies a higher market power of the monopolistic firm. The demand elasticity is inversely 
related to the firm’s market power, because individual goods become more distant 
substitutes for each other when the price elasticity of demand falls. Therefore, a marginal 
increase of the price by a firm would not lead to a significant fall in the demand for its 
product, since close substitutes are not available. Consequently, firms’ market power 
increases when the price elasticity of demand falls (see Walsh, 2003).  
 
It is worth noting that the mark-ups pertaining to the model with no subsistence absorption, 
i.e.   0* fiy , are smaller than the mark-ups (39) and (40). If there were no subsistence 
points in consumption and investment, these two mark-ups would equal the same value: 
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The introduction of subsistence points (i.e.   0* fiy ) decreases the price elasticity of the 
demand, compared to the case with no subsistence absorption (i.e.   0* fiy ), because the 
existence of subsistence consumption prevents the demand from falling significantly with a 
price increase. Specifically, households need a minimum level of the good’s consumption 
to survive, irrespective of its price. Consequently, the reduced elasticity of the demand 
with respect to price enables the producer to exploit his increased market power by 
charging a higher mark-up.  
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Thus, due to the introduction of the subsistence absorption, the mark-up of price over the 
marginal cost is time variant. Its dynamics depends on the current stage of the business 
cycle. Namely, the mark-up falls during an economic boom (i.e. an increase in    fit
f
it ic  ) 
and increases during a recession (i.e. a fall in    fit
f
it ic  ). The negative effect of the 
economic expansion on the mark-up is explained by the pro-cyclical nature of the price 
elasticity of demand (6). Specifically, the absolute value of the demand elasticity (6) 
increases with a rise of itc and reduces the market power of the firm. 
 
Comparing the mark-ups (39) and (40) provides an insight into the international price 
discrimination reflected in systematic differences among the prices of the same good 
across the world, when all prices are expressed in a common currency (Corsetti and Dedola, 
2005). Since the mark-ups charged in the home (39) and foreign (40) markets are generally 
different, our model generates deviations from the law of one price (LOP), i.e. ittit peq  . 
The LOP only holds in two special cases. First, the home mark-up (39) is identical to the 
foreign mark-up (40) and equals
1

 in the absence of subsistence points, 
i.e. 0**  fii yy . Therefore, prices are equalized across the two countries when expressed 
in the exporter’s currency, i.e. pit = etqit. Second, the LOP is also observed in the situation 
when the ratio of the subsistence absorption to the aggregate demand is the same in both 
markets, i.e.
f
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. Specifically, the firm charges a price mark-up of 
1

 in 
both domestic and foreign markets. 
 
Thus, subsistence points in consumption and investment represent a useful tool to explain 
the international price discrimination. If the consumption function (4) had no subsistence 
points (i.e. 0**  fii yy ), the domestic (39) and foreign (40) mark-ups would be constant 
and equal to
1

 . Thus, the only way to explain international price differentials in the 
absence of subsistence absorption would be to assume that the preferences of domestic and 
foreign households are heterogeneous. In particular, the price elasticity of the domestic 
demand, , must differ from its foreign counterpart, f , in order for the optimal mark-up to 
vary across markets: 
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However, in the presence of subsistence consumption points, i.e.   0* fiy , the assumption 
of preference heterogeneity is not necessary to generate mark-up inequalities across 
markets.  
 
Our model explains international price differentials with a counter-cyclical nature of the 
time varying LCP mark-up, which depends on the current stage of the business cycle in the 
importer’s country. Since different economies are likely to operate at different stages of the 
business cycle, mark-ups are likely to vary across destinations. For example, if the foreign 
economy experienced a boom relative to the domestic country ( itit
f
it
f
it icic  ), the 
mark-up charged in the foreign country (40) would fall below the home mark-up (39), 
i.e.
it
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tit
MC
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 . Intuitively, as the foreign market experiences the boom, a greater 
number of substitutes for good i becomes available, which increases the price elasticity of 
the demand for the good. Consequently, the firm’s market power abroad is weaker than at 
home. When the domestic mark-up (39) exceeds its foreign counterpart (40), the price paid 
by foreign customers of domestic good i falls below the price charged at home, 
i.e. titit eqp  . Thus, the LOP does not hold when countries operate at different points of 
the business cycle. 
 
Although the LCP firm sets the price for the foreign market in the importer’s currency, the 
degree of the ERPT into the import price is different from zero. LCP does not insulate the 
import price from currency fluctuations because of the time varying profile of the mark-up. 
Before showing that LCP does not completely stabilize import prices in this model, we 
solve a PCP firm’s optimization problem in the next section. 
 
4.2.2.2 PCP firm’s optimization problem 
 
Unlike LCP firms, PCP firms set the same price for all markets. Consider a domestic PCP 
firm charging a nominal price pit in both domestic and foreign markets. Since prices are set 
in the exporter’s currency, foreign consumers pay a nominal price
t
it
e
p
 for good i. Thus, the 
PCP firm’s profit maximization problem is slightly different from that of the LCP firm. 
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Specifically, similarly to the LCP case outlined in the previous section, the PCP firm 
maximizes the present discounted value of real profits, 
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subject to the resource restriction (24), the domestic demand constraints (4) and (9), as well 
as the foreign demand constraints: 
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Specifically, the PCP firm chooses the time paths for pit, hit and kit given the 
processes if
t
cf
t
i
t
c
ttttt xxxxAuwr ,,,,,,,,0 and te  . 
 
The Lagrangean associated with the PCP firm’s profit-maximization problem is: 
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(44) 
The first-order conditions with respect to capital, kit, and labour, hit, are identical to the 
LCP firm’s optimality conditions (29) and (30).  
 
However, the derivative of the Lagrangean (44) with respect to price is different: 
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Solving the equation (45) for the reverse of the optimal price mark-up over the marginal 
cost yields 
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Using the demand conditions (4), (9) and (43), the reverse of the optimal mark-up (46) is 
transformed into 
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Finally, reversing the ratio (47) and substituting  fiy
* for    fi
f
i ic
**   gives the following 
optimal mark-up of the export price over the marginal cost: 
1
**
3
1
11





























f
ii
f
it
f
itititit
it
yy
icicMC
p



 .     (48) 
Thus, since the PCP firm sets the same price for foreign and domestic markets, we observe 
only one optimal mark-up (48) instead of two separate mark-ups (39) and (40) in the LCP 
case. 
 
The PCP mark-up of the export price over the marginal cost is qualitatively similar to the 
LCP mark-ups (39) and (40). The mark-up (48) contains a time-invariant ratio driven by 
the elasticity parameter, , and a time varying component, which falls in the ratio of the 
aggregate demand to the total subsistence absorption, 
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. However, in 
contrast to the LCP mark-ups (39) and (40), the PCP mark-up features the sum of the home 
and foreign absorptions, fii yy
**  , since the PCP firm sets the same price for both markets. 
 
Comparing the PCP mark-up (48) to the mark-ups (39) and (40), which are charged by 
LCP firms, also reveals several similarities. Specifically, in both LCP and PCP, the 
existence of subsistence absorption leads to an increase of the mark-up, compared to the 
case of no subsistence points in consumption and investment, i.e. 0**  fii yy : 
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If there is a positive level of subsistence absorption, the LCP (49a) and PCP (49b) mark-
ups of the export price over the marginal cost are generally different. The three mark-ups 
converge to the same value only in one special case. In particular, the subsistence-to-
demand ratio should be the same in these three cases: 
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Despite the differences among the mark-ups of the LCP (49a) and PCP (49b) firms, all 
three mark-ups successfully justify one of the major puzzles in the macroeconomic 
literature, namely the violation of the LOP. The next section summarizes the conditions 
under which prices are not equal across countries even when converted to a common 
currency. 
 
4.2.2.3 International price differentials 
 
The behaviour of the domestic and foreign subsistence absorptions has a significant impact 
on the international price differentials for variety i. The implications of our model for the 
international price discrimination may be summarized by three propositions. 
 
Proposition 1: If 0**  fii yy , then 
1
321




 . 
In the absence of subsistence absorption, i.e. 0**  fii yy , the export price is invariant to 
the type of firm, since both LCP and PCP firms charge the same mark-up over the 
marginal cost, i.e. 
1

. Moreover, since the LCP mark-up charged at home is identical to 
the LCP mark-up set for the foreign market, the international price discrimination is absent. 
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Thus, when all prices are converted to a common currency, variety i costs the same in all 
countries, irrespective of the type of the firm that produced it (PCP or LCP). 
 
Proposition 2: When    fitfitfiititi icyicy  // ** , 21   ; 
when    fitfitfiititi icyicy  // ** , 21   . 
If the share of the subsistence absorption in the aggregate demand is higher in the foreign 
market, than in the domestic market, the LCP mark-up set for the foreign buyer (40) is 
higher than its domestic counterpart (39). Therefore, foreign consumers pay a higher price 
for good i, compared to home consumers. Intuitively, firms enjoy a greater market power 
abroad, because foreign agents require a higher minimum amount of the good to sustain 
their standard of living. Therefore, the foreign demand is less elastic with respect to price 
changes, compared to the domestic demand. Consequently, the domestic LCP firm can 
afford a marginal increase in the export price without significantly depressing the volume 
of exports. 
 
Similarly, if the share of the home subsistence absorption in the total domestic demand is 
higher than its foreign counterpart, the mark-up set by the domestic LCP firm for domestic 
consumers exceeds the mark-up charged in the foreign market. In this case, domestic 
consumers face higher prices, as opposed to foreign buyers. 
 
Proposition 3 :  A rise in either *iy or
f
iy
* leads to an increase in 3 . 
Interestingly, home consumers are affected by price movements resulting from a change of 
foreign consumption patterns. For instance, an increase in the foreign subsistence 
absorption, fiy
* , leads to a rise of the PCP mark-up (48). Thus, both domestic and foreign 
consumers face an increased export price, pit. Intuitively, an increase in either foreign or 
home subsistence absorption leads to a rise of the firm’s market power and its ability to 
increase the mark-up, because higher levels of the subsistence absorption make the demand 
less sensitive to price changes. Since the PCP firm sets the same price for both markets, 
both domestic and foreign consumers pay a higher price, even if only foreign households 
have increased their subsistence consumption. This finding suggests that shocks to the 
foreign consumption may be transmitted to the domestic economy, if domestic firms set 
prices in their own currency and supply both foreign and home markets. 
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In this section, we solved the profit maximization problems of the domestic LCP and PCP 
firms selling their output to the home and foreign markets. The purpose of this 
optimization was to show the determination of the optimal export and import prices by 
each type of firm. We observed that, although the pricing rules of the LCP and PCP firms 
differ, both firms set the export price as a time varying mark-up over the marginal cost. In 
particular, the existence of subsistence points in consumption and investment generates 
time variance in the price elasticity of demand, which introduces instability into the pirce 
mark-up. We also addressed the issues of the international price discrimination using the 
optimal mark-up rules for LCP and PCP firms. We concluded that, in the presence of 
subsistence absorption, the LOP does not hold even for PCP goods. 
 
The inconstancy of the mark-up has important implications for the degree of ERPT, 
because mark-up movements may either mitigate or exacerbate the response of the import 
price to changes in the exchange rate. The next section discusses the effect of exchange 
rate movements on the export and import prices of LCP and PCP goods. 
 
4.3 Pricing-to-market and exchange rate pass-through 
 
In this section, we compute the degree of ERPT and PTM for four cases – LCP with no 
subsistence points in the aggregate absorption, PCP with no subsistence points in the 
aggregate absorption, LCP with subsistence points in consumption and investment, and 
PCP with subsistence points in consumption and investment. The purpose of this section is 
to determine whether the shape of consumers’ preferences and the type of firm (LCP or 
PCP) are important for determining the response of the export and import prices to 
currency fluctuations.  
 
Since we assume no imported inputs for computational simplicity, the pass-through of an 
exchange rate change into the marginal cost is zero. Therefore, the only determinant of the 
size of ERPT and PTM is the price mark-up, which is adjusted following the depreciation 
of the domestic importer’s currency. Intuitively, importer currency depreciation makes 
imported PCP goods relatively expensive. A downward adjustment of the mark-up of price 
over the marginal cost limits this increase of the import price, while the increase of the 
mark-up magnifies the rise in the import price.  
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This section contains two parts. First, we compute the degree of the good-specific ERPT, 
which defines the response of a good’s import price to currency movements. The good-
specific ERPT is essentially the elasticity of the import price with respect to the exchange 
rate (Parsley, 1993). When the absolute value of the ERPT into the import price equals one, 
the extent of the pass-through is complete.  
 
4.3.1  PCP with no subsistence absorption 
 
If there are no subsistence points in the aggregate absorption, the optimal export price is 
modelled as a constant mark-up (40a) over the marginal cost in both domestic and foreign 
markets. Given that neither the mark-up nor the marginal cost varies across buying 
countries, international price differentials for a PCP firm’s good are absent. Since the 
export price is fixed in the exporter’s currency, the depreciation of the importer’s currency 
increases the import price. However, because the price mark-up is fixed, the PCP firm 
cannot decrease the mark-up in order to protect its market share abroad and prevent the 
increase of the import price.  
 
For instance, suppose that a foreign PCP firm sets a unique export price, fitp , in its own 
currency. The import price paid by home importers is given by 
t
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Suppose that the home currency depreciates. The depreciation leads to an increase in te  and 
raises the import price (50). If the price mark-up, , was time varying, the firm could 
adjust the mark-up downwards in order to protect consumers from the import price 
increase. However, since the price mark-up is fixed at 






1

, the derivative of the mark-
up with respect to the exchange rate is zero. Thus, it is not possible to offset fluctuations of 
the import price by adjusting the export price.  
 
In order to confirm that the degree of PTM is zero in the PCP case with no subsistence 
absorption, let us compute the elasticity of the export price with respect to the exchange 
rate. Price elasticity represents a relative change of price, which results from a relative 
change of the exchange rate: 
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The PTM definition (51) shows that the degree of PTM is zero due to the unresponsiveness 
of the mark-up of the export price over the marginal cost to currency movements, 
i.e. 

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.  
 
Since the export price, fitp , does not react to changes in the exchange rate, the import price 
(50) rises by the full amount of the depreciation. In order to prove that the ERPT into the 
import price is complete, let us compute the elasticity of the import price with respect to 
the exchange rate: 
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The ERPT equation (52) suggests that a 1% depreciation of the importer’s currency causes 
a 1% increase of the import price, i.e. the pass-through of the exchange rate change into the 
import price is complete.  
 
Thus, in the absence of subsistence absorption, the import price of a PCP good moves one-
to-one with the exchange rate, because the degree of PTM is zero due to the constancy of 
the mark-up of the export price over the marginal cost. In the next section, we relax the 
assumption of a constant mark-up by changing the shape of consumer preferences. 
Introducing a time varying price mark-up dramatically changes our predictions on the PTM 
and ERPT.  
 
4.3.2 PCP with subsistence absorption  
 
The introduction of subsistence points in consumption and investment generates variable 
mark-ups of price over the marginal cost. Specifically, the PCP mark-up (48) falls 
following an increase in either foreign or domestic demand, because a rise of the demand 
reduces the firm’s market power by increasing the price elasticity of demand (6). 
 
In order to observe the effect of the mark-up variability on the ERPT, let us compute the 
elasticity of the import price with respect to the exchange rate: 
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 33  . Unlike the ERPT with no 
subsistence points (52), the ERPT (53) is not complete, since its value is different from one.  
 
A movement of the exchange rate, et, affects the demand in the domestic and foreign 
markets. Intuitively, currency fluctuations affect the aggregate price level and encourage 
the consumer to restructure her consumption basket. Specifically, the importer’s currency 
depreciation (i.e. a rise in et) leads to an increase in the aggregate price level, Pt, as the 
imported goods comprised by the aggregate price index become relatively expensive. 
Therefore, good i’s relative price,
t
f
itt
P
pe
, is likely to fall and lead to an increase in the 
domestic demand (4) for this good.
 16
 The foreign demand is also affected by the 
depreciation of the domestic currency, since the foreign currency appreciates. Therefore, 
the aggregate price level in the foreign economy, ftP , decreases, because the imported 
goods become relatively cheap. Consequently, good i’s relative price,
f
t
f
it
P
p
, rises and leads 
to a fall in the foreign demand for this good. Thus, the depreciation of the domestic 
currency raises the domestic demand for good i, itit ic  , and reduces the foreign demand 
for the same variety, fit
f
it ic  . 
 
Since the absorptions itit ic  and 
f
it
f
it ic  move in the opposite directions following the 
depreciation of the domestic currency, the sign of the derivative 
te
 3 is ambiguous. If the 
absolute value of the increase of the domestic absorption is larger than the extent of the fall 
in the foreign absorption, the mark-up 3 falls and leads to an incomplete ERPT (53), i.e. 
                                               
16 Note that the relative price,
t
f
itt
P
pe
, may also increase, if the numerator of the ratio increases more than the 
denominator following the depreciation. However, since the price index, Pt , comprises many  imported 
varieties, we assume that the magnitude of the increase of the price index is larger than that of the rise of 
good i’s import price. This assumption may be relaxed and we may assume instead that the relative price paid 
by the domestic importer of the foreign PCP good increases. In this case, the domestic demand would fall 
and the mark-up would unambiguously rise because of the fall of the price elasticity of the domestic demand 
(6). 
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03 


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
and ERPT<1. If the fall of the foreign demand outweighs the increase of the 
domestic aggregate absorption, the mark-up 3 increases, i.e. 0
3 


te

and ERPT>1. Since 
the degree of the ERPT (53) exceeds one, a 1% depreciation of the importer’s currency 
leads the import price to increase by more than 1%. The degree of the ERPT may also be 
complete if the increase of the domestic demand fully offsets the decrease in the foreign 
demand, i.e. 03 


te

. 
 
Similarly, the elasticity of the export price with respect to the exchange rate is generally 
different from zero, unlike the PCP case with no subsistence points. The degree of PTM is 
computed as the ratio of the proportionate change of the export price to the proportionate 
change in the exchange rate: 
 
3
3
3
3



 t
t
f
it
t
t
f
it e
eMC
e
e
MC





.       (54) 
Since the mark-up is adjusted as a result of fluctuations in either foreign or domestic 
demand, 03 


te

, the degree of the PTM (54) is ambiguous. The export price may fall, 
increase or remain unchanged following the depreciation of the domestic currency, 
depending on the reaction of the mark-up to currency movements. The discussion of the 
ERPT (53) mentioned that the derivative of the mark-up with respect to the exchange rate 
may be zero, positive or negative, depending on the relative magnitudes of the changes in 
the foreign and domestic demand, which result from the depreciation. Consequently, the 
degree of the PTM (54) may be zero, positive or negative, respectively.  
 
Thus, the response of the export price to the depreciation of the importer’s currency 
depends on demand fluctuations in the foreign and domestic markets. It is not certain that 
the foreign exporter would decrease the mark-up of price over the marginal cost, in order 
to protect the domestic consumer from the increase of the import price. The PCP mark-up 
may even increase with the depreciation, if the rise of the domestic demand, itit ic  , is 
outweighed by the fall of the foreign demand, fit
f
it ic  . Therefore, our model provides a 
logical explanation for the increase of the mark-up following the depreciation of the 
importer’s currency, although many studies suggest that a mark-up rise during the importer 
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currency depreciation is counterintuitive (Knetter, 1989). We justify the increase in the 
mark-up, which occurs despite the appreciation of the exporter’s currency, with the 
presence of subsistence points in the aggregate absorption. 
 
4.3.3 LCP with no subsistence absorption  
 
Consider a foreign LCP firm that supplies the domestic market with no subsistence points 
in consumption and investment. The optimal LCP mark-up (40) suggests that the price paid 
by the domestic importer represents a constant mark-up over the marginal cost: 
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The import price definition (55) implies that fitq is insensitive to currency 
fluctuations 
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, because the mark-up is constant and the marginal cost does not 
depend on the exchange rate by assumption. Therefore, the degree of the ERPT into the 
import price is zero: 
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because 0


te

. Thus, a 1% depreciation of the domestic currency has no effect on the 
import price, because the LCP firm fixes the price in the importer’s currency. 
 
However, the effect of the exchange rate on the export price is different from zero. Export 
price represents a good’s price in units of the exporter’s currency: 
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The export price definition (56) suggests that the depreciation of the importer’s currency 
(i.e. an increase in te ) reduces the export price. Since the price is fixed in the importer’s 
currency, fewer units of the exporter’s currency can be obtained for fitq  units of the 
importer’s currency after the depreciation. The elasticity of the export price (56) with 
respect to the exchange rate gives the degree of PTM: 
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Thus, the export price (56) falls one-to-one with the depreciation of the importer’s 
currency. 
 
4.3.4 LCP with subsistence absorption 
 
In the presence of subsistence points in consumption and investment, the optimal price is 
denominated in the importer’s currency according to the optimal LCP mark-up (40): 
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However, unlike the LCP case with no subsistence absorption, the import price (58) varies 
with the depreciation of the importer’s currency. Specifically, the depreciation (an increase 
of et) raises the domestic demand (4) for the imported variety i, since its relative price, 
t
f
it
P
q
, 
falls because of the rise of the aggregate price level. Since the increase in the domestic 
demand raises the price elasticity of demand (6), the firm’s market power falls and causes a 
decrease in the mark-up, 2 . Thus, although the import price is set in the local currency, it 
varies with the exchange rate, i.e. 0


t
f
it
e
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, due to the counter-cyclical nature of the mark-
up of price over the marginal cost, i.e. 
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In order to understand that denominating prices in the importer’s currency does not fully 
insulate the import price from currency fluctuations, let us compute the ERPT as the 
elasticity of the import price (58) with respect to the exchange rate: 
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The magnitude of the ERPT (59) equals the elasticity of the mark-up, 2 , with respect to 
the exchange rate. Since the mark-up falls in the exchange rate due to the increased price 
elasticity of the importer’s demand, the ERPT is unambiguously negative. A depreciation 
of the importer’s currency leads to a fall of the import price. Thus, despite the fact that 
prices are set in the local currency, the import price is not immune to currency fluctuations 
when there exists subsistence absorption. 
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Since the mark-up of price over the marginal cost is counter-cyclical, the response of the 
export price to the exchange rate is also time variant. In order to determine the sign of the 
effect of the exchange rate on the export price, let us compute the PTM as the elasticity of 
the export price with respect to the exchange rate: 
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The sign of the PTM effect (60) is unambiguously negative, because the mark-up is 
counter-cyclical, i.e. 0
2
2 



 t
t
e
e
. Moreover, the absolute value of the degree of PTM (60) 
exceeds one, which implies that a 1% depreciation of the importer’s currency reduces the 
export price by more than 1%. 
 
This section computed the degree of ERPT and PTM at disaggregated level by examining 
the effect of exchange rate changes on a good’s import and export prices. We demonstrated 
that the degree of ERPT into the good’s import price depends on whether it is produced by 
a LCP or PCP firm. Moreover, the size of the ERPT crucially depends on the presence of 
subsistence points in the aggregate demand function. Our findings offer a new 
interpretation of several stylized facts about the local currency price stability and 
international price discrimination. Before reassessing these stylized facts in the light of our 
DSGE model, let us complete the ERPT discussion by deriving the ERPT into the 
aggregate price level. 
 
4.3.5 Aggregate ERPT 
 
Aggregate ERPT is defined as the response of the aggregate domestic price level (5) to the 
depreciation of the domestic exchange rate. The existence of subsistence points in 
consumption and investment has important implications for the degree of the aggregate 
ERPT.  
 
In order to compute the aggregate ERPT, we must define the aggregate domestic price 
index. Let us assume a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms, where each firm 
produces one differentiated variety, i. There are four types of goods traded in the domestic 
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economy, namely home LCP goods, home PCP goods, foreign LCP varieties and foreign 
PCP varieties. Let us denote the prices of these four goods by 
LCPH
itp
, , PCPHitp
, , LCPFitq
, and PCPFitt pe
, , respectively, where all prices are expressed in the 
domestic currency. Following Betts and Devereux (1996), let us assume that domestic 
firms produce fraction n of all traded goods. The remaining portion, (1-n), is supplied by 
foreign firms. Let us also suppose that fraction s of the domestic firms is LCP, while (1-s) 
denotes the fraction of home PCP firms. The shares of the LCP and PCP firms in the 
foreign country’s total number of firms are also denoted by s and (1-s).  
 
Thus, the domestic market is supplied by ns domestic LCP firms, n(1-s) domestic PCP 
firms, (1-n)s foreign LCP firms and (1-n)(1-s) foreign PCP firms. Substituting into the 
aggregate domestic price index (5) the fractions of each firm type and their respective 
prices gives 
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The aggregate price index for the home country (61) suggests that the price level responds 
to the depreciation of the domestic currency, because the prices of the foreign PCP 
goods, PCPFitp
, , must be converted into the domestic currency using the exchange rate, et. 
However, the aggregate price level is also affected by the pass-through of exchange rate 
movements into the prices of other goods, namely LCPHitp
, , PCPHitp
, , LCPFitq
, . Since the mark-
up of price over the marginal cost is time varying in our model, all four prices that 
constitute the aggregate price index, Pt, are sensitive to the exchange rate. 
 
In order to simplify the definition of the aggregate price index (61), let us express it as a 
percentage deviation around the steady state. Using the symbol "^" to denote linear 
approximation around the zero-shock equilibrium yields: 
   tt esnP ˆ11ˆ  ,        (62) 
where         PCPFit
LCPF
it
PCPH
it
LCPH
it psnqsnpsnpns
,,,, ˆ11ˆ1ˆ1ˆ  . The aggregate 
price definition (62) allows us to compute the degree of the ERPT into the domestic price 
level. Since all variables in the index (62) represent percentage deviations around the 
steady state, the response of the price index to a movement of the exchange rate is defined 
as the ratio of the price level to the exchange rate, tt eP ˆ/
ˆ . The size and the sign of this ratio 
depend on the shape of the aggregate demand function. 
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Suppose that there are no subsistence points in consumption and investment. Therefore, 
both PCP and LCP firms set the export price as a fixed mark-up over the marginal cost: 
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Since prices LCPHitp
, , PCPHitp
, and LCPFitq
, are insensitive to currency fluctuations, the 
percentage deviations of these prices in response to an exchange rate shock are zero, 
i.e. 0ˆˆˆ ,,,  LCPFit
PCPH
it
LCPH
it qpp . Thus, in the absence of subsistence absorption, the ERPT 
into the domestic price level equals 
  sn
e
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t
t  11
ˆ
ˆ
,         (63) 
which is constant and unambiguously positive. Specifically, the domestic currency 
depreciation (a rise in teˆ ) leads to an increase in the domestic price level, because both n 
and s are positive fractions, i.e. 0 < n < 1 and 0 < s < 1. The aggregate price level is 
sensitive to the exchange rate due to the presence of the foreign PCP goods in the domestic 
consumption basket. Since the imported PCP goods become relatively expensive with the 
depreciation of the domestic currency, the ERPT into the domestic price level is positive. 
Moreover, the degree of the aggregate ERPT is less than one, because (1-n) < 1 and (1-s) 
< 1.  
 
Thus, the aggregate ERPT is generally incomplete and only a fraction of an exchange rate 
movement is transmitted into the domestic price level. This implies that a 1% depreciation 
of the domestic currency causes the aggregate domestic price level to increase by less than 
1%. The aggregate ERPT would be complete only in one extreme case. Specifically, the 
aggregate ERPT (63) equals one when the domestic market is entirely supplied by the 
foreign PCP firms, i.e. n=0 and s=0. Intuitively, any change in the exchange rate would be 
fully passed through into the domestic price level, because the domestic consumption 
basket does not contain products whose prices are insensitive to the exchange rate. 
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Thus, in the case of no subsistence absorption, the magnitude of the response of the 
domestic price level to an exchange rate change depends only on the share of foreign firms 
in the home market, (1-n), and the share of PCP firms in the total number of firms, (1-s). 
An increase of the share of foreign goods in the domestic consumption basket raises the 
response of the domestic price index to an exchange rate movement. Similarly, a reduction 
of the fraction of PCP firms mitigates the effect of exchange rate fluctuations on the 
domestic price index. Thus, the responsiveness of the domestic price index to the exchange 
rate increases in the fraction of goods whose prices are sensitive to currency movements.  
 
The predictions of our model for the aggregate ERPT are dramatically different in the case 
of non-zero subsistence absorption. When the aggregate demand function has subsistence 
points, all goods that constitute the domestic consumption basket are priced as a counter-
cyclical mark-up over the marginal cost: 
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Thus, all prices contained in the domestic price index (61) respond to the exchange rate 
because of the counter-cyclical nature of the mark-up. The price of the domestic LCP good 
falls in the exchange rate, i.e. 0
ˆ
ˆ ,

t
LCPH
it
e
p
. Specifically, the depreciation of the domestic 
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exchange rate raises the aggregate price level and decreases the relative price of good i. 
The reduction of the relative price increases the demand for this good and the price 
elasticity of the demand (6). Consequently, the firm’s mark-up of price over the marginal 
cost falls as a result of a reduction of the market power. Similarly, the import price of the 
foreign LCP good falls in the exchange rate due to the counter-cyclical nature of the mark-
up, i.e. 0
ˆ
ˆ ,

t
LCPF
it
e
q
.  
 
However, the effect of currency fluctuations on PCP goods’ prices, PCPHitp
,ˆ and PCPFitt pe
,ˆ , is 
uncertain, because the impact of the exchange rate on the PCP mark-up (48) is ambiguous. 
Section 4.3.2 explained that the depreciation of the domestic currency has a two-fold effect 
on the aggregate demand by raising the domestic demand for good i and reducing the 
foreign demand for this good. Since the domestic and foreign demands, itit ic  and 
f
it
f
it ic  , 
move in the opposite directions following the depreciation of the domestic currency, the 
effect of currency movements on the price mark-up over the marginal cost is uncertain.  
 
Since the response of the PCP mark-up to the exchange rate is unpredictable, we are unable 
to forecast the degree of the ERPT into the domestic price level. However, we can define 
the ERPT using the aggregate price index (62): 
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 .        (65) 
Thus, in the presence of subsistence points in the aggregate absorption, the aggregate 
ERPT (65) represents a sum of two terms. The first term is a fixed fraction standing for the 
share of foreign PCP firms in the domestic market. The second term represents a time 
varying ratio determined by the response of traded goods’ prices to currency fluctuations. 
Since both PCP and LCP mark-ups of price over the marginal cost are sensitive to the 
exchange rate, the sign and the magnitude of the aggregate ERPT (65) are ambiguous. 
 
In this section, we constructed the ERPT into the aggregate domestic price level, in order 
to examine the effect of subsistence points in the aggregate demand on the response of the 
domestic price index to the exchange rate. We showed that, in the absence of subsistence 
points, the aggregate ERPT is unambiguously positive and incomplete, which implies that 
the aggregate price index increases only by a fraction of the domestic currency 
depreciation. However, in the case of subsistence absorption, we are unable to draw 
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unambiguous predictions on the sign and degree of the aggregate ERPT, because the effect 
of the exchange rate on the PCP mark-up of price over the marginal cost is unpredictable. 
 
4.4 Reassessing the stylized facts about the ERPT and PTM 
 
Our findings on the good-specific and aggregate ERPT into import prices enable us to 
revisit several stylized facts about international price differentials and local currency price 
stability. First, we compare the import price dynamics implied by our model with the 
stylized findings on the ERPT (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995 and Chari et al., 2002). Second, 
we contrast the export price behaviour predicted by our model with the stylized facts about 
PTM (Knetter, 1989).  
 
The main difference between our framework and the stylized model of PTM and ERPT lies 
in the counter-cyclical nature of the mark-up of price over the marginal cost, which implies 
an inverse relationship between the mark-up and the aggregate demand. Specifically, a 
change in the exchange rate affects domestic and foreign demands for good i by altering 
the relative price of the good, which represents the ratio of the good’s price over the 
aggregate price level. Since the exchange rate affects the aggregate demand in the domestic 
and foreign markets, the price mark-up responds to currency fluctuations. The counter-
cyclical nature of the mark-up offers a fresh interpretation of the main stylized facts about 
PTM and ERPT. 
 
4.4.1 Stylized facts about ERPT 
 
The crucial role of invoicing currency for the ERPT determination is widely acknowledged 
in the benchmark literature on exporters’ price-setting behaviour. For example, the stylized 
partial equilibrium framework (Gopinath et al., 2010) suggests that the PCP case delivers a 
complete ERPT, while the LCP yields a zero ERPT. This result is based on the 
assumptions about the currency used to invoice prices. The PCP firm fixes the price of its 
good in the exporter’s currency. Consequently, the import price fluctuates one-to-one with 
the exchange rate, increasing by the full amount of the importer’s currency depreciation. In 
contrast, the import price of an LCP good is insensitive to currency fluctuations, since 
prices are fixed in the importer’s currency. By deriving the degree of ERPT into the LCP 
and PCP import prices for the case of no subsistence points in the aggregate absorption, we 
reached the same conclusion in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.3 of this chapter. In particular, we 
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showed that the LCP fully stabilizes the import price, while the PCP leads the import price 
to move one-to-one with the exchange rate.  
 
The DSGE model proposed in this chapter suggests a more complicated relationship 
between the invoicing currency choice and the ERPT due to the variability of the mark-up 
of price over the marginal cost. Even if prices are denominated in the importer’s currency, 
the volatility of the mark-up induces the import price variability. The ERPT definition (59) 
suggests that the LCP does not fully insulate the import price from currency movements, 
because the price mark-up shifts following the depreciation or appreciation of the 
importer’s currency. In particular, the import price falls following the depreciation of the 
importer’s currency due to the downward adjustment of the price mark-up. Thus, the LCP 
limits the increase of the good’s price after the depreciation, but the good-specific ERPT is 
different from zero. Since the LCP mitigates import price movements induced by the 
exchange rate, the share of LCP firms affects negatively the degree of the aggregate ERPT 
(65) into the domestic price level. 
 
Similarly, Section 4.3.2 demonstrated that the PCP does not necessarily lead import prices 
to move one-to-one with exchange rate changes, since counter-cyclical variations of the 
price mark-up cause deviations from the complete ERPT. Specifically, the mark-up of 
price over the marginal cost (48) represents a function of the domestic and foreign 
demands and falls during an economic boom in either of the two countries. By affecting 
the demand both at home and abroad, currency movements induce a volatility of the mark-
up, which either exacerbates or mitigates the import price rise resulting from the 
depreciation of the importer’s currency. Thus, even if firms set prices in their own currency, 
exchange rate movements may not generate proportional changes of the import price. 
 
Therefore, irrespective of the type of firm (PCP or LCP), import prices respond to currency 
fluctuations because price mark-ups are sensitive to demand changes that result from 
exchange rate movements. However, the extent of the import price response depends on 
the invoicing currency. Specifically, while the price mark-up of a foreign PCP firm 
fluctuates following a demand change in either domestic or foreign country, the LCP mark-
up responds only to a movement of the importer’s demand. Thus, the LCP protects the 
importer from the increase of the PCP price mark-up (48), which is caused by a fall of the 
demand in the exporter’s country.  
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4.4.2 Stylized facts about PTM 
 
The background literature on PTM is dominated by the proposition that firms undertake a 
downward adjustment of the mark-up of price over the marginal cost following the 
importer’s currency depreciation, in order to limit the import price rise caused by the 
depreciation (Marston, 1990). Intuitively, firms are expected to protect their market share 
abroad and absorb a portion of the increase in import prices by a downward mark-up 
adjustment. However, an upward mark-up adjustment that magnifies the import price rise 
generated by the depreciation is considered puzzling and counterintuitive (Knetter, 1989).  
 
We resolve this puzzle by modelling an environment where subsistence absorption 
constitutes a significant proportion of the aggregate demand. Section 4.3.2 showed that the 
PCP mark-up (48) may exacerbate the effect of the importer’s currency depreciation by 
rising as a result of a reduction of the aggregate demand, i.e. fit
f
ititit icic  . Consider 
the mark-up charged by a foreign PCP firm exporting to the domestic economy. A 
depreciation of the domestic currency (i.e. an increase in et) inevitably affects the domestic 
and foreign demands for the foreign PCP good. The foreign demand for good i falls, 
because the depreciation of the domestic currency increases the relative price of good i, 
f
t
it
P
p
, by lowering the aggregate price level abroad. Specifically, the aggregate price index 
in the foreign country, ftP , is depressed by the depreciation of the domestic currency, 
which means that PCP goods imported by foreign agents from the domestic country 
become relatively cheap.  
 
The effect of the domestic currency depreciation on the domestic demand for good i is 
ambiguous, because both numerator and denominator of the relative price ratio, 
t
tt
P
pe
, 
increase. First, the depreciation raises the import price of the foreign PCP good, pitet. 
Second, the depreciation increases the domestic price level, Pt, because foreign PCP goods 
become relatively expensive. If the increase of the import price exceeds the rise of the 
domestic price level, the relative price of good i increases and depresses the domestic 
demand for this good. Similarly, if the rise of the domestic price level outweighs the 
import price increase, the relative import price falls and raises the domestic demand for 
good i. Therefore, the effect of the exchange rate on the domestic demand for good i 
depends on the response of its relative price to currency fluctuations. 
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An upward adjustment of the PCP mark-up (48) after the depreciation of the domestic 
currency is possible if the sum of the domestic and foreign demands, fit
f
ititit icic  , 
falls. Thus, an upward mark-up adjustment is consistent with two scenarios. In the first 
scenario, both foreign and domestic demands for good i fall after the depreciation. In the 
second case, the domestic demand increases and the foreign demand decreases, but the 
reduction of the foreign demand outweighs the rise of the domestic demand, i.e. 
f
it
f
ititit icic  falls. In both scenarios, the reduction of the aggregate demand raises the 
PCP mark-up (48) and exacerbates the effect of the depreciation by causing a marginal 
increase in the foreign PCP good’s import price, pitet. 
 
Thus, a rise in the mark-up of price over the marginal cost despite the importer’s currency 
depreciation is reconciled with the theory if one adds subsistence absorption to the model. 
The introduction of subsistence absorption generates a positive relationship between the 
demand level and the demand elasticity (6), which is inversely related to the firm’s market 
power. Consequently, an aggregate demand fall resulting from the depreciation causes a 
rise of the price mark-up over the marginal cost, since the firm’s market power increases.  
 
A puzzling increase in the price mark-up over the marginal cost during the importer’s 
currency depreciation may describe the price dynamics of any good for which a 
subsistence level of consumption exists. In particular, this good must represent a necessary 
element of the consumption basket, which should always comprise a fixed amount of the 
good, irrespective of its price. Intuitively, the producer of such good can afford increasing 
the price mark-up, because the demand for its good does not fall significantly in the price, 
due to the importance of the good for households’ minimum standard of living. Therefore, 
the puzzling behaviour of the price mark-up over the marginal cost may be justified with a 
high market power of the firms whose products are necessary for the subsistence of the 
household. 
 
4.5 Simulations 
 
Section 4.3 demonstrated that, in the presence of subsistence absorption, setting prices in 
the local currency does not stabilize import prices because of counter-cyclical movements 
of the price mark-up. Similarly, fixing prices in the producer’s currency does not guarantee 
a complete ERPT, if subsistence consumption constitutes a portion of the aggregate 
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demand. Irrespective of whether the firm is LCP or PCP, import prices mimic the 
behaviour of the counter-cyclical mark-up of price over the marginal cost. 
 
In this section, we compare the behaviour of the domestic LCP firm’s mark-up with that of 
the domestic PCP mark-up by simulating our DSGE model. The simulation traces the 
effect of technology and preference shocks on the economy. Following Mankiw and 
Summers (1986) and Betts and Devereux (1996), a value of one is assigned to parameter 
 of the utility function (1), which determines the marginal utility of real money holdings. 
Parameter  , which represents an additional determinant of the marginal utility of money 
balances, has been assigned an arbitrarily low value, following the suggestion in Erceg et 
al. (2006). Preference parameter   has been given a value of 3.08 (Ravn et al., 2008). 
Exogenous shock specifications are borrowed from Ravn et al. (2008). Specifically, the 
logarithm of the technology shock, log At, is modelled as a first-order autoregressive 
process. The persistence of both technology and preference shocks is set to 0.9. The 
calibration of the remaining structural parameters of the economy follows Ravn et al. 
(2006) and is summarized in Table 14. 
 
Figure 26 presents the impulse response of the domestic LCP mark-up to a preference 
shock, where the impulse response is defined as percent deviation of the variable from its 
steady state. Namely, we introduced a positive shock to foreign and domestic 
preferences,
 f
t (1a), in order to boost the levels of the foreign and domestic 
consumption, cftx and
c
tx . The graph demonstrates that a positive preference shock leads to a 
drop in the LCP mark-up due to a rise in the importer’s consumption. This illustration 
confirms the counter-cyclical nature of the mark-up (40), which falls following a positive 
shock to the aggregate demand in the importer’s country. The mark up fall results from the 
increase of the price elasticity of the demand (6), which implies a decrease of the firm’s 
market power. 
 
Interestingly, the behaviour of the PCP mark-up (Figure 27) in response to a positive shock 
to domestic and foreign preferences is similar to that of the LCP mark-up, although the 
PCP and LCP firms use different invoicing currencies. In both cases, a fall in the mark-up 
is observed, since a consumption rise generated by the positive preference shock increases 
the price elasticity (6) of the aggregate demand and decreases the firm’s market power. 
However, the PCP case exhibits a larger fall in the mark-up, since the PCP mark-up (48) 
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absorbs the increase of both countries’ consumption, while the LCP mark-up (40) responds 
only to fluctuations in the importer’s consumption. 
 
The effect of the technology shock on the mark-ups is qualitatively similar to that of the 
preference shock. Figures 28 and 29 represent the impulse responses of the domestic LCP 
and PCP mark-ups to a positive shock to the domestic and foreign technologies. Increased 
productivity of the technological process leads to a fall of both LCP and PCP mark-ups. 
Intuitively, an increase in the country’s productivity leads to a higher local output and 
income, which allows households to raise their consumption. Consequently, mark-ups fall 
following positive technology shocks due to an inverse relationship between the aggregate 
demand and the price mark-up over the marginal cost. However, similarly to the case of 
preference shocks, the PCP mark-up (48) exhibits a stronger fall, since it absorbs the effect 
of the demand increase in both markets, while the LCP mark-up (40) responds only to 
demand fluctuations of the importer’s economy. 
 
The impulse responses of the domestic PCP and LCP mark-ups to positive preference and 
technology shocks confirm the main conclusions reached in Section 4.3. First, we showed 
that both LCP and PCP mark-ups respond negatively to any shock that leads to a higher 
absorption in the economy. The counter-cyclical nature of the mark-up is due to a pro-
cyclical profile of the price elasticity of the demand (6). Specifically, an increase of the 
aggregate demand raises the demand elasticity. Since the firm’s market power falls in the 
demand elasticity for its product, the mark-up decreases during economic booms.  
 
Second, the simulations highlighted that the size of the mark-up adjustment depends on the 
extent of the change of the aggregate absorption, since the impulse response of the PCP 
mark-up displays a stronger fall, compared to that of the LCP mark-up. Specifically, a 
stronger increase of the aggregate demand implies a larger fall of the mark-up of price over 
the marginal cost.  
 
Finally, Figures 26-29 illustrated that the domestic PCP mark-up absorbs the effects of 
positive technology and preference shocks in both countries, while the LCP mark-up 
responds only to the shocks in the importer’s country. Thus, if the domestic and foreign 
demands were simultaneously hit by a positive shock, the PCP mark-up would fall faster 
than the LCP mark-up. This finding clarifies the aggregate ERPT definition (65) which 
suggests that the ERPT is governed by the fraction of PCP firms. Since the PCP mark-up is 
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more sensitive to macroeconomic shocks, compared to the LCP mark-up, the 
responsiveness of the aggregate price level to currency fluctuations rises in the market 
share of PCP firms. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we reassessed several stylized facts about the international price 
discrimination using the concept of subsistence consumption borrowed from Ravn et al. 
(2006).  The existence of subsistence points in consumption and investment generates a 
time variance of the price mark-up, which causes an inconstancy of ERPT and PTM. We 
built a two-country DSGE framework with subsistence points in the aggregate demand and 
two types of producers, namely LCP and PCP firms. Through solving the household’s 
utility maximization problem and the firms’ profit maximization problems, we examined 
the importance of the firm type for the degree of ERPT and PTM.  
 
We determined that setting prices in the importer’s currency does not lead to a zero pass-
through of exchange rate changes into the import prices of goods that are essential for 
maintaining the household’s minimum standard of living. Similarly, setting prices in the 
exporter’s currency does not necessarily lead the import price to move one-to-one with 
currency changes. The reason for the deviation of our model from the cases of the zero and 
complete ERPT lies in the price mark-up over the marginal cost. Specifically, the mark-up 
varies with business cycles because the presence of subsistence absorption generates a pro-
cyclical elasticity of demand with respect to price. Therefore, the price mark-up fluctuates 
with movements in the aggregate demand for both LCP and PCP firms.  
 
In order to illustrate the similarity between the responses of the LCP and PCP mark-ups to 
economic booms, we simulated the impulse responses of the PCP and LCP mark-ups to a 
positive shock to preferences and technology in the domestic and foreign markets. We 
showed that the mark-up drops following both shocks, irrespective of the currency in 
which prices are set. Since the exchange rate affects the aggregate demand in the domestic 
and foreign countries, currency movements are expected to shift both mark-ups and alter 
the pass-through of currency fluctuations into the import prices of PCP and LCP goods. 
 
Thus, our definitions of the optimal mark-ups set by LCP and PCP firms offer a new 
perspective on the local currency stability and international price differentials. Unlike the 
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stylized models predicting a complete ERPT for PCP goods and a zero EPRT for LCP 
goods (Gopinath et al., 2010), our model suggests that import prices fluctuate with the 
importer’s currency depreciation in both PCP and LCP cases. Moreover, the degree of the 
good-specific ERPT is determined by the effect of the exchange rate on the aggregate 
demand, due to the aforementioned counter-cyclical profile of the price mark-up.  
 
Our predictions on the aggregate ERPT also differ from the stylized model of Betts and 
Devereux (1996) where the degree of the aggregate ERPT into the domestic price level 
depends only on the fraction of the foreign PCP firms. Although the fraction of the foreign 
PCP firms is also one of the main determinants of the aggregate ERPT in our model, the 
effect of an exchange rate change on the domestic price level cannot be predicted based 
only on this fraction. In particular, the degree of the aggregate ERPT is determined by the 
effect of currency movements on the aggregate demand, because mark-ups fall during 
economic booms and rise during slowdowns. 
 
In addition to examining the ERPT, our model sheds new light on the stylized findings 
about PTM. By exploiting the counter-cyclical nature of the mark-up, the model justifies 
the “puzzling” evidence suggesting that the price mark-up increases during the importer’s 
currency depreciation and magnifies the import price increase caused by the depreciation, 
instead of mitigating it (Knetter, 1989). We argue that the depreciation of the importer’s 
currency raises the PCP mark-up, if the currency change depresses the sum of the 
aggregate demands of the domestic and foreign countries by affecting relative prices of the 
PCP good. Since the price mark-up over the marginal cost increases following a fall of the 
aggregate demand in our model, empirical evidence on the increase of the mark-up despite 
the importer’s currency depreciation can be reconciled with theory. 
 
Thus, our DSGE model of a time varying price mark-up over the marginal cost is capable 
of justifying empirical evidence on the ERPT and PTM in the situations which stylized 
frameworks consider to be puzzling. Moreover, since our model features a time varying 
price mark-up, it provides a theoretical justification for the PTM inconstancy found in the 
UK export price data in Chapter 3. Therefore, models containing a time varying mark-up 
of price over the marginal cost are expected to fit data better than fixed mark-up models by 
accommodating an unstable PTM and ERPT. Since the time variance of PTM and ERPT 
underpins all chapters of this thesis, the next chapter concludes this work by discussing 
policy implications of an inconstant effect of the exchange rate on export and import prices. 
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5 Chapter 5: Summary of Main 
Findings and their Policy 
Implications 
 
This thesis discussed the non-linearity of the exchange rate effect on the export and import 
prices of a traded good by focusing on the time variation of the PTM and ERPT. After 
outlining the background theoretical and empirical literature on the international price 
discrimination and local currency price stability in Chapter 1, we developed three models 
of the optimal export price – two partial equilibrium set-ups and a dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium framework.  
 
Chapter 2 offered a partial equilibrium model with a non-linear elasticity of the importer’s 
demand with respect to the import price. We argued that the demand for the exporter’s 
good is more elastic when its import price is significantly higher than the import price of a 
suitable substitute, because the importer has an incentive to switch to a cheaper variety. 
However, the demand for the imported variety is less elastic in the situations when a 
cheaper substitute is not available because of high switching costs. Since the firm’s market 
power falls in the price elasticity of demand, the mark-up of price over the marginal cost 
follows a two-regime process. The first regime is characterized by a low price elasticity of 
the import demand and a large mark-up, while the second regime corresponds to a high 
demand elasticity and a low mark-up.  
 
The non-linearity of the price mark-up generates a two-regime process for the ERPT. In 
the regime containing large mark-up values, the degree of ERPT is higher than in the 
regime corresponding to low mark-up magnitudes. Intuitively, when the firm’s market 
power is high, the exporter does not need to protect his market share abroad by limiting the 
import price increase resulting from the importer’s currency depreciation. Similarly, when 
the firm’s market power falls, the ERPT decreases, since the exporter adjusts the price 
mark-up downwards in order to prevent the importer from switching to cheaper substitutes. 
 
We applied the threshold regression methodology by Hansen (1999) in order to estimate 
structural breaks in the ERPT into the US import prices of selected European goods for the 
period 1995-2011. We estimated the threshold parameter by searching for the threshold 
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value which maximizes the concentrated sum of squared errors from the regression of the 
import price on the exchange rate and other explanatory variables. The statistical 
significance of threshold estimates was tested using asymptotic p-values of the F1 statistic 
proposed by Hansen (1999) in order to test the null hypothesis of no structural change in 
the relationship between the dependent variable and the regressor of interest. Finally, we 
tested the precision of the threshold estimate by constructing its asymptotic confidence 
intervals. These intervals encompass all values of the threshold parameter, which satisfy 
the null hypothesis suggesting that a given threshold value equals the “true” value of the 
threshold parameter.  
 
Our estimation results show a positive and statistically significant effect of the exchange 
rate on the import prices of the majority of product categories considered. The sensitivity 
of import prices to currency movements suggests that prices are set in the producer’s 
currency, since under the PCP a depreciation of the importer’s currency increases the 
number of units of the importer’s currency required to purchase a fixed amount of the 
exporter’s currency. The empirical findings for some products enabled us to confirm the 
main predictions of our theoretical model. First, we obtained a statistically significant 
estimate of the threshold effect in the ERPT, which suggests that the response of the import 
price to exchange rates is non-linear and depends on the difference between the import 
price of the exporter’s good and that of its substitute. Second, we found that the ERPT is 
larger in the regime where the exporter has a significant price advantage over competitors, 
compared to the regime where this advantage is absent. This finding is consistent with our 
model where the exporter decreases the price mark-up in the situations when the importer 
has a strong incentive to switch to a cheaper supplier. Consequently, a decrease in the 
mark-up of price over the marginal cost reduces the extent of the import price increase 
caused by the depreciation of the importer’s currency. The plots of asymptotic confidence 
intervals of the threshold estimates display narrow intervals implying a high precision of 
the parameter estimates.  
 
We concluded Chapter 2 by checking the robustness of our empirical findings to omitted 
variables bias and serial correlation among regressors. The robustness to omitted variables 
bias was tested by augmenting the regression with several non-linear terms that help 
reducing the risk of spurious correlations resulting from omitted regressors. The robustness 
to potential serial correlation among independent variables was checked by removing the 
regressors that may be serially correlated with the exchange rate. By running the threshold 
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regression algorithm by Hansen (1999) on the adjusted specifications, we did not detect 
significant changes in either the point estimates of the ERPT parameters or their statistical 
significance. Therefore, our initial empirical findings on the ERPT into the US import 
prices are robust to omitted variables bias and serial correlation among independent 
variables. 
 
In an attempt to find the evidence of a non-linear ERPT for a larger number of products, 
we continue exploring the time variance of the link between the exchange rate and traded 
goods prices in Chapter 3. However, instead of examining the response of import prices to 
the exchange rate, we investigate the sensitivity of the export price to currency movements 
using a forecasting methodology. We develop a new partial equilibrium model of the PTM 
in order to justify the instability of the relationship between the exchange rate and the 
export price. Using Krugman’s hypothesis suggesting that consumers of differentiated 
goods dislike the instability of prices (Krugman, 1986), we proposed a new type of demand 
function where the volatility of the exchange rate negatively affects the importer’s demand. 
Through solving the exporter’s profit maximization problem, we showed that the response 
of the export price to currency movements depends on the exchange rate volatility. Since 
the exchange rate volatility is generally inconstant, the degree of PTM is also unstable over 
time. 
 
Due to the instability of the effect of the exchange rate on the export price, we use out-of-
sample forecasting tests to test whether the exchange rate has predictive content for the 
export price. Rossi (2006) shows that out-of-sample tests are the most appropriate tests of 
model mis-specification in the situation of parameter instability, because they are suitable 
for testing a joint null hypothesis on a coefficient. The first part of this joint hypothesis 
suggests that the coefficient equals a constant value. The second part restricts this constant 
value to zero. We apply fixed, rolling, recursive and random walk coefficient time varying 
parameter regressions to the UK price indices of manufactured exports to the EU for the 
period 1999-2010. In order to determine whether the addition of the exchange rate 
significantly improves the forecasting performance of an export price model, we use the 
forecast encompassing test by Clark and McCracken (2001), which assesses the difference 
between the average forecast errors of nested models.  
 
Our empirical findings strongly support the main predictions of our theoretical model. First, 
the exchange rate has a statistically significant predictive power for the export prices of 
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almost all product categories analyzed. Specifically, the inclusion of exchange rate terms in 
the export price regression significantly reduces its average prediction error. Second, the 
relationship between the export price and the exchange rate is unstable, because 
regressions that are robust to parameter instability predict the export price significantly 
better than fixed parameter models. In order to confirm the robustness of our estimation 
output to potential seasonality of the price data, we repeat all regressions using a modified 
dataset where each price index has been transformed into annualized inflation rate. Our 
new empirical findings mimic the results obtained from seasonally unadjusted data. 
Specifically, the predictive power of the exchange rate and the forecasting superiority of 
adaptive regressions remain uncontested. 
 
After obtaining robust empirical evidence of the non-linearity of PTM and ERPT within a 
partial equilibrium framework in Chapters 2 and 3, we design a general equilibrium model 
of a time varying PTM with two types of firm – local currency pricing and producer 
currency pricing. The main difference between our DSGE model from Chapter 4 and 
related literature on international price discrimination (Betts and Devereux, 1996) lies in 
the consumption function, which contains subsistence points borrowed from Ravn et al. 
(2006). Subsistence consumption of a good represents a fixed amount consumed 
irrespective of the good’s price level due to the importance of this product for maintaining 
the basic living standard of the household.  
 
Through solving the consumer’s utility maximization problem and the firm’s profit 
maximization problem we show that the mark-up of price over the marginal cost is time 
varying for both LCP and PCP firms. The mark-up falls during economic booms and 
increases during slowdowns, because an increase in the aggregate demand of the economy 
raises the elasticity of the demand with respect to price. Since the relationship between the 
mark-up and the demand elasticity is inverse, mark-ups fall in the aggregate demand. The 
counter-cyclical nature of the price mark-up causes a time varying relationship between the 
exchange rate and import or export prices. Thus, irrespective of the firm type, the PTM and 
ERPT are inconstant, because the price mark-up fluctuates with business cycles. 
Specifically, currency movements affect the aggregate demand in the economy by 
changing the purchasing power of the domestic currency. Since the price mark-up responds 
to aggregate demand fluctuations, our model generates a time varying relationship between 
the exchange rate and the mark-up. 
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In addition to justifying the time variance of PTM and ERPT, the predictions of our DSGE 
model offer a fresh interpretation of several stylized facts about international price 
differentials and local currency price stability (Gopinath et al., 2010 and Knetter, 1989). 
First, we showed that the LCP does not insulate import prices from currency fluctuations, 
because the LCP price mark-up is inconstant and absorbs the effect of the exchange rate 
change on the aggregate demand. Second, we proved that the PCP does not necessarily 
lead the import price to move one-to-one with currency fluctuations due to the 
aforementioned counter-cyclical profile of the price mark-up. Finally, we showed that the 
PCP firm’s mark-up of price over the marginal cost can be adjusted either upwards or 
downwards, depending on the effect of the exchange rate on the aggregate demand. Thus, 
it is not certain that the exporter would adjust his mark-up downwards following the 
depreciation of the importer’s currency, in order to protect the importer from an increase of 
the import price.  
 
We concluded Chapter 4 by illustrating the time varying nature of the PCP and LCP mark-
ups with their impulse responses to positive shocks to consumer preferences and 
production technology. Specifically, both PCP and LCP mark-ups fall in response to 
positive shocks to preferences and technology. Since both mark-ups respond to aggregate 
demand shocks, the degree of the aggregate ERPT into the domestic price level cannot be 
predicted from the shares of PCP and LCP firms, unlike the case of a constant mark-up 
(Betts and Devereux, 1996). In order to forecast the extent of the aggregate ERPT, we need 
to predict the response of each mark-up to the exchange rates change. 
 
The motivation behind studying the time variance of PTM and ERPT relates to inflation 
policy, because the degree of PTM determines the extent of the ERPT into the domestic 
price level. By conducting PTM, foreign suppliers either limit the response of the import 
price level to currency movements or magnify it. Thus, the variation of PTM and ERPT 
over time determines the evolution of the inflation rate.  
 
In order to illustrate the effect of the ERPT inconstancy on the inflation policy, let us 
suppose that the policy maker decided to devalue the domestic currency in the next period.  
The weakening of the domestic currency boosts the domestic exports by reducing its prices 
measured in units of the foreign importer’s currency. However, the policy-maker is aware 
that the currency devaluation may lead to an uncontrollable rate of inflation. In order to 
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examine the inflationary consequences of the domestic currency devaluation, she must 
forecast the inflation rate of the next period.  
 
In the first step, she regresses the domestic inflation rate, t , on a constant, c, nominal 
exchange rate in units of the domestic currency per one unit of the basket of the currencies 
of the main trade partners, et, and a set of M controls, xit: 
tit
M
i itt
xec    1 ,        (1) 
where t denotes the error term of the inflation regression (1). The specification (1) is a 
linear model with stable parameters, which is estimated using historic data spanning 
periods from 1 through t , i.e. {1, 2, 3, …, t}. Note that   denotes the aggregate ERPT, i.e. 
the sensitivity of the domestic price level to the depreciation of the home currency.  
 
After obtaining the parameter estimates from the regression
17
 (1), i.e. *c , * and *i , the 
policy maker predicts the one-step-ahead value of the inflation rate, 1t , in the second step. 
She uses the target value of the exchange rate after the intended currency devaluation, et+1, 
and the forecasts of other regressors, fitx 1 : 
f
it
M
i it
f
t xec 11
*
1
**
1    .       (2) 
The one-step-ahead forecast (2) of the inflation rate is based on the policy maker’s 
assumption that the regression coefficients,  and i , are constant over time. She assumes 
that the parameter estimates obtained using historic data remain valid for future periods 
and enable her to produce accurate forecasts of the inflation rate.  
 
Let us hypothesize that the policy maker’s assumption of the constancy of the ERPT 
coefficient,  , is wrong. Instead of the specification (1), the inflation rate should be 
modelled according to the following equation: 
tit
M
i ittt
xec    1 ,       (3) 
where the ERPT parameter, t , is time varying. The one-step-ahead value of the inflation 
rate, which corresponds to the inflation model (3), is represented by 
111111 
  tit
M
i ittt
xec  .       (4) 
                                               
17 Note that subscript t is absent from  , since parameter constancy is assumed. 
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Thus, forecasting the future inflation rate (4) using the forecasting model (2) is not 
accurate, because the ERPT estimate, * , is not applicable to future periods. An accurate 
forecasting model should embed potential time variance of the relationship between the 
exchange rate and the price level. We can compute the error resulting from forecasting the 
future inflation rate (4) with the fixed parameter model (2): 
    11 1
*
111
*
1
*
11  
  t
M
i
f
itiit
M
i itt
f
tt xxecc  .  (5) 
The prediction error (5) increases in the difference between the true ERPT parameter, 1t , 
and its constant estimate, * . Therefore, underestimating or overestimating the value of 
the ERPT parameter, i.e. 1
*
 t or 1
*
 t , increases the absolute value of the 
forecasting error (5). Moreover, the prediction error (5) increases in the degree of 
parameter evolution, because a faster parameter evolution implies a larger distance 
between the fixed estimate, * , and the “true” parameter, 1t . Thus, using a fixed 
parameter regression in the situation of parameter inconstancy increases forecast errors due 
to the poor predictive ability of the constant parameter model (1). 
 
If the policy maker underestimates the response of the domestic price level to currency 
fluctuations, i.e. 1
*
 t  0,0 1*  t , the currency devaluation (i.e. an increase of et) 
would lead to an unexpected surge in inflation. Thus, the export boom resulting from the 
depreciation of the domestic currency would be generated at the expense of price stability. 
Moreover, this inflation jump may offset the welfare increment stemming from the 
increase of exports. 
 
Thus, basing the monetary policy on an outdated estimate of the ERPT can have 
detrimental inflationary consequences for the economy. Similarly, overestimating the 
degree of PTM by foreign exporters may increase the inflation rate beyond the allowed 
limit. For example, suppose that the policy maker determined from historic data that the 
aggregate ERPT was low because of PTM by foreign exporters, who decreased their profit 
margins following a depreciation of the domestic currency, in order to protect their market 
shares abroad. However, the firm’s ability to conduct PTM by absorbing the effect of the 
deprecation into its profit margins may vary over time. If the policy maker erroneously 
expected foreign suppliers to limit the ERPT in periods when exporters would not conduct 
PTM, she would fail to predict the rise of the domestic inflation in response to a planned 
devaluation of the domestic currency.  
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Therefore, policy recommendations aimed at keeping the future inflation level under 
control should accommodate potential evolution of PTM and ERPT over time. Thus, 
analyzing the time variance of PTM and ERPT is as important as focusing on the sources 
of international price differentials and local currency price stability. 
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6 Appendix 
 
6.1 Proof (Krugman, 1986) 
 
The algorithm of this proof follows Parsley (1993). Let us assume a linear demand 
function, baPD  , where –a denotes the slope and b stands for the intercept. The 
elasticity of the demand with respect to price is 
aPb
b
aPb
aP
D
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D
E

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
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

 1 .      (1) 
Given that
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Similarly, the derivative 
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Using the definitions (1), (2), (3) and
aPb
baP
E


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2
1 , the ERPT (Eq.9, Ch.1) equals 
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Thus, the absolute value of the ERPT equals 
 
 
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Since the price elasticity of the demand for a monopolist’s good is 1E  by definition, the 
absolute ERPT (5) is always less than one-half, i.e. 
2
1
ln
ln



e
P
. 
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6.2 Tables 
 
Table 1 - Import Unit-value Dataset 
 
Commodity 
code 
AT CH CZ DE DK FI GR HU NL NO PL SE UK 
1124 NA NA NA A A A A NA NA NA NA A A 
1222 NA A NA A A NA A NA A NA NA NA A 
533 A NA A A A A A NA A NA NA A A 
6123 A A A A NA NA NA NA A NA A NA A 
621 A A A A A A A NA A A A A A 
6353 NA A NA A A A NA NA A A NA A A 
6421 A A A A A A A NA A A A A A 
678 A NA A A A A A NA A NA NA A NA 
7525 A NA A A A A NA NA A NA NA A NA 
79312 NA NA NA A A A NA NA A NA NA A NA 
84722 A NA NA A A A NA A A NA NA A NA 
89286 A NA A A NA A A NA A NA NA A NA 
Notes:  1. Import unit-values are constructed using data on import values and quantities from the OECD 
International Trade by Commodity Statistics. 2. Commodities are denoted by the Standard International 
Trade Classification codes explained in Table 2. 3. “A” and “NA” denote available and unavailable values, 
respectively. 4. Country names are abbreviated as follows: AT – Austria, CH – Switzerland, CZ - Czech 
Republic, DE – Germany, DK – Denmark, FI – Finland, GR – Greece, HU – Hungary, NL – Netherlands, 
NO – Norway, PL – Poland, SE – Sweden,  UK – United Kingdom. 
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Table 2 - Commodity Codes and Sample Periods 
 
Commodity code Commodity description Period 
1124 Spirits (other than 51216); liqueurs 1995-2011 
1222 Cigarettes containing tobacco 1995-2009 
533 Pigments, paints, varnishes and related 
materials 
1996-2011 
6123 Parts of footwear 1996-2010 
621 Materials of rubber (pastes, plates, 
sheets, etc.) 
1996-2010 
6353 Builders’ joinery and carpentry of wood 1995-2010 
6421 Cartons, bags, other containers, of 
paper, paperback, etc. 
1996-2010 
678 Tubes, pipes and fittings, of iron or steel 1996-2011 
7525 Peripheral units, including control and 
adapting units 
1996-2011 
79312 Sailboats, not inflatable, with auxiliary 
motor or not 
1995-2011 
84722 Stockings, ankle-socks and the like 1996-2006 
89286 Trade advertising material, commercial 
catalogues, etc. 
1996-2011 
Notes: 1. Commodity codes refer to the Standard International Trade Classification representing the current 
international standard for classifying internationally traded commodities. 2. Code 51216 denotes “Ethyl 
alcohol and other spirits, denatured”.   
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Table 3 - Industries Constituting the PPI Dataset 
 
Commodity Industry 
Spirits (other than 51216); 
liqueurs 
Manufacture of beverages 
Cigarettes containing tobacco Manufacture of tobacco products 
Pigments, paints, varnishes and 
related materials 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products; 
basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical 
preparations 
Parts of footwear Manufacture of leather and related products 
Materials of rubber (pastes, 
plates, sheets, etc.) 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
Builders’ joinery and carpentry 
of wood 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and 
cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles of 
straw and plaiting materials 
Cartons, bags, other containers, 
of paper, paperback, etc. 
Manufacture of paper and paper products 
Tubes, pipes and fittings, of iron 
or steel 
Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal 
products, except machinery and equipment 
Peripheral units, including 
control and adapting units 
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical 
products; manufacture of electrical equipment 
Sailboats, not inflatable, with 
auxiliary motor or not 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, semi-
trailers and of other transport equipment 
Stockings, ankle-socks and the 
like 
Manufacture of textiles and wearing apparel 
Trade advertising material, 
commercial catalogues, etc. 
Manufacture of paper and paper products; printing 
and reproduction of recorded media 
Note: Industry PPI data was retrieved from the Eurostat Short-term Business Statistics database.  
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Table 4 – Euro Adoption Chronology 
 
Year Country 
1999 Austria 
1999 Germany 
1999 Finland 
1999 Netherlands 
2001 Greece 
N/A Czech Republic 
N/A Denmark 
N/A Hungary 
N/A Norway 
N/A Poland 
N/A Sweden 
N/A Switzerland 
N/A UK 
Note: “N/A” indicates that the country has not adopted the Euro as its national currency.  
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Table 5 - Threshold Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors (Eq. 27, Ch.2) 
 
Commo
-dity 
code 
DF CV 
 
1  
(s.e.) 
2  
(s.e.) 
3  
(s.e.) 
4  
(s.e.) 
5  
(s.e.) 
1124 85 2.64 (99%) 
1.99 (95%) 
1.66 (90%) 
0.68 
(0.58) 
-8.57 
(10.96) 
4.21 
(5.43) 
0.55
c
 
(0.12) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
1222 73 2.65 (99%) 
1.99 (95%) 
1.67 (90%) 
-0.39
a 
(0.22) 
2.01 
(2.42) 
-0.37 
(0.55) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
533 121 2.63 (99%) 
1.98 (95%) 
1.66 (90%) 
0.51 
(0.32) 
-0.86 
(2.80) 
0.23 
(0.61) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
0.14
c
 
(0.03) 
6123 86 2.64 (99%) 
1.99 (95%) 
1.66 (90%) 
-2.07 
(1.49) 
-0.10 
(6.89) 
0.06 
(1.53) 
0.10 
(0.21) 
0.53
a
 
(0.30) 
621 151 2.61 (99%) 
1.98 (95%) 
1.65 (90%)  
2.56
 c
 
(0.87) 
4.57 
(4.03) 
-0.93 
(0.88) 
-0.21
c
 
(0.07) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
6353 107 2.63 (99%) 
1.98 (95%) 
1.66 (90%) 
-10.09
 c
 
(1.84) 
27.58 
(20.34) 
-6.22 
(4.49) 
-1.32
 c
 
(0.36) 
-0.41 
(0.39) 
6421 151 2.61 (99%) 
1.98 (95%) 
1.65 (90%) 
-0.23 
(0.69) 
5.11 
(4.02) 
-1.02 
(0.87) 
-0.10
 a
 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
678 107 2.63 (99%) 
1.98 (95%) 
1.66 (90%) 
3.28
 c
 
(0.40) 
6.94
 c
 
(1.86) 
-1.43
 c
 
(0.41) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
0.16 
(0.11) 
7525 93 2.64 (99%) 
1.99 (95%) 
1.66 (90%) 
1.96 
(1.90) 
6.94 
(5.50) 
-1.52 
(1.20) 
-0.05 
(0.19) 
-0.39
b 
(0.17) 
79312 70 2.65 (99%) 
1.99 (95%) 
1.67 (90%) 
3.84
a
 
(2.24) 
3.32 
(7.25) 
-0.73 
(1.57) 
0.16 
(0.42) 
-0.44 
(0.31) 
84722 58 2.67 (99%) 
2.00 (95%) 
1.67 (90%) 
-1.89 
(4.31) 
-21.77
 b
 
(9.99) 
4.77
 b
 
(2.20) 
0.52
 b
 
(0.26) 
0.12 
(0.20) 
89286 93 2.64 (99%) 
1.99 (95%) 
1.66 (90%) 
0.62 
(0.88) 
9.62
 b
 
(4.08) 
-2.12
 b
 
(0.88) 
0.11
 c
 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
Notes: 1. This table presents the estimated coefficients from the unrestricted regression of the import price 
(Eq.27, Chapter 2). The coefficients β1, β2 and β3 define the responses of the import price to the marginal cost, 
price differential, and the product of the marginal cost and price differential, respectively. Coefficients β4 and 
β5 represent the ERPT in the lower and upper regimes, respectively. 2. The expected signs of the coefficients 
are as follows: β1>0, β2<0, β4>0, and β5>0, where β4>β5. The sign of the coefficient β3 is ambiguous. 3. “DF” 
denotes the degrees of freedom, 5)2(  KTdf , whereT is the number of time periods and K stands 
for the number of exporting countries. Number 5 reflects the number of regressors in the import price model 
(Eq.27, Ch.2).  4. “CV” denotes the critical values for the 2-tail T-test at the 90%, 95% and 99% confidence 
levels. 5. “s.e.” denotes the standard errors. 6. Commodity codes refer to the Standard International Trade 
Classification presented in Table 2. 7. Superscripts “c”, “b” and “a” indicate the statistical significance of the 
coefficient estimate at the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence levels, respectively.  
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Table 6 - Statistical Significance of Threshold Estimates (Eq.27, Ch.2) 
 
Commo
-dity 
code 
ˆ  
(threshold 
estimate) 
1F test (LR) 1F CV 
(bootstrap) 
1F p-value 
(bootstrap) 
95% confidence 
region for  
1124 -0.14
 c
 23.26 18.33 (99%) 
14.30 (95%) 
12.49 (90%) 
0.003 [-0.14, -0.14] 
1222 -0.21 5.83 20.86 (99%) 
13.86 (95%) 
12.30 (90%) 
0.430 [-0.31, 1.03] 
533 0.40
 c
 23.12 22.09 (99%) 
13.47 (95%) 
10.47 (90%) 
0.010 [0.20, 0.40] 
6123 1.20 4.56 13.23 (99%) 
10.92 (95%) 
8.63 (90%) 
0.387 [-0.40, 1.20] 
621 -0.08 9.04 13.49 (99%) 
10.36 (95%) 
9.41 (90%) 
0.117 [-0.08, 0.92] 
6353 -0.10 22.30 33.13 (99%) 
26.61 (95%) 
23.80 (90%) 
0.150 [-0.10, -0.10] 
6421 -0.10 6.89 13.86 (99%) 
10.22 (95%) 
8.35 (90%) 
0.167 [-0.33, 1.20] 
678 1.33 4.30 14.49 (99%) 
11.07(95%) 
9.17 (90%) 
0.567 [-0.42, 1.46] 
7525 -0.25 5.38 11.70 (99%) 
9.16 (95%) 
8.05 (90%) 
0.360 [-0.48, 2.46] 
79312 -1.60 4.44 20.27 (99%) 
16.41 (95%) 
13.50 (90%) 
0.557 [-1.60, 2.02] 
84722 1.42 5.44 11.00 (99%) 
7.94(95%) 
5.67 (90%) 
0.113 [-0.44, 2.30] 
89286 0.70 11.97 30.94 (99%) 
23.48 (95%) 
17.97 (90%) 
0.153 [0.61, 0.93] 
Notes: 1. This table presents the results of the bootstrap replications conducted to examine the significance of 
the threshold estimate, ˆ , in the import price equation (Eq.27, Ch.2). Superscript “c” indicates the statistical 
significance of the threshold estimate at the 99% confidence level.  2. The 1F test represents the LR test 
(Eq.28, Ch.2). The null hypothesis implies no structural change in the exchange rate coefficient. This test 
compares the concentrated sums of squared errors from the restricted (Eq.26, Ch.2) and unrestricted (Eq.27, 
Ch.2) regressions of the import price. 3. Commodity codes refer to the Standard International Trade 
Classification presented in Table 2. 4. Asymptotic p-values for the LR 1F test (Eq.34, Ch.2) are computed by 
simulating the 1F statistic through conducting 300 repeated estimations of the unrestricted and restricted 
import price equations. The null hypothesis of the ERPT stability is rejected if the bootstrap p-value is 
smaller than the desired significance level. 5. “CV” denotes the bootstrap critical values for the LR 1F test at 
the 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels. The excess of the statistic value over the critical value implies the 
rejection of the null hypothesis of no structural change in the coefficient on the log-transformed exchange 
rate.  
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Table 7 - Threshold Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors (Eq. 41, Ch.2) 
 
Commodity 
code 
DF CV 
 
1  
(s.e.) 
2  
(s.e.) 
3  
(s.e.) 
1124 87 2.64 (99%) 
1.99 (95%)  
1.66 (90%) 
0.87 
(0.53) 
0.56
c
 
(0.10) 
-0.007 
(0.04) 
1222 75 2.66 (99%) 
2.00 (95%)  
1.67 (90%) 
-0.53
 b
 
(0.20) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.08 
(0.05) 
533 123 
 
2.63 (99%) 
1.98 (95%)  
1.66 (90%) 
0.52
a
 
(0.30) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.14
c
 
(0.03) 
6123 88 2.64 (99%) 
1.99 (95%)  
1.66 (90%) 
-2.55
a
 
(1.38) 
0.09 
(0.21) 
0.36 
(0.25) 
621 153 2.63 (99%) 
1.98 (95%)  
1.66 (90%) 
1.71
c
 
(0.53) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.13
b
 
(0.05) 
6353 109 2.63 (99%) 
1.98 (95%)  
1.66 (90%) 
-10.61
c
 
(1.84) 
-1.53
 c
 
(0.34) 
-0.59 
(0.38) 
6421 153 2.63 (99%) 
1.98 (95%)  
1.66 (90%) 
-1.05
 a
 
(0.54) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.10
b
 
(0.05) 
678 109 2.63 (99%) 
1.98 (95%)  
1.66 (90%) 
2.36
 c
 
(0.30) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.20
c
 
(0.06) 
7525 95 2.64 (99%) 
1.99 (95%)  
1.66 (90%) 
-0.36 
(0.48) 
-0.12 
(0.18) 
-0.38
 b
 
(0.17) 
79312 72 2.66 (99%) 
2.00 (95%)  
1.67 (90%) 
3.38 
(2.11) 
0.16 
(0.41) 
-0.46 
(0.29) 
84722 60 2.66 (99%) 
2.00 (95%)  
1.67 (90%) 
7.95
 c
 
(2.75) 
-0.07 
(0.27) 
0.18 
(0.20) 
89286 95 2.64 (99%) 
1.99 (95%)  
1.66 (90%) 
-0.80 
(0.64) 
0.14
 c
 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
Notes: 1. This table presents the estimated coefficients from the unrestricted regression of the import price 
(Eq.41, Ch.2). The coefficient β1 defines the response of the import price to the log of the marginal cost. The 
coefficients β2 and β3 represent the ERPT in the lower and upper regimes, respectively. 2. The expected signs 
of the coefficients are as follows: β1>0, β2>0, β3>0, where β2>β3. 3. “DF” denotes the degrees of 
freedom, 3)2(  KTdf , where T is the number of time periods and K stands for the number of 
exporting countries. Number 3 reflects the number of regressors in the import price model.  4. “CV” denotes 
the critical values for the 2-tail T-test at the 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels. 5. “s.e.” denotes the 
standard errors. 6. Commodity codes refer to the Standard International Trade Classification presented in 
Table 2. 7. Superscripts “c”, “b” and “a” indicate the statistical significance of the coefficient estimate at the 
99%, 95% and 90% confidence levels, respectively.  
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Table 8 - Statistical Significance of Threshold Estimates (Eq.41, Ch.2) 
 
Commo
-dity 
code 
ˆ  
(threshold 
estimate) 
1F test (LR) 1F CV 
(bootstrap) 
1F p-value 
(bootstrap) 
95% confidence 
region for  
1124 -0.14
 c
 35.50 25.01 (99%) 
16.08 (95%) 
11.05 (90%) 
0.000 [-0.14, -0.14] 
1222 0.47 4.20 14.63 (99%) 
11.89 (95%) 
9.99   (90%) 
0.560 [-0.31, 1.03] 
533 0.40
 b
 20.28 21.03 (99%) 
14.20 (95%) 
9.93   (90%) 
0.017 [0.20. 0.40] 
6123 1.20 3.62 18.57 (99%) 
12.34 (95%) 
8.92   (90%) 
0.510 [-0.40, 1.20] 
621 0.92 7.33 17.25 (99%) 
13.20 (95%) 
 9.82  (90%) 
0.263 [-0.08, 1.47] 
6353 -0.10 24.04 35.32 (99%) 
27.50 (95%) 
26.19 (90%) 
0.173 [-0.10, -0.10] 
6421 0.93 8.34 16.82 (99%) 
12.73 (95%) 
10.58 (90%) 
0.187 [-0.30, 1.20] 
678 0.23
a
 
 
19.70 33.65 (99%) 
22.99 (95%) 
18.80 (90%) 
0.093 [-0.09, 0.31] 
7525 -0.25 3.86 11.75 (99%) 
9.50   (95%) 
8.16   (90%) 
0.380 [-0.48, 2.46] 
79312 -1.60 6.35 15.64 (99%) 
10.57 (95%) 
8.26   (90%) 
0.163 [-1.60, 2.02] 
84722 0.35 2.28 5.83   (99%) 
4.85   (95%) 
4.18   (90%) 
0.490 [-0.44, 2.30] 
89286 0.70 10.39 25.58 (99%) 
16.37 (95%) 
12.81 (90%) 
0.146 [0.52, 1.36] 
Notes: 1. This table presents the results of the bootstrap replications conducted to examine the significance of 
the threshold estimate, ˆ , in the import price equation (Eq.41, Ch.2). Superscripts “c”, “b” and “a” indicate 
the statistical significance of the threshold estimate at the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence levels, respectively. 
2. The 1F test (Eq.28, Ch.2) represents the LR test. The null hypothesis implies no structural change in the 
exchange rate coefficient. This test compares the concentrated sums of squared errors from the restricted 
(Eq.42, Ch.2) and unrestricted (Eq.41, Ch.2) regressions of the import price. 3. Commodity codes refer to the 
Standard International Trade Classification presented in Table 2. 4. Asymptotic p-values for the LR 1F test 
are computed by simulating the 1F statistic (Eq.34, Ch.2) through conducting 300 repeated estimations of the 
unrestricted and restricted import price equations. The null hypothesis of the ERPT stability is rejected if the 
bootstrap p-value is smaller than the desired significance level. 5. “CV” denotes the bootstrap critical values 
for the LR 1F test at the 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels. The excess of the statistic value over the 
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critical value implies the rejection of the null hypothesis of no structural change in the coefficient on the log-
transformed exchange rate.  
 
Table 9A - Threshold Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors (Eq. 43, Ch. 2) 
 
Commo-
dity code 
DF CV  β1 
(s.e) 
β2 
(s.e) 
β3 
(s.e) 
β4 
(s.e) 
β5 
(s.e) 
1124 81 2.64 (99%) 
1.99 (95%) 
1.66 (90%) 
-1294.68
b
 
(607.85) 
670.51
b
 
(314.86) 
-115.48
b
 
(54.27) 
-0.98 
(13.02) 
2.29
a
 
(1.25) 
1222 69 2.66 (99%) 
2.00 (95%) 
1.67 (90%) 
528.45 
(352.43) 
-118.74 
(79.78) 
8.87 
(6.01) 
0.42 
(2.72) 
-0.13 
(0.49) 
533 117 2.63 (99%) 
1.98 (95%) 
1.66 (90%) 
-1517.99
a
 
(779.39) 
327.38
a
 
(169.52) 
-23.51
a
 
(12.28) 
0.75 
(2.67) 
0.12
b
 
(0.06) 
6123 82 2.64 (99%) 
1.99 (95%) 
1.66 (90%) 
5141.05 
(4803.14) 
-1137.40 
(1073.99) 
83.80 
(80.01) 
17.89
a
 
(10.69) 
0.02 
(0.18) 
621 147 2.63 (99%) 
1.98 (95%) 
1.66 (90%) 
-488.71 
(1864.47) 
102.00 
(412.10) 
-7.04 
(30.35) 
2.42 
(3.90) 
0.65
c
 
(0.23) 
6353 103 2.63 (99%) 
1.98 (95%) 
1.66 (90%) 
33065.89
c
  
(10307.75) 
2232.07 
(1556.11) 
517.03
c
 
(161.08) 
-63.28 
(51.95) 
0.63 
(0.85) 
6421 147 2.63 (99%) 
1.98 (95%) 
1.66 (90%) 
-4178.97 
(2609.18) 
910.89 
(565.58) 
-66.17 
(40.86) 
4.99 
(4.28) 
-0.20 
(0.33) 
678 103 2.63 (99%) 
1.98 (95%) 
1.66 (90%) 
-2978.39
c
 
(576.07) 
 
656.26
c
 
(126.67) 
-48.11
c
 
(9.28) 
4.54
b
 
(1.97) 
-0.24 
(0.20) 
7525 89 2.64 (99%) 
1.99 (95%) 
1.66 (90%) 
-918.74
c
 
(313.25) 
183.73
c
 
(63.40) 
-12.23
c
 
(4.27) 
-5.52 
(5.57) 
-0.26
b
 
(0.10) 
79312 66 2.66 (99%) 
2.00 (95%) 
1.67 (90%) 
6022.98 
(16593.15) 
-1366.07 
(3620.33) 
103.20 
(263.26) 
22.63
b
 
(10.76) 
-0.09 
(0.08) 
84722 54 2.70 (99%) 
2.02 (95%) 
1.68 (90%) 
-473.74 
(25502.97) 
60.88 
(5672.44) 
-1.26 
(420.48) 
-21.33
a
 
(11.62) 
-0.59 
(0.47) 
89286 89 2.64 (99%) 
1.99 (95%) 
1.66 (90%) 
1796.46 
(1729.85) 
-397.29 
(380.98) 
29.28 
(27.95) 
11.71
b
 
(4.55) 
0.69
b
 
(0.32) 
Note: See notes to Table 9B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
222 
 
 
Table 9B - Threshold Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors (Eq. 43, Ch. 2) 
 
Commo-
dity code 
DF CV β6 β7 β8 β9 
1124 81 2.64 (99%) 
1.99 (95%) 
1.66 (90%) 
-3.14 
(2.84) 
0.60 
(6.45) 
0.64
c
 
(0.13) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
1222 69 2.66 (99%) 
2.00 (95%) 
1.67 (90%) 
0.09 
(0.33) 
-0.02 
(0.62) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
533 117 2.63 (99%) 
1.98 (95%) 
1.66 (90%) 
-0.28
c
 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.58) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.16
c
 
(0.03) 
6123 82 2.64 (99%) 
1.99 (95%) 
1.66 (90%) 
-0.05
a
 
(0.03) 
-3.89
a
 
(2.34) 
0.33 
(0.22) 
0.00 
(0.31) 
621 147 2.63 (99%) 
1.98 (95%) 
1.66 (90%) 
-0.17 
(0.12) 
-0.55 
(0.86) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
0.15 
(0.10) 
6353 103 2.63 (99%) 
1.98 (95%) 
1.66 (90%) 
0.98 
(0.93) 
13.34 
(11.18) 
-1.31
c
 
(0.34) 
-0.54 
(0.38) 
6421 147 2.63 (99%) 
1.98 (95%) 
1.66 (90%) 
0.11 
(0.19) 
-0.98 
(0.91) 
-0.11
a
 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
678 103 2.63 (99%) 
1.98 (95%) 
1.66 (90%) 
0.09 
(0.06) 
-0.93
b
 
(0.44) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.24
c
 
(0.08) 
7525 89 2.64 (99%) 
1.99 (95%) 
1.66 (90%) 
0.08
c
 
(0.03) 
1.20 
(1.21) 
-0.44
b
 
(0.17) 
-0.02 
(0.25) 
79312 66 2.66 (99%) 
2.00 (95%) 
1.67 (90%) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
-4.86
b
 
(2.37) 
-0.72 
(0.49) 
-0.24 
(0.34) 
84722 54 2.70 (99%) 
2.02 (95%) 
1.68 (90%) 
0.26 
(0.17) 
4.61
a
 
(2.60) 
0.59
a
 
(0.30) 
0.07 
(0.23) 
89286 89 2.64 (99%) 
1.99 (95%) 
1.66 (90%) 
-0.20
b
 
(0.09) 
-2.68
c
 
(0.99) 
0.11
b
 
(0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
Notes: 1. This table presents the estimated coefficients from the unrestricted regression of the import price 
(Eq.43, Ch.2). The coefficients β1, β2 and β3 define the responses of the import price to the marginal cost, the 
squared marginal cost and the marginal cost raised to the power of 3, respectively. The coefficients β4, β5 and 
β6 represent the effects of the price differential, the squared price differential and the price differential raised 
to the power of 3, respectively, on the import price. The coefficient β7 defines the impact of the product of the 
marginal cost and the price differential. The ERPT in the lower and upper regimes is reflected in the 
coefficients β8 and β9, respectively. 2. The expected signs of the coefficients are as follows: β1>0, β2>0, β3>0, 
β4<0, β6<0, β8>0, β9>0, where β8>β9. The sign of the coefficients β5 and β7 is ambiguous. 3. “DF” denotes the 
degrees of freedom, 9)2(  KTdf , where T is the number of time periods and K stands for the 
number of exporting countries. Number 9 reflects the number of regressors in the import price model.  4. 
“CV” denotes the critical values for the 2-tail T-test at the 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels. 5. “s.e.” 
denotes the standard errors. 6. Commodity codes refer to the Standard International Trade Classification 
presented in Table 2. 7. Superscripts “c”, “b” and “a” indicate the statistical significance of the coefficient 
estimate at the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence levels, respectively.  
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Table 10 - Statistical Significance of Threshold Estimates (Eq.43, Ch.2) 
 
Commo
-dity 
code 
ˆ  
(threshold 
estimate) 
1F test (LR) 1F CV 
(bootstrap) 
1F p-value 
(bootstrap) 
95% confidence 
region for  
1124 -0.14
c
 36.89 25.25 (99%) 
18.12 (95%) 
14.45 (90%) 
0.000 [-0.14, -0.14] 
1222 -0.21 5.38 13.81 (99%) 
10.66 (95%) 
8.16   (90%) 
0.310 [-0.31, 1.03] 
533 0.40
c
 27.19 22.96 (99%) 
18.16 (95%) 
14.48 (90%) 
0.000 [0.20, 0.40] 
6123 1.15 3.81 17.45 (99%) 
11.74 (95%) 
7.93   (90%) 
0.440 [-0.40, 1.20] 
621 1.27 4.58 17.00 (99%) 
14.91 (95%) 
11.57 (90%) 
0.570 [-0.08, 1.47] 
6353 -0.10 18.05 25.82 (99%)  
21.50 (95%) 
19.64 (90%) 
0.173 [-0.10, -0.10] 
6421 -0.10 6.49 18.19 (99%) 
12.20 (95%) 
9.54   (90%) 
0.307 [-0.33, 1.20] 
678 0.90 6.59 17.99(99%) 
13.50 (95%) 
12.10 (90%) 
0.353 [-0.42, 1.46] 
7525 2.46 3.11 16.34 (99%) 
11.94 (95%) 
10.34 (90%) 
0.787 [-0.48, 2.46] 
79312 -0.11 2.30 28.57 (99%)  
18.21 (95%) 
14.74 (90%) 
0.863 [-1.60, 2.02] 
84722 1.42 7.32 18.26 (99%) 
11.75 (95%) 
8.89   (90%) 
0.170 [-0.44, 2.30] 
89286 0.70 6.28 21.04 (99%) 
14.22 (95%) 
9.16   (90%) 
0.153 [0.25, 1.49] 
Notes: 1. This table presents the results of the bootstrap replications conducted to examine the significance of 
the threshold estimate, ˆ , in the import price equation (Eq.43, Ch.2). Superscript “c” indicates the statistical 
significance of the threshold estimate at the 99% confidence level. 2. The 1F test (Eq.28, Ch.2) represents the 
LR test. The null hypothesis implies no structural change in the exchange rate coefficient. This test compares 
the concentrated sums of squared errors from the restricted (Eq.44, Ch.2) and unrestricted (Eq.43, Ch.2) 
regressions of the import price. 3. Commodity codes refer to the Standard International Trade Classification 
presented in Table 2. 4. Asymptotic p-values for the LR 1F test are computed by simulating the 1F statistic 
(Eq.34, Ch.2) through conducting 300 repeated estimations of the unrestricted and restricted import price 
equations. The null hypothesis of the ERPT stability is rejected if the bootstrap p-value is smaller than the 
desired significance level. 5. “CV” denotes the bootstrap critical values for the LR 1F test at the 90%, 95% 
and 99% confidence levels. The excess of the statistic value over the critical value implies the rejection of the 
null hypothesis of no structural change in the coefficient on the log-transformed exchange rate.  
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Table 11 - RMSFE from the PTM and non-PTM Models (Seasonally Unadjusted) 
 
Category 
Rolling Recursive Split 
Random Walk 
TVP 
PTM Non-
PTM 
PTM Non-
PTM 
PTM Non-
PTM 
PTM Non-
PTM 
Aggregate  
Series 
0.00586
c
 0.00642 0.00605c 0.00630 0.00839c 0.00943 0.01047 
 
0.01054 
 
Food 0.00630 0.00614 0.00611 0.00596 0.00677c 0.00770 0.01085 0.01087 
Chemicals 0.00586 0.00593 0.00597a 0.00609 0.01468c 0.01518 0.01113 0.01127 
Machinery 0.00699c 0.00708 0.00711c 0.00712 0.02810 0.02727 0.01066 0.01055 
Electric 
Machinery 
0.00912 0.00902 0.00950 0.00929 0.01432c 0.01662 0.01273 
 
0.01277 
Clothing 0.00890c 0.00894 0.00938 0.00919 0.01446 0.01393 0.01621 
 
0.01587 
 
Road 
Vehicles 
0.00555 0.00540 0.00558 0.00548 0.00979c 0.01068 0.00748 
 
0.00797 
 
Paper and 
Paperboard 
0.00727 0.00699 0.00709 0.00702 0.01033 0.00987 0.01296 
 
0.01327 
 
Miscellaneous 
Metal 
Manufactures 
0.00627
c
 0.00651 0.00622c 0.00645 0.00983 0.00813 0.01130 
 
0.01146 
 
Wood  and 
Cork 
Manufactures 
0.00649 0.00642 0.00650c 0.00664 0.00751c 0.01258 0.01015 
 
0.01063 
 
Textile 
Fabrics 
0.00612
c
 
 
0.00643 
 
0.00620
c
 
 
0.00647 
 
0.01509
c
 
 
0.01525 
 
0.01102 
 
0.01089 
 
Note: see notes to Table 12 
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Table 12 - RMSFE from the PTM and non-PTM Models (Seasonally Adjusted) 
 
Category 
Rolling Recursive Split 
Random Walk 
TVP 
PTM Non-
PTM 
PTM Non-
PTM 
PTM Non-
PTM 
PTM Non-
PTM 
Aggregate  
Series 
0.64794
c
 0.69470 0.62840a 0.66389 0.68950 0.70829 1.07293 1.07098 
Food 0.68169 0.66156 
 
0.65089 
 
0.64342 
 
0.81381
c
 
 
0.94440 
 
1.19944 
 
1.20634 
Chemicals 0.65695b 0.65156 0.63529b 0.63407 0.61388c 0.62988 1.22343 1.21829 
Machinery 0.76343c 
 
0.78795 
 
0.80002 
 
0.78322 
 
0.87787
c
 
 
1.16547 
 
1.11280 
 
1.11683 
 
Electric 
Machinery 
1.11108 
 
1.07510 
 
1.12171 
 
1.12412 
 
1.22780
c
 
 
1.35389 
 
1.36299 
 
1.37637 
 
Clothing 0.93871 
 
0.91765 
 
0.91567
b
 
 
0.90887 
 
0.92493
c
 
 
0.91802 
 
1.82023 
 
1.82302 
 
Road 
Vehicles 
0.56131 
 
0.53293 
 
0.52296 
 
0.50120 
 
0.58028 
 
0.52832 
 
0.84167 
 
0.83227 
 
Paper and 
Paperboard 
0.83980 
 
0.82650 
 
0.82557 
 
0.81791 
 
0.83583
c
 
 
0.87954 
 
1.60385 
 
1.65217 
 
Miscellaneous 
Metal 
Manufactures 
0.90351 
 
0.88102 
 
0.88094
b
 
 
0.86644 
 
1.11436 
 
0.94783 
 
1.48680 
 
1.49020 
 
Wood  and 
Cork 
Manufactures 
0.71312
c
 
 
0.76502 
 
0.72475
b
 
 
0.76384 
 
0.81465
c
 
 
0.87264 
 
1.16943 
 
1.20608 
 
Textile 
Fabrics 
0.74716
c
 
 
0.78293 
 
0.73787
c
 
 
 
0.76050 
 
0.94613 
 
0.82146 
 
1.41389 1.39749 
Notes: 1. Tables 11 and 12 display the RMSFE (Eq.26b, Ch.3) delivered by rolling, recursive, split and 
RWCTVP estimation of the PTM (Eq.23a, Ch.3) and non-PTM (Eq.23b, Ch.3) models of the export price. 
Sample period spans the observations from January 1999 to April 2010. 2. A small RMSFE indicates a strong 
forecasting performance of a model and a large RMSFE reflects a poor predictive power.  3. PTM model 
suggests that the exchange rate has predictive power for the export price. Non-PTM model implies that the 
exchange rate has no predictive content for the export price. 4. TVP stands for the Time Varying Parameter 
estimation. 5. Aggregate series refers to the aggregate price indices of the UK trade in manufactures with the 
EU. 6. Symbols “c”, “b” and “a” denote the statistical significance of the difference between the RMSFE of 
the non-PTM (Eq.23b, Ch.3) and PTM (Eq.23a, Ch.3) models at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, 
respectively. The statistical significance of the error differential is determined using asymptotic critical 
values of the ENC-NEW test of forecast encompassing by Clark and McCracken (2001). These critical 
values are applicable only to split, rolling and recursive regressions. The null hypothesis of the ENC-NEW 
test suggests that RMSFENon-PTM-RMSFEPTM=0. If the null hypothesis is rejected and RMSFENon-
PTM>RMSFEPTM, the hypothesis of PTM is adopted. 
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Table 12A – OLS Regression Coefficients and p-values (Eq.32, Ch.3) 
 
Category δ 
(PV) 
[HCPV] 
β1 
(PV) 
[HCPV] 
β2 
(PV) 
[HCPV] 
β3 
(PV) 
[HCPV] 
β4 
(PV) 
[HCPV] 
β5 
(PV) 
[HCPV] 
β6 
(PV) 
[HCPV] 
β7 
(PV) 
[HCPV] 
β8 
(PV) 
[HCPV] 
AS 0.41 
(0.097) 
[0.104] 
0.45 
(0.000) 
[0.000] 
0.24 
(0.037) 
[0.039] 
-0.03 
(0.823) 
[0.810] 
0.27 
(0.090) 
[0.060] 
-0.26 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
0.13 
(0.101) 
[0.091] 
0.0001 
(0.626) 
[0.665] 
-0.0001 
(0.519) 
[0.560] 
FOOD -0.11 
(0.215) 
[0.219] 
0.57 
(0.000) 
[0.000] 
0.23 
(0.027) 
[0.030] 
0.39 
(0.008) 
[0.013] 
-0.09 
(0.536) 
[0.570] 
-0.09 
(0.168) 
[0.156] 
0.05 
(0.492) 
[0.475] 
0.0002 
(0.160) 
[0.263] 
-0.0003 
(0.019) 
[0.052] 
CHEM 0.53 
(0.040) 
[0.033] 
0.72 
(0.000) 
[0.000] 
-0.05 
(0.661) 
[0.635] 
0.03 
(0.803) 
[0.808] 
0.18 
(0.087) 
[0.076] 
-0.16 
(0.027) 
[0.033] 
0.03 
(0.724) 
[0.684] 
0.0000 
(0.661) 
[0.730] 
0.0000 
(0.729) 
[0.767] 
MACH 0.61 
(0.092) 
[0.131] 
0.75 
(0.000) 
[0.000] 
0.06 
(0.611) 
[0.577] 
-0.01 
(0.951) 
[0.942] 
0.04 
(0.849) 
[0.827] 
-0.19 
(0.036) 
[0.091] 
0.05 
(0.563) 
[0.624] 
0.0000 
(0.884) 
[0.880] 
0.0000 
(0.667) 
[0.634] 
ELEC 0.52 
(0.148) 
[0.206] 
0.66 
(0.000) 
[0.000] 
0.22 
(0.033) 
[0.057] 
-0.09 
(0.695) 
[0.516] 
0.06 
(0.776) 
[0.627] 
-0.10 
(0.398) 
[0.413] 
-0.02 
(0.877) 
[0.871] 
0.0000 
(0.877) 
[0.887] 
-0.0001 
(0.653) 
[0.633] 
CLOT 0.15 
(0.789) 
[0.751] 
1.01 
(0.000) 
[0.000] 
-0.13 
(0.320) 
[0.266] 
0.05 
(0.886) 
[0.542] 
0.57 
(0.877) 
[0.476] 
0.00 
(0.971) 
[0.969] 
-0.07 
(0.522) 
[0.570] 
0.0000 
(0.808) 
[0.863] 
0.0001 
(0.550) 
[0.707] 
ROAD -0.16 
(0.251) 
[0.199] 
0.66 
(0.000) 
[0.000] 
0.34 
(0.000) 
[0.001] 
-0.01 
(0.947) 
[0.953] 
0.06 
(0.660) 
[0.676] 
-0.01 
(0.814) 
[0.819] 
0.04 
(0.435) 
[0.396] 
0.0001 
(0.580) 
[0.588] 
0.0000 
(0.914) 
[0.918] 
PAP -0.50 
(0.015) 
[0.014] 
0.79 
(0.000) 
[0.000] 
0.14 
(0.200) 
[0.109] 
0.23 
(0.249) 
[0.105] 
0.04 
(0.813) 
[0.756] 
-0.10 
(0.276) 
[0.348] 
0.15 
(0.128) 
[0.145] 
0.0000 
(0.899) 
[0.880] 
0.0000 
(0.979) 
[0.976] 
MET 0.29 
(0.041) 
[0.041] 
0.57 
(0.000) 
[0.000] 
0.19 
(0.078) 
[0.055] 
0.42 
(0.001) 
[0.002] 
-0.20 
(0.123) 
[0.108] 
-0.27 
(0.000) 
[0.001] 
0.16 
(0.035) 
[0.042] 
-0.0001 
(0.394) 
[0.428] 
0.0001 
(0.343) 
[0.379] 
WOO 0.70 
(0.023) 
[0.021] 
0.40 
(0.000) 
[0.001] 
0.29 
(0.009) 
[0.014] 
0.12 
(0.479) 
[0.351] 
0.01 
(0.960) 
[0.949] 
-0.24 
(0.005) 
[0.009] 
0.07 
(0.430) 
[0.543] 
0.0001 
(0.426) 
[0.562] 
-0.0001 
(0.416) 
[0.538] 
TEXT 0.16 
(0.342) 
[0.276] 
0.71 
(0.000) 
[0.000] 
0.27 
(0.023) 
[0.042] 
-0.01 
(0.956) 
[0.962] 
0.12 
(0.551) 
[0.589] 
-0.23 
(0.001) 
[0.010] 
0.22 
(0.002) 
[0.009] 
0.0001 
(0.230) 
[0.328] 
-0.0002 
(0.155) 
[0.263] 
Notes: 1. This table presents the estimated coefficients from the OLS regression of the import price (Eq.32, 
Ch.3) with corresponding p-values (PV) and heteroskedasticity-consistent p-values (HCPV). δ stands for 
constant, while other parameters are defined as follows: β1 -  coefficient on the first lag of the log of the 
export price, β2 – coefficient on the second lag of  the log of the export price, β3 – coefficient on the first lag 
of the log of the marginal cost, β4 – coefficient on the second lag of the log of the marginal cost, β5 – 
coefficient on the first lag of the log of the exchange rate, β6 – coefficient on the second lag of the log of the 
exchange rate, β7 – coefficient on the product of the first lag of the annual average volatility of the exchange 
rate, σt-1, and the first lag of the log of the exchange rate, β8 - coefficient on the product of the second lag of 
the annual average volatility of the exchange rate, σt-2, and the second lag of the log of the exchange rate. 2. 
The PTM defined as the response of the log of the export price to the log of the exchange rate is given by   
[β5 + β7σt-1] and [β6 + β8σt-2]. The statistical significance of coefficients β7 and β8 indicates that the annual 
average volatility of the exchange rate causes a structural break in the PTM. 3. The expected sign of the  
coefficients on marginal costs is positive, i.e. β3>0 and β4>0. The expected signs of the remaining regression 
parameters are ambiguous. 4. Commodity codes represent the following industries: AS – Aggregate Series, 
FOOD - Food, CHEM – Chemicals, MACH – Machinery, ELEC -  Electric Machinery, CLOT – Clothing, 
ROAD – Road Vehicles, PAP – Paper and Paperboard, MET – Miscellaneous Metal Manufactures, WOO – 
Wood and Cork Manufactures, TEXT – Textile Fabrics. 5. Bold type indicates the statistical significance of a 
227 
 
 
coefficient estimate at the 99%, 95% or 90% confidence levels. 6. Sample period spans the observations from 
March 2000 to April 2010. 
 
Table 12B – First-Differenced Data on UK Export Prices, PPI and Exchange Rate 
Date EPI PPI BSEERI 
February 1999 0.000 0.000 0.004 
March 1999 -0.004 0.002 0.007 
April 1999 -0.004 0.002 0.000 
May 1999 0.000 0.000 0.004 
June 1999 0.000 0.000 0.000 
July 1999 0.000 0.000 -0.005 
August 1999 -0.004 0.000 0.002 
September 1999 -0.004 0.001 0.006 
October 1999 0.000 0.000 0.004 
November 1999 -0.004 0.000 0.000 
December 1999 0.000 0.000 0.003 
January 2000 -0.009 0.000 0.007 
February 2000 0.004 0.000 -0.002 
March 2000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 
April 2000 -0.004 0.002 0.006 
May 2000 0.000 0.000 -0.008 
June 2000 0.004 0.001 -0.013 
July 2000 0.000 0.000 0.004 
August 2000 0.000 -0.001 0.004 
September 2000 -0.004 0.001 -0.006 
October 2000 -0.004 0.001 0.011 
November 2000 0.004 0.000 -0.007 
December 2000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
January 2001 0.000 -0.002 -0.005 
February 2001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 
March 2001 0.000 0.000 0.004 
April 2001 0.000 0.000 0.004 
May 2001 -0.004 0.001 0.001 
June 2001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
July 2001 -0.004 -0.001 0.003 
August 2001 0.000 -0.001 -0.005 
September 2001 -0.009 0.000 0.005 
October 2001 0.005 0.000 -0.001 
November 2001 -0.005 -0.003 0.000 
December 2001 0.014 0.000 0.002 
January 2002 0.000 0.001 0.001 
February 2002 0.000 0.000 0.001 
March 2002 0.004 0.001 -0.003 
April 2002 -0.004 0.002 0.003 
May 2002 -0.004 0.001 -0.006 
June 2002 0.004 0.000 -0.004 
July 2002 0.000 0.000 0.010 
Notes: This table presents first-differenced data on the UK trade in manufactures with the EU. Data on the 
aggregate Export Price Index (EPI) was obtained from the Monthly Review of External Trade Statistics 
provided by the Office for National Statistics. Data on the Producer Price Index (PPI) for the output of 
manufactured goods was retrieved from the PPI First Release 2005=100 by the Office for National Statistics. 
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BSEERI denotes Broad Sterling Effective Exchange Rate Index from the Financial Statistics Freestanding 
release by the Office for National Statistics. All variables have been log-transformed. 
 
Table 13 - PTM and ERPT in the LCP and PCP (Ch. 4) 
 
Case PTM ERPT 
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Notes: 1. This table displays the degrees of PTM and ERPT for two types of firm (i.e. Producer Currency 
Pricing and Local Currency Pricing) and two types of demand function, namely the demand with subsistence 
absorption (Eq.4, Ch.4) and the demand with no subsistence absorption. 2. PTM is computed as the elasticity 
of the export price with respect to the exchange rate, i.e. percentage change in the export price divided by the 
percentage change in the exchange rate. The ERPT represents the elasticity of the import price with respect to 
the exchange rate, i.e. proportionate change of the import price divided by the proportionate change of the 
exchange rate. 3. The functional forms of the export and import prices are derived using the optimal price 
mark-ups given in equations (39), (40) and (48) from Chapter 4. The optimal  mark-ups of price over the 
marginal cost are found by solving the firms’ profit maximization problems. 
 Table 14 – Calibration of the DSGE Model from Ch. 4 
 
Parameter Interpretation Value 
β Subjective factor for discounting future utility 0.9902 
δ Intertemporal elasticity of substitution in 
consumption 
2 
h Steady state share of time spent at work 0.2 
c*,c*
f
 Domestic and foreign subsistence consumption 0.064 
i*,i*
f
 Domestic and foreign subsistence investment 0.016 
η Elasticity of substitution across differentiated 
goods 
5.3 
σ Quarterly depreciation rate of capital 0.01 
α Elasticity of output with respect to capital 0.25 
(c*+i*)/(c+i) Domestic ratio of the aggregate subsistence 
demand to the aggregate demand  
0.3 
(c*
f
+i*
f
)/(c
f
+i
f
) Foreign ratio of the aggregate subsistence demand 
to the aggregate demand 
0.3 
Notes: This table summarizes the calibration of the parameters from the DSGE model of the time varying 
PTM and ERPT, which is derived in Chapter 4. It presents the values assigned to the parameters of the utility 
(Eq.1, Ch.4) and production (Eq.24, Ch.4) functions. These parameter values are used to simulate the 
response of the PCP and LCP mark-ups (Figures 26-29) to positive shocks to technology and preferences. 
Parameter calibration follows Ravn et al. (2006). 
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6.3 Figures 
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Notes: 1. This figure plots the  2F LR statistic (Eq.35, Ch.2) testing the null hypothesis that the observed 
threshold parameter value equals the true threshold. The excess of the statistic value over the critical value 
implies the rejection of the null hypothesis. 2. Commodity code 1124 denotes “Spirits (other than 51216); 
liqueurs” in the Standard International Trade Classification. 3. Commodity code 51216 refers to “Ethyl 
alcohol and other spirits, denatured” in the Standard International Trade Classification. 4. The horizontal line 
corresponds to the critical value for the  2F statistic at the 0.05 significance level. The set of  2F  
values lying above the horizontal line represents the asymptotic confidence interval for the threshold, i.e. the 
“no-rejection” region containing all threshold values that satisfy the null hypothesis.   
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Figure 2: Confidence Interval for the Threshold (1222)
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Notes: 1. This figure plots the  2F LR statistic (Eq.35, Ch.2) testing the null hypothesis that the observed 
threshold parameter value equals the true threshold. The excess of the statistic value over the critical value 
implies the rejection of the null hypothesis. 2. Commodity code 1222 denotes “Cigarettes containing 
tobacco” in the Standard International Trade Classification. 3. The horizontal line corresponds to the critical 
value for the  2F statistic at the 0.05 significance level. The set of  2F  values lying above the 
horizontal line represents the asymptotic confidence interval for the threshold, i.e. the “no-rejection” region 
containing all threshold values that satisfy the null hypothesis.   
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Figure 3: Confidence Interval for the Threshold (533)
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Notes: 1. This figure plots the  2F LR statistic (Eq.35, Ch.2) testing the null hypothesis that the observed 
threshold parameter value equals the true threshold. The excess of the statistic value over the critical value 
implies the rejection of the null hypothesis. 2. Commodity code 533 denotes “Pigments, paints, varnishes and 
related materials” in the Standard International Trade Classification. 3. The horizontal line corresponds to the 
critical value for the  2F statistic at the 0.05 significance level. The set of  2F  values lying above the 
horizontal line represents the asymptotic confidence interval for the threshold, i.e. the “no-rejection” region 
containing all threshold values that satisfy the null hypothesis.  
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Figure 4: Confidence Interval for the Threshold (6123)
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Notes: 1. This figure plots the  2F LR statistic (Eq.35, Ch.2) testing the null hypothesis that the observed 
threshold parameter value equals the true threshold. The excess of the statistic value over the critical value 
implies the rejection of the null hypothesis. 2. Commodity code 6123 denotes “Parts of footwear” in the 
Standard International Trade Classification. 3. The horizontal line corresponds to the critical value for 
the  2F statistic at the 0.05 significance level. The set of  2F values lying above the horizontal line 
represents the asymptotic confidence interval for the threshold, i.e. the “no-rejection” region containing all 
threshold values that satisfy the null hypothesis.  
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Figure 5: Confidence Interval for the Threshold (621)
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Notes: 1. This figure plots the  2F LR statistic (Eq.35, Ch.2) testing the null hypothesis that the observed 
threshold parameter value equals the true threshold. The excess of the statistic value over the critical value 
implies the rejection of the null hypothesis. 2. Commodity code 621 denotes “Materials of rubber (pastes, 
plates, sheets, etc.)” in the Standard International Trade Classification. 3. The horizontal line corresponds to 
the critical value for the  2F statistic at the 0.05 significance level. The set of  2F  values lying above 
the horizontal line represents the asymptotic confidence interval for the threshold, i.e. the “no-rejection” 
region containing all threshold values that satisfy the null hypothesis.  
  
235 
-0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3
0
5
10
15
20
25
Figure 6: Confidence Interval for the Threshold (6353)
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Notes: 1. This figure plots the  2F LR statistic (Eq.35, Ch.2) testing the null hypothesis that the observed 
threshold parameter value equals the true threshold. The excess of the statistic value over the critical value 
implies the rejection of the null hypothesis. 2. Commodity code 6353 denotes “Builders’ joinery and 
carpentry of wood” in the Standard International Trade Classification. 3. The horizontal line corresponds to 
the critical value for the  2F statistic at the 0.05 significance level. The set of  2F  values lying above 
the horizontal line represents the asymptotic confidence interval for the threshold, i.e. the “no-rejection” 
region containing all threshold values that satisfy the null hypothesis.  
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Figure 7: Confidence Interval for the Threshold (6421)
Threshold Parameter
L
ik
e
li
h
o
o
d
 R
a
ti
o
 
Notes: 1. This figure plots the  2F LR statistic (Eq.35, Ch.2) testing the null hypothesis that the observed 
threshold parameter value equals the true threshold. The excess of the statistic value over the critical value 
implies the rejection of the null hypothesis. 2. Commodity code 6421 denotes “Cartons, bags, other 
containers, of paper, paperback, etc.“ in the Standard International Trade Classification. 3. The horizontal 
line corresponds to the critical value for the  2F statistic at the 0.05 significance level. The set of 
 2F values lying above the horizontal line represents the asymptotic confidence interval for the threshold, 
i.e. the “no-rejection” region containing all threshold values that satisfy the null hypothesis.  
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Figure 8: Confidence Interval for the Threshold (678)
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Notes: 1. This figure plots the  2F LR statistic (Eq.35, Ch.2) testing the null hypothesis that the observed 
threshold parameter value equals the true threshold. The excess of the statistic value over the critical value 
implies the rejection of the null hypothesis. 2. Commodity code 678 denotes “Tubes, pipes and fittings, of 
iron or steel” in the Standard International Trade Classification. 3. The horizontal line corresponds to the 
critical value for the  2F statistic at the 0.05 significance level. The set of  2F values lying above the 
horizontal line represents the asymptotic confidence interval for the threshold, i.e. the “no-rejection” region 
containing all threshold values that satisfy the null hypothesis.  
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Figure 9: Confidence Interval for the Threshold (7525)
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Notes: 1. This figure plots the  2F LR statistic (Eq.35, Ch.2) testing the null hypothesis that the observed 
threshold parameter value equals the true threshold. The excess of the statistic value over the critical value 
implies the rejection of the null hypothesis. 2. Commodity code 7525 denotes “Peripheral units, including 
control and adapting units“ in the Standard International Trade Classification. 3. The horizontal line 
corresponds to the critical value for the  2F statistic at the 0.05 significance level. The set of  2F values 
lying above the horizontal line represents the asymptotic confidence interval for the threshold, i.e. the “no-
rejection” region containing all threshold values that satisfy the null hypothesis.  
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Figure 10: Confidence Interval for the Threshold (79312)
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Notes: 1. This figure plots the  2F LR statistic (Eq.35, Ch.2) testing the null hypothesis that the observed 
threshold parameter value equals the true threshold. The excess of the statistic value over the critical value 
implies the rejection of the null hypothesis. 2. Commodity code 79312 denotes “Sailboats, not inflatable, 
with auxiliary motor or not“ in the Standard International Trade Classification. 3. The horizontal line 
corresponds to the critical value for the  2F statistic at the 0.05 significance level. The set of  2F  
values lying above the horizontal line represents the asymptotic confidence interval for the threshold, i.e. the 
“no-rejection” region containing all threshold values that satisfy the null hypothesis.  
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Figure 11: Confidence Interval for the Threshold (84722)
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Notes: 1. This figure plots the  2F LR statistic (Eq.35, Ch.2) testing the null hypothesis that the observed 
threshold parameter value equals the true threshold. The excess of the statistic value over the critical value 
implies the rejection of the null hypothesis. 2. Commodity code 84722 denotes “Stockings, ankle-socks and 
the like” in the Standard International Trade Classification. 3. The horizontal line corresponds to the critical 
value for the  2F statistic at the 0.05 significance level. The set of  2F values lying above the horizontal 
line represents the asymptotic confidence interval for the threshold, i.e. the “no-rejection” region containing 
all threshold values that satisfy the null hypothesis.  
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Figure 12: Confidence Interval for the Threshold (89286)
Threshold Parameter
L
ik
e
li
h
o
o
d
 R
a
ti
o
 
Notes: 1. This figure plots the  2F LR statistic (Eq.35, Ch.2) testing the null hypothesis that the observed 
threshold parameter value equals the true threshold. The excess of the statistic value over the critical value 
implies the rejection of the null hypothesis. 2. Commodity code 89286 denotes “Trade advertising material, 
commercial catalogues, etc.” in the Standard International Trade Classification. 3. The horizontal line 
corresponds to the critical value for the  2F statistic at the 0.05 significance level. The set of  2F values 
lying above the horizontal line represents the asymptotic confidence interval for the threshold, i.e. the “no-
rejection” region containing all threshold values that satisfy the null hypothesis.  
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Figure 13  
 
 
Notes: 1. This figure displays the RMSFE (Eq.26b, Ch.3) from estimating the PTM model (Eq.23a, Ch.3) 
using split, rolling (Rol), recursive (Rec) and RWCTVP (TVP) regressions. A low RMSFE indicates a strong 
predictive power of a model. 2. The sample spans the period from January 1999 to April 2010. 3. Numbers 
along the horizontal axis indicate the level of product disaggregation as follows: 1 - Aggregate Series (total 
Manufactures), 2 - Food, 3 - Chemicals, 4 - Machinery, 5 - Electric Machinery, 6 - Clothing, 7 - Textile 
Fabrics, 8 - Road Vehicles, 9 - Paper and Paperboard, 10 - Miscellaneous Metal Manufactures, 11 - Wood  
and Cork Manufactures. 
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Figure 14 - Estimates of the PTM Parameters for Aggregate Series (Seasonally 
Unadjusted)  
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Notes: 1. This figure plots the coefficients on the past exchange rates, β5t and β6t, from the PTM model 
(Eq.23a, Ch.3). 2. The UK data on aggregate price indices of manufactured exports to the EU spans the 
period from January 1999 to April 2010. 3. First, the PTM coefficients are estimated using the first half of 
the sample. Second, the coefficients are updated for each subsequent period through a re-estimation using 
rolling (roll) and recursive (rec) regressions.  
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Figure 15 
 
 
Notes: 1. This figure displays the RMSFE (Eq.26b, Ch.3) from estimating the PTM model (Eq.23a, Ch.3) 
using split, rolling (rol), recursive (rec) and random walk coefficient time varying parameter  (TVP) 
regressions. A low RMSFE indicates a strong predictive power of the model. 2. Data on the UK export price 
indices has been seasonally adjusted according to the equation (30) from Chapter 3. The sample spans the 
period from January 1999 to April 2010. 3. Numbers along the horizontal axis indicate the level of product 
disaggregation as follows: 1 - Aggregate Series (total of Manufactures), 2 - Food, 3 - Chemicals, 4 -
Machinery, 5 - Electric Machinery, 6 - Clothing, 7 - Textile Fabrics, 8 - Road Vehicles, 9 - Paper and 
Paperboard, 10 -  Miscellaneous Metal Manufactures, 11 - Wood  and Cork Manufactures. 
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Figure 16 - Estimates of the PTM Parameters for Food (Seasonally Unadjusted) 
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Note: see note to Figure 25. 
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Figure 17 - Estimates of the PTM Parameters for Chemicals (Seasonally 
Unadjusted) 
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 Note: see note to Figure 25. 
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Figure 18 - Estimates of the PTM Parameters for Machinery (Seasonally 
Unadjusted) 
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Note: see note to Figure 25. 
 
Figure 19 - Estimates of the PTM Parameters for Electric Machinery (Seasonally 
Unadjusted)  
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 Note: see note to Figure 25. 
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Figure 20 - Estimates of the PTM Parameters for Clothing (Seasonally 
Unadjusted) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
 
 

5t
roll

5t
rec
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
 
 

6t
roll

6t
rec
 
Note: see note to Figure 25. 
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Figure 21 - Estimates of the PTM Parameters for Road Vehicles (Seasonally 
Unadjusted) 
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Note: see note to Figure 25. 
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Figure 22 - Estimates of the PTM Parameters for Paper and Paperboard 
(Seasonally Unadjusted) 
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Note: see note to Figure 25. 
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Figure 23 - Estimates of the PTM Parameters for Miscellaneous Metal 
Manufactures (Seasonally Unadjusted)  
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Note: see note to Figure 25. 
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Figure 24 - Estimates of the PTM Parameters for Wood and Cork Manufactures 
(Seasonally Unadjusted) 
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Note: see note to Figure 25. 
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Figure 25 - Estimates of the PTM Parameters for Textile Fabrics (Seasonally 
Unadjusted) 
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Notes: 1. Figures 16-25 plot the estimated coefficients on the past exchange rates, β5t and β6t , from the PTM 
model (Eq.23a, Ch.3). 2. Data on the UK export price indices for trade with the EU is disaggregated by 
product category and spans the period from January 1999 to April 2010. 3. First, the PTM parameters are 
estimated on the first half of the data sample. Second, the coefficients are updated for each subsequent period 
through a re-estimation using rolling (roll) and recursive (rec) regressions. 
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Figure 26 - Impulse Response of the Domestic LCP Mark-up to a Positive Shock 
to Domestic and Foreign Preferences 
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Notes: 1. Horizontal axis measures time in quarters. 2. Impulse responses represent percent deviations from 
steady state. 3. LCP mark-up (Eq.40, Ch.4) denotes the mark-up of price over the marginal cost under the 
local currency pricing. 4. Preference shock (Eq.1a, Ch.4) is modelled as a first-order autoregressive process 
with a persistence parameter of 0.9. 
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Figure 27 - Impulse Response of the Domestic PCP Mark-up to a Positive Shock 
to Foreign and Domestic Preferences  
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Notes: 1. Horizontal axis measures time in quarters. 2. Impulse responses represent percent deviations from 
steady state. 3. PCP mark-up (Eq.48, Ch.4) denotes the mark-up of price over the marginal cost under the 
producer currency pricing. 4. Preference shock (Eq.1a, Ch.4) is modelled as a first-order autoregressive 
process with a persistence parameter of 0.9. 
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Figure 28 - Impulse Response of the Domestic LCP Mark-up to a Positive Shock 
to Domestic and Foreign Technologies 
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Notes: 1. Horizontal axis measures time in quarters. 2. Impulse responses represent percent deviations from 
steady state. 3. LCP mark-up (Eq.40, Ch.4) denotes the mark-up of price over the marginal cost under the 
local currency pricing. 4. The logarithm of the technology shock, log At, is modelled as a first-order 
autoregressive process with a persistence parameter of 0.9.  
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Figure 29 - Impulse Response of the Domestic PCP Mark-up to a Positive Shock 
to Domestic and Foreign Technologies 
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Notes: 1. Horizontal axis measures time in quarters. 2. Impulse responses represent percent deviations from 
steady state. 3. PCP mark-up (Eq.48, Ch.4) denotes the mark-up of price over the marginal cost under the 
producer currency pricing. 4. The logarithm of the technology shock, log At, is modelled as a first-order 
autoregressive process with a persistence parameter of 0.9.  
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